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1 
Introduction 
1.1 Setting the scene 
Firms in general constantly face new challenges. Among industrial 
activities the oil refining and basic petrochemical industry are outstan-
ding examples of sectors, which have experienced a broad range of 
changes during the past decade. Former studies have revealed that 
particularly Western Europe has witnessed many adjustments in these 
industries (Molle 1988; Bacon 1990; Steenbakkers and Wever 1991). 
These adaptations have been brought about by developments both on 
the demand and supply side. Negative adaptations in the form of 
closures and contractions of firms, however, have clearly predomina-
ted investments. 
After the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979 demand for oil (products) 
fell substantially due to a considerable drop in energy consumption 
and the replacement of oil by other energy sources. Although to a 
somewhat lesser extent than the oil refining industry, the basic 
petrochemical industry has also faced a slack in demand since the 
mid-1970s. Nevertheless, in the immediate aftermath of these oil 
shocks, both industries showed reluctance to disinvest. Only after 
1980, owners of Western European oil refining and basic petroche-
mical production facilities realized that the overcapacity was of a 
structural nature. Since then, major restructuring has been in progress 
first by contraction of existing plants, but in the last few years even by 
complete closures. 
Note, though, that the reduction of refining capacity has especially 
occurred in primary distillation units. In the 1980-1990 period the 
Western European distillation capacity was reduced by about 34 
percent (Steenbakkers and Wever 1991). Conversion facilities and 
cracking units in particular, on the other hand, have gone through a 
period of investments. This has to do with a change in the composition 
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of demand for oil products towards middle and light distillates and 
away from the 'black end' of the barrel, e.g. heavy fuel oil. As a result, 
upgrading capacity of oil refineries has increased. The (catalytic) 
cracking capacity of the EC Member States almost doubled from 81 
Mt to 143 Mt between 1980 and 1988 (EC 1989, 32). 
Apart from the decline in demand of especially heavy fractions, 
changes on the supply side were also responsible for the increasing 
necessity for companies active in these fields to reduce existing surplus 
production capacity in Western Europe more rapidly during the last 
decade. Companies from oil producing countries, and principally 
those from OPEC states, increasingly challenge the required capacity 
of Western European production units, because of a growth of their 
exports of oil and even petrochemical products to Europe (Levy 1982, 
113; Auty 1984, 325; EC 1988, 28). 
All these changed features of the behaviour of oil and petrochemical 
product demand and supply, which have predominandy led to a period 
of high disinvestments but also of investments, have contributed to a 
reshuffling process among the companies involved in the oil refining 
and/or petrochemical industry on the Western European market. This 
reshuffling process reveals itself in the fluctuation of market shares of 
market parties, the companies engaged in one or both of these 
industries. Of course, this fluctuation regarding the market shares of 
these companies had already become noticeable, long before the oil 
shocks took place in the seventies. A reshuffling of some significance, 
however, has set in only after the eighties. Therefore, the develop-
ments on the Western European oil market since 1980 deserve special 
attention. In this period the Western European oil and (basic) petro-
chemical industry experienced many changes in the ownership struc-
ture of plants and, thus, of market shares of companies through 
takeovers, mergers, acquisitions and related activities of corporate 
.restructuring. Some of the companies, which were formerly active in 
these downstream activities, have even left Europe (almost) com-
pletely. In some cases, they have wholly or partly sold their production 
facilities to new entrants on the market, and especially to national oil 
companies from OPEC countries. In short, apart from the fact that 
companies have exited altogether from the Western European scene, 
new entrants have also appeared. 
The main focus of this study is thus on the reshuffling process among 
the participants on the Western European oil and (petrojchemical market 
primarily in the period following the oil shocks. Analysis of this reshuffling 
process and hence of the possible shifts in market position of the actors 
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involved enables us to establish whether the extent of market concen-
tration has increased or decreased considerably through time. In order 
to gain insight into this reshuffling process, the concepts market 
structure and market development, frequendy applied in industrial 
economics, can be regarded as keywords. In industrial economics the 
concept of market structure refers to the ways markets are organized. 
It points to the extent of interrelatedness of market participants in a 
particular industry and to the degree of market concentration. Thus, 
it may be depicted for instance as horizontally concentrated or 
vertically integrated. The market development can be denned as a 
process which is the result of the succession of different market 
situations. The market situation reflects the state of a particular product 
or industry at a certain moment or a short period of time resulting 
from both demand and supply aspects. Regarding the development of 
virtually every product and process a basic pattern of rise and fall can 
be found which is analogous to the processes of birth, growth and 
death of biological organisms. Kuznets (1930) and Burns (1934) 
incorporated the existence of this basic pattern within their product 
cycle concept. According to this product cycle model, individual 
products go through a development cycle, which consists of the 
following phases: a period of experimentation (introduction), a period 
of rapid growth (expansion), a period of diminished growth (stabili-
zation/saturation) and a period of decline (termination). Vernon 
(1966; 1971) has shown that the product life cycle concept can be 
expressed in spatial terms. He argued that as a particular product passes 
through the various stages of the life cycle, shifts concerning the 
location pattern of the industry involved are likely to emerge, because 
of changing factor requirements (e.g. technical and labour inputs). In 
practice, however, not only products and processes but also whole 
industries sometimes follow a path from birth to death and, thus, 
industry life cycles exist too (Kurth 1979). The notion of (industry) 
life cycle may be quite useful in understanding the major changes with 
respect to the market structure of the Western European oil refining 
and basic petrochemical industry and is, therefore, applied as an 
analytical tool in this study. 
The interrelation between the concepts market structure and 
market development has always been a central issue in industrial 
economics. However, in economic geography this relationship be-
tween the market structure of a particular industry and its market 
development and, with that, especially the possible influence of space 
on this relation has hardly been object of study. As McDermott and 
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Taylor (1982) have emphasized, industrial geography, and economic 
geography in general, has tended to view space as a discrete and 
disembodied variable somehow independent of the organizations that 
operate within it. On the other hand, industrial economics has almost 
ignored the impact of space on the above-mentioned relationship 
between market structure and market development. However, it is 
very reasonable to assume that space itself gives also direction to the 
possible changes which may occur regarding the organizational struc-
ture of a particular industry in the course of its development. Indeed, 
space may also affect the pattern generally observed of an industry's 
development. The spatial element has not to be considered as just an 
outcome of (dis)investment decisions of companies, but as one of the 
determining aspects behind them. The influence of the environment 
of organizations on organizational structures has been asserted by 
Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976), and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). In 
Massey's structural approach (Massey and Meegan 1979; Massey and 
Allen 1984) the one-sided stress put on spatial processes in geography 
and on economic processes in (industrial) economics, is criticized. 
Following this structural approach, this study is aimed at a synthesis of 
the spatial and the a-spatial, in which the assumption is made that a 
dynamic relationship exists between both elements (Massey and Allen 
1984, 107). 
Besides, it is acceptable that this dynamic interrelatedness not only 
can be found between market structure and market development on 
the one hand and space on the other, but also between the two first 
mentioned variables themselves. In accordance with the dynamic 
market theory of de Jong (1985; 1989a), it is assumed here that neither 
the market structure nor the market development forms the final 
determinant of the other. In a market economy, both of them can 
create a change of course for one another (de Jong 1985, 6). The 
, existence of a reciprocal relationship is hypothesized. Hence, it is 
supposed that each of the phases of market development mentioned 
above (introduction, expansion, stabilization/saturation, decline/ter-
mination) exercises an influence on the process of competition and on 
the concentration ratio in a particular sector in an economy charac-
terized by free play of demand and supply. This means that if in our 
case the oil refining and/or basic petrochemical industry in Western 
Europe which both obviously show features of such a competitive 
market (see Bacon 1990, 10), find themselves for instance in the 
stabilization phase, predominated by market saturation and overcapac-
ity of a structural nature, market pressures will wipe out this excess 
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capacity fairly rapidly. Especially inefficient firms, which are very often 
small and medium-sized as far as our sectors are concerned, are 
expected to be eliminated in this stage. The majority of the market 
shares in these sectors will fall more and more into the hands of a few 
large companies, and as a result, it is reasonable that the degree of 
market concentration in Western European oil refining and basic 
petrochemical industry will increase. At the same time, however, the 
observation has to be made that the market structure for its part also 
produces an effect on the course of the market development. As an 
example, if the oil industry is mainly controlled by powerful oligopo-
lists, which show a high degree of vertical integration due to their 
involvement in different successive stages of the production chain, and 
is confronted with a loss of profit in oil refining arising from a structural 
overcapacity, the possibility is offered to compensate for these losses 
by profits made in other related activities, such as the exploration and 
production of crude oil, the marketing of oil products or the manu-
facturing of petrochemicals. Therefore, with these cash flows from 
other sectors this oligopolistically structured market may be in a 
position to delay a move into the maturity phase of market develop-
ment regarding their oil refining activities. Indeed, disinvestments in 
the form of contractions and closures of production units, which are 
in the long run inevitable, may thus be postponed until later. 
With this background in mind, the major purpose of this study, then, 
is to check whether the developments, and particularly those after 
1980, in Western European oil refining and basic petrochemical 
industry have been in accordance with the behaviour normally ex-
pected of sectors bearing the features of a competitive market. Apart 
from this validity-seeking task (scientific evaluation and testing of a 
theoretical model), this study is aimed at providing industrial policy 
guidance concerning oil refining and basic petrochemical activities 
particularly at European Community level in order to preserve one of 
the most precious assets of the Western European economy: competi-
tive market structures. As Porter pointed out competition plays a 
crucial role in guaranteeing that individual companies or a whole 
sector can achieve competitive advantage (van Houtum 1991, 31). 
Recent trends towards co-operative agreements (e.g. strategic alliances 
in the form of joint ventures) mergers and acquisitions may have 
brought about a rigid situation concerning the fluidity of market shares 
among the participants involved. Generally, if the market shares of the 
same (groups of) firms do not change over time, it is an indication that 
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competition does not function well (de Jong 1988b, 2). By analyzing 
market shares and its variations, insight may be gained whether or not 
the present market structures in Western European oil refining and 
basic petrochemical industry are adequate — that is, whether the market 
organization among oil and (petro)chemical companies in Western 
Europe is sufficiendy competitive to generate performances conducive 
to the European society's welfare. Elucidation of this process of 
corporate restructuring in these sectors may give a stimulus primarily 
to the EC Commission of Energy Affairs to pursue a more vigilant 
competition policy by which mergers, acquisitions and related activi-
ties are more thoroughly monitored for their effects on the competi-
tiveness of the European market structures for the industries involved 
(Clarke 1985,35). Indeed, it is highly possible to identify a discrepancy 
between the EC policy based on the free-market philosophy and the 
market organization of oil and (petro)chemical compames in Western 
Europe (EC 1989, 34). Resulting from an increased EC integration, 
a tendency towards a dominant position of a few large producers is 
not unlikely to be perceived (de Wolf 1991, 25). 
Regarding the oil refining industry both crude distillation and, the 
secondary treatment, conversion, are dealt with in this study. Con-
version processes such as catalytic cracking and hydrocracking have 
obviously gained in importance both from the point of view of 
investments and production capacity in Europe in recent years (Bacon 
1990, 101). Analysis of the basic petrochemical industry is limited to 
production facilities of ethylene which is the most fundamental base 
chemical in terms of volume of production as well as importance of 
commodities derived from it. The focal position of ethylene crackers 
within the basic petrochemical industry, therefore, justifies to consider 
them as representative of the sector in general (Chapman 1991). 
Chapter 2 discusses the basic technological features of these industries 
and the most significant functional linkages (the material input-output 
relations) between them. Participation of a particular company in oil 
refining as well as basic petrochemical production is quite common 
on the Western European market. As a result, it is advisable to carry 
out an examination of the developments in these sectors in one and 
the same study. Misleading or at best incomplete results tend to emerge 
if these activities are analyzed independendy of each other. 
As has already been observed above, the oil refining and basic 
petrochemical industry in Western Europe obviously show the char-
acteristics of a competitive market. Firsdy, the number of market 
participants is quite large. Secondly, the main input and the main 
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output of both industries are actively traded in markets where pow-
erful forces of supply and demand are at work. 
Analysis of the general development of the Western European oil 
and basic petrochemical industry as a whole, however, does not shed 
light on the reshuffling process among the market participants men-
tioned earlier. In order to acquire knowledge about shifts in market 
shares of market parties, examination on a lower level of certain 
categories of companies will be necessary. All the market participants 
could be classified for instance on the basis of their ownership structure 
(e.g. the major oil companies, the state-controlled companies, the 
independent companies) or the geographical spread of their activities 
(global corporations, multinationals, multiregional firms). Analysis of 
changes in market concentration of these categories may disclose 
important divergences from this general pattern. Indeed, interesting 
differences in strategies of investment and disinvestment between 
(groups of) companies may be concealed by the postwar development 
of these sectors on an aggregated level. The degree of aggregation of 
research results is often too high. Especially in the case of the Western 
European oil refining and basic petrochemical industry results of 
aggregate analysis should be put into perspective by examining the 
strategic decisions made by the individual market participants involved 
in these activities. Therefore, as distinct from former studies which 
have abo dealt with the issue of the development of the Western 
European oil refining and basic petrochemical industry (Molle and 
Wever 1984; Molle 1988; Molle 1993), this study centres on the changes 
which have taken place concerning the relative positions of specific (groups of) 
owners of these production facilities in Western Europe particuhrly since the 
beginning of the eighties. It is particularly directed towards providing an 
insight into the way these separate (categories of) individual actors 
have shaped by means of their various strategies the general trend of 
these industries and, as a result, into the way shifts in ownership 
structure have led to an increase or a decrease in the level of market 
concentration of the Western European refinery and ethylene man-
ufacturing industry. Emphasis is thus placed on the alterations which 
have come about in the ownership structure of production facilities 
of the sectors under consideration. On the basis of the information on 
the ownership structure of these plants and with the help of production 
capacity figures the market position of all actors separately is established 
at several moments in time. 
As the main framework of analysis, the dynamic market approach of 
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de Jong (1985) is applied. In this approach the different phases of the 
industry life cycle are linked to concentration ratios on the market of 
a particular sector. According to this dynamic market theory, it is 
assumed that in a market economy growing sectors show in general a 
declining degree of market concentration. Stagnating and contracting 
sectors, on the other hand, display growing concentration. 
The development of both the Western European oil refining and 
basic petrochemical industry as a whole and the classified companies 
involved in these activities is analyzed on the basis of secondary, factual 
data. The bulk of the primary data are gathered through face-to-face 
personal interviews carried out with upper-level management from 
the department of strategy integration and (corporate) planning of the 
Western European headquarters of several oil and chemical compa-
nies. The qualitative information thus obtained will be used to 
supplement and explain the secondary research material. 
1.2 Research questions 
In seeking to attain the principal objective of this book set out above 
— that is, testing whether the theoretical pattern of sectoral develop-
ment also exists in reality — the following central question is addressed: 
Which changes have taken place in the level of market concentration in the 
Western European oil refining and ethylene manufacturing sector as a whole? 
Which shifts have been occurring in the market position of (categories of) 
companies within both sectors particularly since the oil crises of the seventies, 
which have led to the structural changes observed in the two industries? What 
are the main explanations f or these changes and especially those theoretically 
unexpected? 
Before working out this central question into several sub-questions, 
an important marginal note has to be made. 
It has to be taken into account thoroughly that particularly in this 
study the Western European market cannot be approached as a closed, 
self-contained system. Especially regarding oil refining and basic 
petrochemical production a broader perspective than the Western 
European one has to be adopted. A proper appreciation of shifts in the 
ownership structure of Western European oil refining and basic 
petrochemical production units would be incomplete without gaining 
insight into the global trends in these sectors. Consideration of the 
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developments on the world oil and petrochemical market is necessary, 
because of the fact that many of the Western European firms belong 
to a multinational (i.e. also operative outside Western Europe) or even 
a global corporation. A closure or contraction of a Western European 
production unit may be the result of an investment decision made by 
the corporation outside Europe. Consequendy, the competitive po-
sition of these firms in Western Europe may be significandy affected 
by their position elsewhere in the world (Stobaugh 1988, 2). Yet, 
recognition of the need to incorporate a global perspective into our 
analysis does not only stem from the phenomenon that many firms 
are part of a corporate manufacturing system with a global scope of 
operations. Trends on the world oil market also deserve attention in 
this study as a result of the fact that Western Europe is highly 
dependent on imports of crude oil from other parts of the world and 
primarily from Middle Eastern OPEC countries. Besides, with regard 
to national oil companies from OPEC countries a grown involvement 
in the manufacturing of oil products can be observed both in their 
own country and in Western Europe since the last decade. This latter 
tendency in particular may give rise to a further reshuffling concerning 
the ownership of Western European oil refining and basic petrochemi-
cal production faculties in favour of this category of companies as they 
feel supported by their hold on major world oil supplies (Turner and 
Bedore 1979, 3). 
In short, in this study it is assumed that the general trend which can 
be discerned on the world oil and basic petrochemical market and, 
therefore, on a macro-economic level for these industries as a whole 
determines to a high extent their development on a lower geographic 
scale: for example, Western Europe or a particular petrochemical 
complex. This assumption is based on Massey's structural approach 
(Massey and Allen 1984). It is reasonable to expect that these processes 
on a macro-economic level will become even more important in the 
near future, on account of the policy of the European Community 
which is aimed at removing the still existing barriers to trade (EC 1988, 
31). Thus, the global trends in oil refining and basic petrochemical 
industry will be broadly outlined in chapter 5. 
To address the broad research question as formulated above, we need 
to answer some more specific research questions: 
1. What is the outcome of the investment behaviour of producers 
operative in the oil refining and basic petrochemical industry on a 
worldwide scale? What is the relative position of Western Europe 
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in total world oil and petrochemical production? What are the 
sources underlying the recent global shifts in the oil refining and 
basic petrochemical sector? 
2. Which interrelationship can be found between the various stages 
of sectoral development and the market structure of a sector in 
general and of the Western European oil refining and basic petro-
chemical industry in particular? 
3. What are the effects of the ownership structure of the Western 
European oil refining and basic petrochemical facilities, and recent 
changes in that, on the level of market concentration in our sectors? 
4. What are the consequences of the various strategies pursued by 
(groups of) individual firms active in these industries for their 
relative competitiveness? What are the implications of the invest-
ment/disinvestment decisions of actors engaged in these lines of 
business for the trend in production capacity in Western Europe? 
1.3 Overview of the study 
In order to gain insight into recent market developments in Western 
European oil refining and basic petrochemical industry, it is necessary 
to be acquainted with the main characteristics of the companies 
involved in these sectors. Chapter 2 concentrates, therefore, on the 
most distinctive features of the oil and (basic) petrochemical industry. 
Concepts derived from industrial location theory and from industrial 
economic literature pass in review. This chapter focuses on the 
tendency of oil refineries and basic petrochemical industry to be 
clustered spatially. The discussion of this spatial concentrated location 
pattern brings up the concepts 'complex' and 'formation'. The inter-
wovenness of complexes and formations found in practice leads to the 
presentation of a continuum of both concepts. Investigating the main 
determinants behind the formation and foundation of (petro) chemical 
complexes the following issues are touched upon. First of all the cost 
savings are treated which accrue from increasing industrial agglomera-
tion, the so-called agglomeration economies. One of the sources of 
cost savings, the transfer economies, which are the result of a minimi-
zation of distance between closely interrelated plants, diverts our 
attention to the nature of the materials exchanged between oil 
refineries, basic petrochemical industry and their processing units. The 
technical linkages (the material input-output relations) existing be-
tween the main stages of the production processes intensifies the 
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necessity to aim for transfer-cost benefits by the companies active in 
these industries once more. Thus, attention is paid briefly to the basic 
technological features of oil refining and petrochemical industry. Last 
but not least chapter 2 elaborates another essential characteristic of 
these industries, namely vertical integration. Vertical integration, 
which concerns a wholly or partly incorporation of the activities of 
supplier firms (backward integration) and/or customer firms (forward 
integration) within the manufacturing process of a company's organi-
zation, may have great significance for the market position of the 
companies involved, as it may yield cost efficiencies, the so-called 
economies of scope. In discussing vertical integration, these cost 
savings which may be derived from this strategy, are also touched 
upon. 
Chapter 3 adopts a dynamic perspective regarding vertical integra-
tion and other forms in which the market structure may appear. In 
the light of this the dynamic market theory of de Jong (1985) is taken 
as a structuring guide. Drawing up the outlines of this dynamic market 
model a reflection results on the applicability of this theory to explain 
adequately the reshuffling process mentioned above among companies 
involved in oil refining and/or petrochemical production activities on 
the Western European market. Viewed within the context of some 
other approaches regarding industrial organization and industrial lo-
cation founded in industrial economics and economic geography 
respectively, possible shortcomings of de Jong's dynamic market 
model are revealed. In the final section of chapter 3 hypotheses are 
advanced taking into consideration the theories expounded. Chapter 
4 deals with the methodological aspects of the research. Chapter 5 
centres on the major global trends which these sectors have shown 
particularly since the last decades. Our concern in this chapter is with 
the recent shifts which have come about in the competitive position 
of Western Europe relative to other world regions with respect to oil 
refining (i.e. primary distillation) and basic petrochemical production 
(i.e. ethylene manufacture). Chapter 6 proceeds to extensively exam-
ine and explain the development of both the Western European oil 
refining and basic petrochemical industry as a whole and the catego-
rized companies involved in these activities with the help of the 
dynamic market model of de Jong as the main theoretical framework 
of analysis. Chapter 6 actually tests this theory. Possible discrepancies 
between theory and practice are pointed out and clarified here. This 
chapter focuses particularly on possible difFerences in investment 
behaviour between (groups of) companies operative in the lines of 
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Figure 1.1 Structure of research 
business studied. Apart from secondary data, we make use of material 
from our own in-depth research among some producers whose 
strategic decision making is investigated more closely. The most 
significant conclusions and interpretations are summarized in chapter 
7. There, also account is given of the prospects for the near future 
with respect to the market structure and market development of the 
oil refining and basic petrochemical industry on the Western European 
market. Figure 1.1 provides the structure to this book. 
2 
Oil refining and Petrochemical 
Industry: Some Central Concepts 
2.1 Introduction 
To many people, the phrase 'oil refining and petrochemical industry' 
is immediately associated with 'multi-product marketing system', 'oil 
producing country cartel', 'global market of trade' and so on. These 
descriptions point to a high degree of complexity involved in beco-
ming acquainted with these sectors and their market behaviour in 
particular. This complexity can be attributed to the heterogeneous 
character of the companies active in oil and petrochemical manufac-
ture. At first sight the organization of oil refining and petrochemical 
industry looks like a tangled ball of string. In order to reduce the 
obscurities which may accompany these sectors, the objective of this 
chapter is to disentangle some of the strands. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the market participants engaged in these activities display diversity 
especially regarding aspects such as the structure of ownership of 
production facilities controlled by them (e.g. state-owned companies 
versus (independent) private producers) or their geographical scope of 
organization (e.g. global versus national production), traces of homo-
geneity can also be observed. Turning to the spatial organization of 
these sectors in particular, homogeneity clearly prevails over hetero-
geneity. Various studies which have focused on the location pattern 
of the oil refining and petrochemical industry, have revealed that these 
industries tend to be physically associated as a result of direct interde-
pendence (Chapman 1970; 1973; 1974; Wever 1974; Molle and 
Wever 1984; Molle 1993). On the basis of this finding, the conclusion 
was drawn that petrochemical and oil refining operations are quite 
often part of a spatially integrated industrial system, a so-called 
petrochemical complex. Examination of the main determinants which 
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encourage the formation and establishment of such a localized man-
ufacturing system made up of interacting parts may be considered as 
crucial for gaining an understanding of some basic characteristics of 
these sectors in general. Without doubt, by outlining these determi-
ning aspects the aforementioned complexity regarding the way oil and 
petrochemical production is organized will be reduced to some extent. 
Thus this chapter seeks to elaborate factors like agglomeration econo-
mies, the basic technical features of oil refining and petrochemical 
production processes, the nature of the materials exchanged and 
vertical integration. Apart from agglomeration economies, attention 
is also devoted to economies of scope. Although these scope econo-
mies do not offer an explanation for the maintenance and (continued) 
existence of a petrochemical complex, the cost savings involved may 
not be neglected. As some of the actors engaged in oil and/or 
petrochemical manufacturing belong to multiproduct organizations, 
these economies may be of vital importance and may influence their 
market position in the industries in question. 
Yet only if notice is taken of the following can the above-men-
tioned facets be considered properly. None of these aspects, and 
therefore the phenomenon 'petrochemical complex' itself, can be 
dissociated from the strategies and structure of the companies involved. 
Indeed, the companies which take part in oil and/or petrochemical 
production eventually decide whether or not to enter into, continue 
or intensify relationships with other firms. So, petrochemical com-
plexes have to be approached as artefacts which are created by the 
strategies of corporate manufacturing entities. Their strategies give 
meaning to the notion of 'spatially clustered oil-based system'. The 
strategies and structure of the companies active in Western European 
oil refining and/or (basic) petrochemical production, however, are 
under discussion in chapter 6. 
With this short comment in mind, the phenomenon 'petrochemi-
cal complex' is dealt with now. Before going into the aspects men-
tioned above, first of all, the concepts of complex and formation, 
which are inextricably bound up with each other, are defined. It is 
found that sometimes it is very difficult to make a clear distinction 
between these two concepts. In practice it seems to be possible that 
the one can evolve into the other (Kramer 1990, 70). This can be 
explained in more detail by taking the oil and petrochemical complex 
in the port of Rotterdam as an example. 
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2.2 Complex and formation: the intertwining o f both 
concepts 
The distribution over space of industry is clustered rather than 
dispersed. This generalization receives support from various theories, 
such as the industrial complex theories of Chardonnet (1953) and Isard 
et al. (1959) and the cumulative causation theory of Myrdal (1955). 
In economic geography and regional economy several concepts have 
been developed in order to express and explain this spatial concentra-
ted location pattern of economic activities. The notions of 'associa-
tion', 'activity family', 'filière', 'formation' and 'complex' all seek to 
embrace the found concentration of organizations in general and of 
manufacturing operations in particular. This study confines itself, 
however, to the two last-mentioned concepts 'complex' and 'forma-
tion'. For a description and elaboration of the terms 'association', 
'activity family' and 'filière' can be referred to Potters (1979), Bak 
(1982) and Boulianne and Maillet (1984) respectively. 
Underlying this limitation is the fact that among the notions 
mentioned earlier complex and formation have taken shape most 
definitely especially as regards the possibility to make them opera-
tional. Moreover, only the concept of complex attributes an overrid-
ing importance to input-output relations directed vertically between 
the production units engaged in the successive stages of the production 
chain as an explanation for the maintenance and (continued) existence 
of the spatial clustering of economic activities. It is exactly this vertical 
relatedness which forms an outstanding characteristic of the oil and 
petrochemical business. 
In Dutch and German economic-geographical literature the con-
cept of complex is inextricably linked with the formation concept. 
Kramer (1986; 1988; 1990) even regards the notion of formation as a 
'collecting', 'container' or 'umbrella' concept. From an epistemologi-
cal point of view complexes are actually a type of formation. Kramer 
(1990) divides the latter concept into two sub-groups, namely 'pure' 
formations and complexes. Indeed, in both cases ('pure' formations 
and complexes) the spatial clustering of firms and institutions is 
brought about by their common orientation on one or more produc-
tion environmental aspects. The recognition that direct, commercial 
linkages with suppliers and/or customers, which may explain the 
locational choice of companies in complexes, have in fact also to be 
considered as a component of a production environment supports this 
remark (Jansen and de Smidt 1974; Lambooy 1980). In theory, the 
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only feature which enables us to distinguish complexes from 'pure' 
formations and legitimizes a distinction between these two types 
within the formation concept is whether direct or indirect relations 
between business organizations are predominant in the industrial 
agglomeration. This criterion provides the sole yardstick against which 
both concepts can be used properly. Thus, the concepts 'pure' 
formation and complex can be defined as follows: 
'Pure'formation 
A 'pure' formation encompasses business organizations clustered in 
a limited spatial area between which interrelations are mainly 
indirect. The prime motive which fosters the geographical associa-
tion of these firms has therefore to be sought in their common 
attachment to one or more dominant location factors within the 
production environment. Note, though, that the relationship be-
tween most of these production units and the location ractor(s) to 
which they are orientated (e.g. an airport in an airport formation, 
a harbour in a seaport formation, a labour market in a textile 
formation etc.) is and remains principally indirect. 
Complex 
To apply the concept of complex a prevalence of direct linkages 
between plants is a prerequisite. Direct relations here, both of a 
tangible and non-tangible nature, are the main motive behind the 
spatial cohesion. The location pattern of most of the companies 
engaged in this agglomeration is ultimately based upon the (con-
tinued) existence of these direct relations. In contrast to 'pure' 
formations, these companies form an organizational network, a 
production environment, with which they show a direct intercon-
nectedness. 
Yet the distinction thus drawn immediately raises the question wheth-
er such a clear-cut dichotomy can also be observed in practice. 
Occurrence of direct as well as indirect relations in most of these 
spatially concentrated industrial networks casts doubt on the validity 
of a conceptualization of both phenomena in such a strict form as 
outlined above. Consequendy, it has to be emphasized that both types 
of the formation concept are not mutually exclusive. The distinction 
made between 'pure' formation and complex is not an absolute one. 
In this context, Kramer (1990) has even suggested the existence of a 
formation-complex continuum. According to this continuum, it is 
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pure formations 
* 
equal representation oí characteristics 
of both types 
± 
pure complexes 
Figure 2.1 Formation-complex continuum 
Source: Kramer (1990, 70) 
possible that a pure formation evolves into a complex in the course of 
time. Indirect relations between plants and institutions, characteristic 
of a formation, are replaced more and more by direct linkages. Of 
course, the opposite can take place too: the direct relations between 
production units cease to exist, by which a complex gradually develops 
into a formation. 
The formation-complex continuum, represented by figure 2.1, may 
be best understood by considering the development of a particular 
complex or formation as an example. The gradual transition which 
the petrochemical complex in the port of Rotterdam has experienced 
throws some light on this model. Apparently, in this case an evolution 
has taken place from a formation into a complex. Molle and Wever's 
study (1984) provides evidence for this statement. A large number of 
plants which currently belong to the petrochemical complex chose 
Rotterdam as a location for their operations first and foremost because 
of its favourable geographical position regarding the Western Euro-
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pean market. So, many of the linkages of especially oil refineries, 
storage and transshipment companies, which are looked upon as 
complex relations at the moment, came into being a long time after 
these firms had been situated in Rotterdam. The preference of these 
companies for Rotterdam was therefore not based on already existing 
direct relations with other production units. From this, it can be 
deduced that over the years the petrochemical complex has absorbed 
an ever growing part of the wider port formation of Rotterdam. 
Thus given the possibility that with the passage of time direct 
relations may take the place of indirect linkages and vice versa, it is 
not unreasonable to regard drawing up the outlines of a complex 
sharply as a rather complicated task. Little imagination is required to 
understand that every delimitation of a complex from its broader 
surroundings is a product of time. Especially organizational changes 
(e.g. the fact that production faculties which belong to a complex 
change hands) may alter the structure and extent of such a concen-
trated network of interlinked firms and, hence, imply a spatial process. 
Viewed within the context of a petrochemical complex, the problem 
which has to be dealt with in outlining it is even further aggravated. 
This can be attributed to the misleading adjective 'petrochemical'. In 
order to clarify this, the petrochemical complex of Rotterdam is used 
as an example once more (see also Isard et al. 1959, 33). 
Within the complex many production units of chemicals such as 
chlorine, oxygen, caustic soda, ammonia and sulphuric acid are 
represented. Although these products do not belong to the petro-
chemicals, they still have to be considered as a part of the complex. 
The intermediates they produce form important and necessary inputs 
for the manufacture of many petrochemicals and, as a result, they are 
very important suppliers for the petrochemical industry. From this 
point of view, it is clear that a petrochemical complex has to be looked 
at in a wide perspective. At the same time, however, the question 
arises as to what extent it is justified to include non-petrochemical 
firms. Do companies which obtain only chemical raw materials such 
as hydrogen and chlorine like Brinkers Margarine Fabrieken and 
Herbicide Chemie, for example, or shipyards which build tankers for 
the transportation of chemicals or LNG/LPG also have to be counted 
as part of the complex? Evidendy, in this situation drawing a boundary 
between the petrochemical complex and its broader (chemical) setting 
becomes quite difficult. 
Despite the fact that adoption of the concept of complex certainly 
brings up complications, it still deserves to play a role as a key concept 
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in this study. Previous studies which have already submitted the 
complex concept to a closer examination, have demonstrated that its 
weaknesses are likely to be more than offset by the valuable insights 
it may provide (Wever 1974; Cardol 1988; Kramer 1990). To get most 
benefit from this concept, however, insight is presumed into the main 
determinants behind this phenomenon. For that reason, the sub-
sequent division of this chapter is mainly based on aspects which are 
expected to be of great importance for encouraging the formation and 
foundation of a (petro)chemical complex. Centripetal forces such as 
agglomeration economies, the nature of materials exchanged and 
vertical integration are discussed. 
2.3 Agglomeration economies 
Although it seems to be quite difficult to verify exacdy their existence 
and to measure their extent, there is no doubt that agglomeration 
economies are a basic mechanism in the formation and foundation of 
industrial agglomerations in general and petrochemical complexes in 
particular. As industries seek to achieve cost savings from the begin-
ning of their commercial life, it is plausible that their attempt in doing 
so finds expression in their location pattern. The general preference 
of manufacturing to participate in focal or clustered spatial arrange-
ments pointed out above suggests that agglomeration facilitates the 
acquisition of a particular kind of economy, notably scale economies, 
to those involved. Former studies which have dealt with the issue of 
agglomeration economies within petrochemical complexes in particu-
lar, have emphasized that especially production units engaged in oil 
refining and basic petrochemical production are sensitive to scale 
economies which are offered in such an oil-based industrial agglom-
eration (Chapman 1973, 1191; Molle and Wever 1984). Clearly, 
viewed at a national scale these economies of agglomeration even 
impose a restraint on most individual firms to disperse spatially. The 
importance of agglomeration economies for the development of the 
oil refining and basic petrochemical industry is hardly surprising, if 
account is taken of the capital-intensive production process involved 
in manufacturing basic intermediates and bulk chemicals. This is 
further reinforced by the fact that technological monopolies which 
may be initially enjoyed by the companies active in these sectors are 
usually short-lived, because their products become mostly standard-
ized soon after their introduction on the market. In highlighting the 
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key role of this phenomenon as an agglomerative force and particularly 
its significance for the oil refining and basic petrochemical industry's 
development, the question is inevitably brought up what is meant by 
the notion of'agglomeration economies'. So far this notion has been 
used, without bothering about its definition. 
Actually, it was Alfred Weber (1909) who focused attention on this 
phenomenon and who introduced the 'agglomeration economies' 
concept in literature. Weber defined agglomeration economies as scale 
economies external to the individual production units which are 
obtained as a result of their particular locational association with a 
larger-scale spatial cluster of economic activities. According to this 
definition the source of agglomeration economies is explicidy and 
principally spatial. The concept of agglomeration economies is thus 
restricted to external economies and refers to cost savings which accrue 
to firms and other economic activities at second-hand. This implies 
that these cost economies are derived without necessarily raising their 
own scale of production, but are merely gained from the fact that 
production units take part in the process of spatial clustering. 
These external economies of scale can be distinguished from the 
so-called internal economies of scale. In contrast to the former, these 
economies are obtained by a plant internally resulting from its own 
efforts by producing at larger volumes. The classification thus made 
into these two types of scale economies has a wide currency in 
economic geographic literature. This distinction between internal and 
external economies of scale is quite convenient, if the following is kept 
in mind. Of course, whether economies of scale have to be considered 
as internal or external depends first of all on the fact from which 
production system (e.g. an individual production unit, a sector as a 
whole, a petrochemical complex) these economies are looked at. If, 
for example, an agglomeration is especially made up of small-sized 
plants whose activities are highly specialized and under separate 
ownership, it is likely the economies are mosdy external for the 
individual units involved in it. 
Furthermore, in accordance with Lambooy's (1981) argument it 
needs to be stressed that external and internal economies do certainly 
not have a static nature. In the course of time external economies may 
evolve into internal economies, for example, through merger or as a 
result of the fact that facilities formerly supplied by other companies 
in the agglomeration become internalized. In this respect it is worth 
noting that particularly companies active in oil refining and basic 
petrochemical industry in Western European petrochemical com-
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plexes have experienced this development. But, obviously the oppo-
site may also happen, that is, external economies replace internal ones. 
Turning our attention again to Weber's definition of agglomeration 
economies, it is remarkable that only external economies of scale are 
incorporated. By contrast, internal scale economies are excluded. 
Some other writers who have laboured in this field, have also identified 
agglomeration economies with external economies (Isard 1975; Lam-
booy 1981). In view of the fact that these studies have tended to focus 
principally on companies at the smaller end of the plant size spectrum, 
this should not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, it should be clear that 
such a limitation is difficult to maintain in the context of oil and 
(petro)chemical companies, as many of them play a prominent role in 
the top rank of the world's largest businesses. Considering the actors 
engaged in these sectors, it is not very wise to approach the phenome-
non of agglomeration economies exclusively in terms of external 
economies. It is undeniable, that the oil refining and basic petrochemi-
cal industry also gain cost savings as a result of opportunities offered 
within oil-based industrial complexes which are external to the 
individual companies involved. The availability of a wide range of 
specialized services, for example, those associated with repair as well 
as storage and transport facilities and with the disposal of waste 
products which may be provided more cost-efFectively within a major 
petrochemical complex, deserves to be mentioned in this respect. But, 
as Chapman argues (1973; 1991), the companies active in these fields 
especially reap the benefit of internal economies of scale. The trend 
indicated above that previously external economies of scale have been 
more and more internalized within the corporations operative in 
Western European petrochemical complexes underscores the impor-
tance of this category of economies. It is easy to appreciate that in oil 
refining and basic petrochemical industry particularly the efforts to 
exploit economies of scale via an increase in the size of individual 
production units tend to encourage further agglomeration in massive 
petrochemical complexes. In seeking to achieve these cost savings the 
companies involved prefer to realize additional production capacity at 
already existing rather than greenfield production sites. Especially in 
this way geographical inertia is fostered. 
Note that in case of our sectors which show a high degree of 
technological as well as commercial interwovenness not only the 
realization of external economies but also of internal economies 
requires that a production unit is located in close spatial proximity to 
other activities. Here, it implies a location pattern in the vicinity of 
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plants engaged in related upstream activities (suppliers) and/or down-
stream activities (customer firms) with sufficient production capacity. 
Because of the fact that within most petrochemical complexes ethyl-
ene cracking facilities form the nucleus the following should be taken 
into account. It is evident that for these production units in particular 
gaining fully of potential internal economies of scale calls for neigh-
bouring oil refining units on the input side and consuming plants on 
the output side whose production capacity is more or less attuned to 
the ethylene crackers' demand of raw material and its supply of basic 
chemicals respectively. A dispersed location pattern of these plants 
which are interlinked in the petrochemical production chain would 
certainly partly nullify the internal economies of scale enjoyed by the 
companies involved as a result of increased transport costs thus 
incurred. 
By stressing the importance of primarily internal scale economies 
as an agglomerative force for the sectors in question, we become aware 
that Weber's definition of agglomeration economies needs to be 
broadened in this study. Adopting a wider interpretation of this 
phenomenon, the concept agglomeration economies can be defined 
as follows: 
Agglomeration economies 
The notion of agglomeration economies embraces all scale econo-
mies and increased profits which can be achieved by economic 
activities involved in concentrated production irrespective of the 
level on which agglomeration takes place (e.g. a single large-sized 
production unit or a cluster of firms and institutions in a confined 
geographic area as a whole). 
Defined in this way, the following four types of agglomeration 
economies can be distinguished: 
1. Internal economies of scale that accrue to plants when the average 
cost of production is lowered as the rate of production increases. 
2. Juxtaposition economies that result from placing in close proximity 
different, but economically linked activities. These economies are 
also defined as transfer economies. Transport costs are reduced, 
when successive vertical stages of production are located adjacently. 
3. Localization economies which can be obtained when similar pro-
duction units converge in a limited spatial area. 
4. Urbanization economies which are offered when essentially dis-
similar establishments agglomerate as a result of common locational 
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requirements (e.g. specialized services such as waste disposal facili­
ties, repair facilities, technological services etc.). In contrast to the 
above-mentioned classes of agglomeration economies, urbaniza­
tion economies may be obtained by all economic activities in an 
agglomeration. 
In terms of the classification made above into external and internal 
economies of scale, particularly the two last-named economies may 
be external to the individual oil refining or petrochemical production 
unit, because these cost savings are often derived from scale factors 
operating outside themselves. The foregoing consideration that the 
companies active in the sectors in question mainly take advantage of 
internal scale economies, justifies a further elaboration of the former 
two classes. On the basis of the fact that within Western Europe in 
general and within Western European petrochemical complexes in 
particular virtually all transfers of important intermediates such as 
ethylene are internal to integrated companies, it is reasonable to regard 
also transfer economies as internal economies (Chapman 1991, 136). 
Looking now more closely at the former type of agglomeration 
economies, the internal economies of scale gained at plant level, the 
following points have to be made. By using now the Western 
European oil refining and basic petrochemical industry (considering 
ethylene crackers representative for this sector) as an example, an 
illustration can be offered of the extent in which the companies 
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Figure 2.2 Average production capacity of oil refineries (primary distilh-
tion) in Western Europe, 1950-1990 (Mt/year) 
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involved have sought to attain this goal. Previous studies have ob-
served that the average size of the production capacity of these sectors 
has clearly seen an increase since their appearance on the Western 
European market (Molle and Wever 1984; Chapman 1991; Steen-
bakkers 1991). Figure 2.2 and figure 2.3 plot the general trend 
regarding the average production capacity of oil refining units and 
ethylene cracking facilities in the 1950-1990 period and in the 
1960-1990 period respectively. 
Drawing a parallel between both sectors, it is noticeable that the 
general development of the size of the plants has virtually been the 
same, provided that the average production capacity of ethylene 
crackers is obviously lower. Figure 2.2 illustrates that the average 
production capacity of oil refining units increased from 0.6 million 
tonnes in 1950 to 6.5 million tonnes in 1990. Between 1960 and 1990, 
the average capacity of Western European ethylene crackers rose from 
46,000 tonnes a year to about 365,000 tonnes (figure 2.3). In this 
period the number of production units of ethylene increased threefold, 
production capacity, however, more than 20-fold. The increase in the 
volume of production of these sectors has mainly been achieved by 
extending existing plants rather than by creating new units. This bears 
witness to the observation made earlier that this method of internal 
growth has enjoyed most popularity among the companies involved. 
Both figure 2.2 and figure 2.3 reveal that the trend towards ever larger 
I960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Figure 2.3 Average production capacity of ethylene crackers in Western 
Europe, 1960-1990 (1,000 t/year) 
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individual units even continued during the seventies, although the 
demand for heavy oil products in particular and to a somewhat lesser 
extent ethylene declined. Consequendy, an overcapacity of a struc-
tural nature had inevitably to be encountered by the companies active 
in these sectors. It is quite apparent, that at the beginning of the eighties 
this overcapacity gave rise to a reversed development concerning the 
average size of Western European oil refining, whereas the plant size 
of basic petrochemical production units increased slightly. This is due 
to the fact that between 1980 and 1985 the overcapacity in Western 
European ethylene crackers was mainly reduced at the expense of 
small-sized units. In the oil refining industry, on the other hand, 
especially the medium-sized plants were rationalized by contractions 
and to a somewhat lesser extent by closures (Steenbakkers and Wever 
1991, 71). However, after 1985 oil refineries, like ethylene crackers, 
achieved a further decrease of their surplus production capacity mainly 
by closing small firms. Since then, the manufacture of oil products as 
well as basic petrochemicals has principally fallen into the hands of 
medium- and large-sized production units — a trend which is mirrored 
in an increase of the average size of plants in both sectors once again 
(figure 2.2 and figure 2.3). 
As can be expected in the case of the oil refining and basic 
petrochemical industry, implicit in obtaining internal economies of 
scale at plant level are increasing transport volumes. In order to 
economize on transfer costs, the separate production units linked 
direcdy in the petrochemical processing chain prefer to be situated in 
one another's vicinity. Therefore, along with internal economies of 
scale, transfer economies which result from spatial juxtaposition of oil 
refining and petrochemical manufacturing activities have also led to 
the establishment and formation of petrochemical complexes. Accord-
ing to Chapman (1991), the concentrated spatial form of oil-based 
industrial complexes is even essentially based upon these transfer 
economies. Indeed, the minimization of distance between these 
closely interrelated plants based on material flows brings about high 
transfer-cost benefits for the companies involved. Especially for the 
basic petrochemical industry (ethylene crackers in particular) the 
location in the neighbourhood of its suppliers and customers is highly 
attractive from a viewpoint of transport costs. 
Apart from these transfer economies, the characteristics of the 
products applied also make a concentrated location pattern of these 
activities very desirable and in some cases even necessary. Many of the 
intermediates hamper transportation over long distances, unless high 
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Figure 2.4 Simplified flow diagram of oil refining and primary petrochemi-
cal production 
Source: Turner and Bedore (1979, 204) 
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transport costs and environmental risks are accepted. Therefore, any 
meaningful interpretation of the phenomenon of petrochemical com-
plexes requires an understanding of the nature of materials transferred 
between the main stages of production. Thus, now we tum our 
attention to this issue. 
2.4 Basic technology 
Several studies have already demonstrated that the nature of the 
materials exchanged between oil refineries, basic petrochemical indus-
try and related processing units promotes spatial concentration and 
co-ordination of these sectors within a single integrated complex 
(Chapman 1970; 1991; Wever 1974; Molle and Wever 1984). The 
technical links which exist between production facilities at the up-
stream and downstream end of the processing chain of these industries 
determine to a high degree their preference for clustering. 
Here, as a result, only a short description is given of the basic 
technological features of oil refining and basic petrochemical industry 
in particular. Especially the most important types of products and 
production processes involved are considered. Firsdy, the processing 
of crude oil in an oil refinery is discussed. Next, the basic petrochemi-
cal processes for the production of olefins and aro mades pass in review. 
Finally, the main material input-output relations between the different 
stages of production are highlighted once more. Figure 2.4 represents 
a flow diagram of oil refining and primary petrochemical production, 
which can serve as a structuring guide for our discussion. 
Oil refining 
The technology of an oil refinery consists principally of two stages: 
crude distillation and subsequent conversion. In the crude distillation 
stage crude oil is separated into fractions by distillation. The different 
boiling points of the fractions are used to split up the crude into a 
number of oil products such as gases, naphtha, gasoline, fuel oil and 
so on. An essential characteristic of this distillation process is that, being 
a physical process, it does not alter the structure of the oil fractions. 
This means that the various fractions yielded by this process are totally 
dependent upon the nature of the crude treated. So, heavy crude oil 
(e.g. from Saudi Arabia or Venezuela) produces a higher percentage 
of heavy oil products like fuel oil than crude of a light character (e.g. 
from Algeria or the North Sea). 
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Although since the last decade the intake of crude oil by Western 
European oil refineries has lightened considerably in general, by virtue 
of an increasing use of light North Sea and African crudes, the relative 
importance of the various fractions obtained from distillation has not 
changed significandy. This is probably brought about by the increased 
importation of residues into the Western European refining system, 
which are used as a feedstock and counter-balance the lightening of 
the crude oil supplied to the oil refineries (Bacon 1990,174). Accord-
ing to Molle (1988; 1993), demand, on the other hand, has shifted 
more and more towards light oil products (for instance gas oil, naphtha, 
LPG). Needless to say, oil refineries very often encounter a discrep-
ancy between the product yield of the distillation process and the 
structure of demand. In order to overcome that difficulty, a secondary 
treatment has been developed: conversion. 
By contrast with distillation, conversion processes are all chemical, 
that is, they change the structure of the oil fractions. Conversion 
consists mainly of two principal processes: cracking and reforming. In 
the cracking process heavy fractions are broken down into lighter 
ones. Of course, this process is only applied if the demand for lighter 
oil products exceeds the yield in the distillation process. Considering 
the aforementioned discrepancy, however, conversion and the crack-
ing process in particular are clearly gaining in importance. The 
European Community (1989,32) has found that this development has 
already become observable since the beginning of the eighties. In the 
1980-1988 period the (catalytic) cracking capacity of the Member 
States almost doubled from 81 million tonnes to 143 million tonnes. 
Unlike the cracking process, the reforming process is designed to 
improve the quality of the products — especially of gasoline — rather 
than alter their relative quantities. There are two different reforming 
processes, notably catalytic reforming and thermal reforming. Because 
of the fact that thermal reforming is currendy hardly applied in 
Western Europe, we will restrict our attention to catalytic reforming 
here. In the catalytic reforming process, the structure of the naphtha 
fraction is changed in a so-called platformer by increasing the aromarics 
content. A well-performing motor gasoline requires a fair content of 
aromarics and the naphtha fraction resulting from the distillation of an 
average Middle Eastern oil contains no more than 8 percent of this 
type of base chemicals. However, through reforming the proportion 
of aromatics can be increased to some 30 percent, dependent on the 
processing conditions (pressure, temperature and processing time) and 
the quality of the naphtha feed. 
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Petrochemical production 
Despite the fact that in Western Europe gas oil has been increasingly 
applied for the production of basic petrochemicals lately, the principal 
petroleum derivative used is still naphtha (Molle and Wever 1984; 
Molle 1988). In terms of quantities produced, the olefins and aromatics 
are by far the most important base chemicals. They belong to the group 
of the so-called unsaturated hydrocarbons, which are highly reactive 
and therefore easy to convert into other chemical compounds. It is 
exacdy this quality, which has made the olefins and aromatics the key 
building blocks of the (organic) petrochemical industry and, thus, the 
source of a wide range of materials. 
Olefins are mosdy produced by cracking naphtha. Cracking naph-
tha (or other oil fractions) with ethylene as its main product is a major 
petrochemical process. Aromatics, on the other hand, are basically 
produced from petroleum feedstocks by the catalytic reforming of 
naphtha, a process that is the same as the reforming process of the oil 
refinery. The volume of output of naphtha reformers (platformers) is 
dominated by benzene. For a more detailed discussion of the processes 
of cracking and reforming can be referred to Molle and Wever (1984). 
Main product transfers 
The central position, which particularly naphtha crackers and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, aromatics plants (platformers) occupy within 
the petrochemical complex, is not only based on their forward linkages 
but also on their backward linkages (Chapman 1970; 1991; Molle and 
Wever 1984). 
Taking their backward linkages into account, it is obvious that both 
sectors prefer to be located in the neighbourhood of one or more oil 
refineries. Adjacent location of oil refining facilities, naphtha crackers 
and platformers is highly preferable first of all because the basic 
petrochemical industry in general needs huge volumes of raw mate-
rials. As has already been pointed out above, in Western European 
countries mainly the liquid feedstock naphtha is used as an input for 
manufacturing olefins and aromatics by petrochemical cracking units 
and platformers respectively. Liquid feedstocks are not as difficult and 
cosdy to transport over long distances as natural gas, which is predomi-
nandy applied in the United States. In view of the characteristics of 
the raw materials involved, therefore, spatial concentration of oil 
refining and basic petrochemical production facilities is not stricdy 
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necessary. The following two aspects, however, tend to reinforce the 
preference for a clustered location pattern of these activities. Both 
naphtha crackers and platformen produce residuals which are mostly-
sent back to the oil refinery. Especially, this two way interchange of 
materials between oil refineries and the basic petrochemical plants 
makes location in one another's proximity highly attractive. More-
over, it should be emphasized that only spatial concentration can 
guarantee the flexibility and continuity in the supply of different kinds 
of raw materials, which enables many of the Western European 
naphtha crackers to switch from one feedstock to another nowadays. 
Nevertheless, former studies have confirmed that the forward 
linkages in particular have intensified the core position of naphtha 
crackers and platformen within petrochemical complexes (Molle and 
Wever 1984). The major part of the product output of these industries 
tends to be worked up in their vicinity. This has to do with the nature 
of these products. For example, the highly flammable character of 
olefins, such as ethylene, propylene and butylène fosters a spatial 
clustering of the processing plants of these gases and the cracker(s) 
involved. But also aromatics, of which benzene and toluene are the 
most important ones, are preferably processed in the platformers' 
vicinity. Here, the poisonous character of the products is the prime 
motive for spatial concentration. Thus, the technical problems asso-
ciated with the movement of these basic petrochemicals furthers these 
sectors to agglomerate within a petrochemical complex. In this 
context, it is important to stress, however, that through time devel-
opments in transportation technology have offered the opportunity 
for long-distance transportation of several base petrochemicals, and 
especially ethylene»by pipeline. The extensive supra-national ethylene 
grid connecting tn^ftuhr Affa and the Rotterdam-Antwerp Delta 
provides an exampteibfthis in Western Europe. Yet, it has to be bome 
in mind, that these pipeline-networks are principally meant to com-
pensate temporary interruptions and imbalances in the supply or 
consumption of ethylene. Generally speaking, an adjacent location of 
both ethylene (or other bulk petrochemicals) producing and consum-
ing faculties is more advisable. 
In sum, viewed from a material input-output perspective, it is very 
desirable for naphtha crackers and platformers to be situated in the 
proximity of both oil refineries and olefin and aromatic processing 
plants. Indeed, the technical features of producing oil products from 
crude oil and producing petrochemicals from oil derivatives and the 
nature of many of the intermediates exchanged between the different 
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stages of the production chain enhance a clustered location pattern of 
the companies involved. Note, though, that the paramount impor-
tance which may be attached to this aspect as a determinant needs to 
be put in its proper perspective. Many of the technical linkages would 
not exist without the commercial linkages. 
2.5 Commercial integration 
So far we have dealt with the issues of agglomeration economies and 
technical integration which encourage the companies involved in oil 
refining and basic petrochemical industry to cluster in petrochemical 
complexes, without pointing to the underlying mechanisms behind 
both determinants, that is, the business strategies of these firms. There 
is litde doubt, however, that the effort of oil and petrochemical 
companies to obtain, for example, internal economies of scale is often 
fuelled by horizontal integration, a strategy by which a company seeks 
to extend its market share within an existing sector. The same point 
can be made regarding the technologically based interdependence 
between oil refining and petrochemical manufacture. Although tech-
nical linkages between the sequential stages of the petrochemical 
processing chain highly promote agglomeration of oil refining and 
petrochemical plants, the intensity and continuation of the direct 
input-output relations is ultimately founded on the strategic policies 
of the actors engaged. In this context, particularly the fact that many 
of these firms have become commercially involved in several succes-
sive production processes, by integrating in vertical direction needs to 
be considered as a key determinant behind complex building. There-
fore, in order to enhance our understanding of petrochemical com-
plexes, it is necessary to focus on the strategy of vertical integration. 
Before discussing the basic motives and rationales which foster the 
choice of this strategy, the notion of vertical integration is defined. 
Vertical integration 
Vertical integration can be defined as a process or situation in which 
a firm exercises its activities in two or more industries belonging to 
various successive stages of the manufacturing process of a product. 
Actually, this strategy represents a step towards diversification by 
adopting and applying existing attributes of the firm to new products 
and markets. These attributes are generally related to the technical and 
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marketing skills of the firm and may be exploited in both backward 
and forward direction. 
For many companies involved in oil refining and petrochemical 
operations, vertical integration may be regarded as a characteristic form 
of business organization. Whereas vertical integration among oil com-
panies has been realized in forward direction, that is, by further 
processing of their oil products into basic petrochemicals (downstream 
integration), many chemical companies have implemented this strat-
egy in backward direction (upstream integration). The latter strategic 
development implies that many producers of (petro)chemicals have 
become engaged in oil refining and other operations previously the 
responsibility of their suppliers. Especially, the further commercial 
involvement thus attained of these companies in the petrochemical 
production sequence whether through ownership or partly control 
based on strategic alliances (e.g. in the form of joint ventures) has 
stimulated and generated the building of petrochemical complexes. 
Evidence in support of this statement is provided by Chapman (1973, 
1991). He observed that the decision of oil companies in particular to 
invest in basic petrochemical production facilities quite often led to a 
spatial pattern of these plants close to already existing oil refineries. To 
take an example: when BP decided to extend its activities from oil 
refining to the manufacture of (petro)chemicals, it tended to direct the 
choice of location for its first petrochemical plants towards one of the 
company's oil refining units (Chapman 1973, 47). From the alterna-
tives in the United Kingdom, Grangemouth in Scotland was chosen, 
where the creation of an integrated system of BP's oil refining and 
chemical facilities resulted in the formation of a petrochemical com-
plex. Through time, the direct functional linkages within the complex 
have even been further reinforced as a result of BP's involvement in 
chemical companies outside the BP group. Although the commercial 
relationships which rest upon the vertical structure of organization of 
many of the oil and (petro)chemical companies tend to provide a solid 
basis for petrochemical complexes, it is necessary to be aware that the 
(continued) existence of the input-output linkages largely depends on 
the strategic options of the broader corporations to which these 
companies belong. Therefore, such an oil-based industrial agglomera-
tion can certainly not be approached as a static system. Indeed, we 
need to recognize that it is not reasonable to assume automatically that 
the direct interdependence between the separate production units 
within the complex is tight, simply because of the spatial convergence 
of involvement of one and the same business organization in several 
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activities of the production chain. The interconnections of production 
units within a particular firm may, of course, extend beyond the 
boundary of such a petrochemical complex. In an effort to improve 
or sustain competitive advantage — a commonly sought goal of firms 
— the multinational or even global corporations, to which many of the 
individual plants belong, are likely to conduct a careful inspection 
whether or not their existing linkages still have a beneficial effect on 
their business performance (Porter 1990, 42). Obviously, monitoring 
the efficiency and effectiveness of these linkages and, thus, evaluating 
competitive strategy, may have important consequences for the or-
ganizational as well as the spatial configuration of the companies 
involved.1 This implies that in the course of time a particular petro-
chemical complex may experience substantial changes in its form and 
structure. 
Given the assumption that competitive strategy can only be under-
stood in relation to the company's goal to maintain and strenghten its 
competitiveness the question, then, may be posed what the main 
driving forces are behind the internalization of activities formerly 
performed by suppliers and/or customers. In other words, what 
advantages can be gained from vertical integration? The main motives 
which tend to encourage companies to adopt the strategy of vertical 
integration can be categorized into two groups (Schütte 1986, 230): 
1. cost efficiency considerations 
2. motives of a strategic nature 
Cost efficiency considerations 
In this context, cost efficiency considerations involve an appreciation 
of transaction cost savings which may be derived from providing 
several activities in-house instead of performing them separately. In 
industrial economic literature the cost benefits which a company can 
achieve as a result of specialized production by using a single set of 
acuities to manufacture more than one product is referred to as the 
so-called 'economies of scope' (Cooke 1988, 290). In fact, economies 
of scope encompass the cost savings stemming from learning processes 
1 Competitive strategy concerns decision making related to a particular produc-
tion unit within the business organization as a whole. Actually, it is about how 
to establish and sustain a favourable competitive position in an industry. By 
contrast, corporate (or companywide) strategy involves decisions regarding the 
overall scope of the business firm (e.g. the kinds of economic activities that 
the company decides to be engaged in) (Dicken and Lloyd 1990, 292). 
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and synergy (the two plus two equals five effect). Clearly, vertical 
integration may serve as a convenient mechanism for acquiring these 
scope economies. Concentrating on oil refining and basic petrochemi-
cal operations, which are highly characterized by continuous-flow 
processes, integration of successive stages of production can offer 
considerable cost reductions through avoiding additional treatments 
and hampered circulation of the exchanged products. Besides, it 
furthers the ability to shift resources more prompdy. Furthermore, if 
common application is possible of technological and/or managerial 
information and of production facilities, such as machines, distribution 
systems and specialized services for the manufacture of a variety of 
products, then, vertical integration is also likely to yield cost efficien-
cies for the companies active in these fields. Yet, it would be 
misleading to suggest that enjoying economies of scope inevitably 
requires a broadening of the boundaries of a business firm itself. 
Indeed, it has to be taken into consideration that in some cases 
manufacturing of products by specialized single-business firms which 
contract with other companies in the marketplace may be less cosdy 
than in-house organization of all tasks in a multi-product firm. 
Therefore, particularly if the transfer does not concern highly specific 
technological know-how or R & D information, market intermedia-
tion may prove to be more profitable. 
As previous studies have argued, however, pursuit of scope econo-
mies do not fully explain why firms choose to be vertically integrated 
(Teece 1980, 225). Often strategic reasons also play a decisive role as 
motives for vertical integration. 
Motives of a strategic nature 
Whereas vertical integration motivated by the desire to obtain econo-
mies of scope is mainly linked to the objective of improving the 
internal efficiency of the business firm, the choice of this strategy based 
on strategic arguments essentially rests upon reinforcing the external 
competitive position of the company's core activity. In attempting to 
reach the latter goal one or more of the following strategic motivations 
may foster business organizations to integrate vertically. 
1. securing the supply of inputs and/or controlling the oudet for 
products. 
By following a strategy of backward integration a company may 
remove its uncertainty over input supply of raw materials and 
feedstocks. For that reason, some chemical companies have become 
active in oil refining and other upstream activities. A prime example 
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of backward integration, here is Du Pont's takeover of the Ameri-
can independent oil company Conoco. Alternatively, forward 
integration furthers a company's ability to control the distribution 
and marketing for its products. In this respect, the recent invest-
ments made by companies from OPEC countries in Western 
European oil refining and service station facilities is illustrative. 
2. protecting and/or acquiring technological capabilities. 
It is not hard to imagine that vertical integration facilitates the 
achievement of technological capabilities and innovations. Com-
panies that are vertically integrated, are generally better equipped 
to innovate because they participate in many production and/or 
distribution activities in which change can occur. Moreover, pro-
tection of technologies is much easier to guarantee in a firm with 
a vertical structure of organization, partly as a result of entry barriers 
thus raised. 
3. higher barriers to entry. 
Apparendy the more vertically integrated a business firm, the 
greater the financial, managerial and organizational resources re-
quired to enter and compete in the industry involved. Established 
companies in a particular industry may discourage potential new 
entrants, on account of the fact that the latter needs to enter several 
stages of production simultaneously. Lack of experience in other 
stages than its own base of operation may restrain a company to 
invest. According to Teece (1976), the key issue here is a new 
entrant's disadvantage relative to what its position would have been 
had single-stage entry been possible. True, if the industry were not 
integrated the new firm would be able to enter the desired stage 
and rely on existing firms in related stages for its supplies and 
outputs. 
4. overcoming market imperfections 
An important incentive for vertical integration may also be based 
upon the desire to weaken the strong monopolistic or oligopolistic 
position taken by a company's suppliers and/or customers. By 
wholly or partly incorporating their activities a company can avoid 
being extremely dependent on a small number of powerful buyers 
and sellers. Vertical integration may, therefore, be a means of 
curtailing the overwhelming power of monopolists or oligopolists. 
5. enhancing the stability of corporate profits. 
There is every likelihood, that a company will reach a point where 
it is faced with a decline of its cash flows from its core activity. This 
has primarily to do with changes in demand conditions (e.g. market 
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saturation and substitution of one product for another). Under these 
circumstances pursuing a strategy of vertical integration is likely to 
be a sound and sensible policy, on the mere grounds that not all 
economic activities in a diversified company's portfolio will follow 
an identical cycle of demand. Thus, in response to these challenges, 
a company may seek to ofiset the losses of revenues suffered in its 
core business by entering into new (related) industries. Through 
this strategic decision a stabilization of cash flows may be ensured. 
Having considered the logic lying behind the decision of a company 
to integrate vertically, a final crucial point should be made regarding 
the intensity with which this or another strategy is followed. Whilst 
it is virtually undeniable that vertical integration is an essential char-
acteristic form of organization of many oil and petrochemical compa-
nies, there are good reasons for supposing that the need and enthusiasm 
for this strategy (or other strategies, such as horizontal integration or 
unrelated diversification) is likely to wax and wane in the course of an 
industry's development. We noted earlier that business organizations 
constantly monitor their internal affairs (internal efficiency) as well as 
their external environments (that is, their external competitive posi-
tion in a particular industry). In practice, especially the relationship 
between a business firm and the latter variable, its external environ-
ment in the form of its competitive settings (a company's demand and 
supply conditions) are often in a continuous state of flux. More 
explicitly, this implies that facing volatility and turbulence in a 
company's business environment is the rule rather than the exception 
nowadays (Chapman and Walker 1991). In order to achieve a 'good 
fit' with its changing environment, a company inevitably needs to 
realign itself with the new challenges and opportunities offered. This 
is done by making strategic decisions. In tact, strategies are the most 
central element in the interaction between a business firm and its 
environment. It seems to be clear that turbulent and uncertain 
environments require to be met by dynamic strategies. Turning our 
attention again to vertical integration discussed in this section, this 
means that in reaction to environmental turbulence in which the 
nature of competition evolves, the importance attached to this strategy 
as a mechanism of attaining a favourable competitive position in one 
or several industries is likely to vary substantially through time. Indeed, 
it is quite easy to appreciate that when an industry reaches the end of 
a phase of expansion accompanied by increasingly fierce competition 
mainly resulting from a slackening of demand for the product(s) 
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involved, vertical intégration tends to be more popular as a business 
strategy than in the period before when demand was growing and cash 
flows were stable. Corporate executives certainly tune their applica-
tion of vertical integration or another business strategy to prevailing 
market conditions. Consequendy, in seeking an understanding of the 
relationship between oil and petrochemical companies and their 
environments, we have to adopt a process view with respect to 
business strategies. 
The next chapter therefore sets out a dynamic approach as a 
framework for our analysis of the development of the Western 
European oil refining and basic petrochemical industry — namely the 
dynamic market model of de Jong (1985; 1989a). This model postu-
lates a fluctuation in the forms of business organization arising from 
shifts in the strategies applied in relation to the various stages of the 
industry life cycle. 
3 
De Jong's Dynamic Market Theory 
3.1 Introduction 
Although integration phenomena of business organizations and the 
degree of market concentration resulting from them have traditionally 
played a central role in industrial economics as a basic object of study, 
the dynamic market theory of de Jong is only one of the few 
approaches which treats concentration in a particular market as a 
process. Most theories of market concentration merely focus on 
business strategies, such as vertical integration dealt with in the 
previous section, and the form of market organization resulting from 
them (monopoly, oligopoly etc.) at one point of time. They do not 
incorporate an evolutionary dimension wherein it is hypothesized that 
in the historical development of a particular industry the level of 
market concentration varies across its cycle. As Markusen pointed out, 
the majority of the theoretical work in economics and business studies 
on competitive behaviour of firms and, thus, on organizational struc-
ture has looked at competition (and other ways markets are organized) 
as rather static, that is, in equilibrium situation. Her profit cycle model 
shows a remarkable degree of correspondence with de Jong's dynamic 
market theory (Markusen 1985, 27). Both are actually extensions of 
the product life-cycle concept which seek to recognize and account 
for systematic changes of a particular sector. Notwithstanding this 
similarity, some fundamental differences between both theoretical 
approaches have to be identified. Whereas de Jong's model relies on 
output as the key indicator in analyzing sectoral changes, Markusen 
gauges a sector's passage through its life cycle by the expansionary path 
of profitability (Markusen 1985, 27). As we concentrate here on the 
fluctuations in market shares of (groups of) firms and thus on the 
oscillations in commercial structure of sectoral markets, output seems 
to be a more appropriate measure. By applying output as the central 
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criterion, we are able to investigate the changing market position of 
market participants as time proceeds. Therefore for the purpose of this 
study the model of de Jong seems to be more applicable. A further 
important distinction rests upon the fact that Markusen's (1985, 5) 
approach clearly acknowledges the role local specificity has in the 
pattern of sectoral dynamics in terms of market concentration. Con-
versely, the dynamic market theory of de Jong considers spatial 
variation in production-environmental conditions as less relevant as a 
determinant of concentration. Using corporate behaviour of individ-
ual entrepreneurs as analytical entry point, de Jong regards en-
trepreneurship as the most crucial factor underlying structural changes 
in a particular market. De Jong thus posits that whatever the nature of 
externalities faced by firms including locational aspects, management 
itself through the strategic decisions it makes is the primary driving 
force behind business performance. He casts decisions of industry 
leaders in the lead role and emphasizes that entrepreneurs in general 
do not resign themselves to the whims of their environment. This is 
not to suggest that his approach ignores the impact of environmental 
characteristics on sectoral development. Yet, these characteristics have 
not been incorporated into the model as a variable. Maybe it is 
necessary to refine de Jong's model and to include a spatial element in 
it — an orphan which has often been ignored and unwanted in 
(industrial) economics. In spite of the fact that we base our analysis of 
the market development in the Western European oil refining and 
petrochemical industry on this model, it is useful to ponder whether 
the dynamic market concept can provide a comprehensive explanation 
of the concentration pattern of the sectors involved. This issue is 
addressed in section 3.3. In this section we consider the applicability 
of this model by drawing upon the insights of other approaches of 
industrial organization. This attempt of interdisciplinary cross-fertili-
zation serves as a basis for the formulation of hypotheses. Before 
turning to theorizing, the Jong's approach is discussed. In the next 
section we sketch out the reciprocal relationship which he has found 
between structure and process by means of the life-cycle concept. The 
changes in concentration ratio over time are represented schematically 
in figure 3.1. It can be applied as a structuring guide not only for the 
following discussion, but also for our analysis of structural changes on 
the Western European oil and (petro)chemical market in chapter 6. 
This scheme demonstrates the basic logic lying behind his model 
which may help us to understand the sectoral development of both 
sectors through time. 
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Figure 3.1 General life cycle of industry and accessory structural changes 
Source: de Jong (1988b, 17). 
3.2 The dynamics of market structure: de Jong's model 
In associating the changing organizational structure of individual 
sectors1 with the life-cycle ideas of birth, growth and death, de Jong 
(1985) has observed the following systematic relationship. 
Introduction stage 
In the introduction stage of the manufacture of a new product only a 
few companies are active in the sector involved. Initially the market 
structure tends to be monopolistic, which of course implies a high 
degree of market concentration. But also later on, when commercial 
life of the product has started and, thus, the number of sellers and 
buyers has increased, the level of concentration on a market for a 
1 It is possible to make a distinction between the terms sector and industry. 
Whilst an industry refers to business organizations which may manufacture 
several different products simultaneously, a sector concerns a set of corpora-
tions and firms that organizes the fabrication of one particular type of product 
using a common technological production process. For our discussion of de 
Jong's dynamic market model the application of the latter concept is more 
appropriate, because in this approach single-product firms are assumed. 
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particular product usually remains high. Only a few entrepreneurs are 
willing to ran the risk of facing bottlenecks on the demand and/or 
supply side which often exist at this stage. To minimize the possibility 
of failure, most pioneers are prone to cooperate with other market 
participants. De Jong argues that cooperation by forming vertical 
agreements, or vertical integration, is clearly preferred to horizontal 
integration2, that is with firms in the same production line. This 
statement seems to be quite plausible, since — as we saw in section 2.5 
- vertical integration, by which a company gains complete or partial 
control over the activities of suppliers and/or customers, may reduce 
a firm's uncertainty inherent in inputs and outputs. In case cooperation 
in a horizontal sense occurs, it will be implemented by joint ventures 
rather than mergers. This has probably to do with the fact that business 
organizations wish to maintain their separate identity obtained re-
cently. 
Expansion stage 
Once the new product is successfully introduced, business organiza-
tions in a sector are likely to experience a rapidly accelerating growth 
rate of demand. At the beginning of this growth stage the potential 
market is estimated to be large in relation to actual sales. This will 
induce many companies to embark on investments. Apart from 
existing entrepreneurs who will expand their output, new entrants will 
leap on the bandwagon and will create new capacity. The entry of 
new producers will bring about a trend towards horizontal déconcen-
tration both in absolute and relative sense3. Diminishing of relative 
concentration rests upon the fact that entrant firms will impose certain 
restrictions upon the market power of firms which have pioneered the 
2 Horizontal integration takes place when a firm moves into activities which are 
either competitive with, or directly complementary to a company's present 
activities. As this strategy is primarily aimed at expanding a firm's market share 
in a particular line of business by squeezing out competition, market concen-
tration tends to increase. 
3 Λ distinction should be made between absolute and relative concentration. 
The former concept relates to the degree to which production in a particular 
market or sector is concentrated in the hands of a few large firms. In measuring 
absolute concentration we are thus concerned with individual markets or 
sectors, and with the number and relative sizes of firms involved. Unlike 
absolute concentration, relative concentration only measures the extent to 
which market shares are (un)equally distributed among market participants 
(Clarke 1985, 10). 
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sector. This implies a more even distribution of market shares. In 
addition, vertical disintegration may also be noticeable. The need for 
financial resources to expand the production capacity of the company's 
core product in accordance with increasing demand may incite 
producers to hive off related upstream and/or downstream activities. 
As a result of both processes (horizontal déconcentration and vertical 
disintegration), market concentration is inclined to decrease. It should 
not come as a surprise, however, that as expansion proceeds relative 
déconcentration is replaced by concentration again. This is due to the 
feet that in the long term especially through differences in en-
trepreneurial abilities companies will not benefit equally from an 
expansionary policy. Consequently, some of them will grow more 
than others. When the market begins to show signs of saturation, these 
inequalities in growth are even reinforced. Under profit-squeeze 
conditions in which supply outstrips demand and thus overcapacity 
arises, it is indeed reasonable to suggest that some firms are better 
equipped than others to encounter these less favourable developments 
and to maintain their market position. 
Maturity stage 
With the onset of maturity even the leading firms in a sector become 
fully aware of the permanent character of market saturation. The fact 
that surplus capacity is of a structural nature can no longer be ignored 
in this stage. Generally speaking, farsighted corporations which have 
recognized the inevitable setback of the market early and have, as a 
result, reinvested (part of their) profit in vertical integration in antici-
pation of diminished growth prospects for their core business will be 
in a stronger position than competing firms which have failed to do 
so. Having diversified into different sectors the former may, for 
example, pursue a strategy of cross-industry subsidization during the 
maturity phase by which a competitive advantage can be gained over 
the latter. It is possible that they will now fully exploit this advantage 
by absorbing their less efficient or less liquid competitors through 
mergers or takeovers. These collusive and predatory practices will 
enable them to reaffirm or improve their market share within the given 
sector. Tendencies towards vertical integration as well as horizontal 
concentration will result in a few large firms dominating the bulk of 
production. Little imagination is required that, as the demand growth 
for the product concerned levels off further or even stagnates, these 
large integrated business organizations will increasingly exert pressure 
on the remaining market participants. Eventually, competition will 
become so fierce that particularly many of the small firms will have to 
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reduce their production capacity. In some cases, this may imply that 
companies are forced to go out of business altogether. The reshuffling 
process on the market thus generated tends to produce an oligopolis-
tically structured market which is accompanied with an increase in 
absolute and relative concentration. 
Decline stage (stage of recession) 
Having passed beyond the maturity phase, firms within the sector are 
submitted to a reversal of demand by which the sales volume of the 
production now clearly declines (figure 3.1). In this stage of shrinkage 
and obsolescence the few surviving business organizations will suffer 
absolute losses on production resulting from an extreme low utilization 
rate of manufacturing facilities. As the market for the product dwindles 
dramatically, disinvestments particularly in the form of closures are 
ubiquitous. In order to enhance their profitability or merely to ensure 
their existence, especially large financially strong firms may engage in 
different types of mergers. As a result the tight oligopolistic structure 
at the end of the maturity phase may be replaced by a monopoly. This 
fosters a further growth of concentration ratios. Market participants 
will not only undertake horizontal mergers as a means of sheer survival 
in the core product area, many of them will also seek economies 
through related or conglomerate mergers (mergers for vertical inte-
gration or diversification respectively). It is obvious that when ulti-
mately the demise of the sector occurs, the latter manoeuvre, that is, 
external diversification whether in vertical or lateral direction becomes 
increasingly essential for consolidating the firm's position within the 
economy at large. Being pressed for time striving for diversification 
internally by means of in-house R & D is often less feasible. In 
particular, if a sector is highly challenged by a new substitute product, 
wooing firms operating in that rapidly growing product area with a 
view to merging with them (or taking them over) tends to be a more 
promising way out of the decline phase. Indeed, by converting 
successfully its physical capacity and know-how to the new product, 
a company may find itself back in the expansion stage and may proceed 
along a new industry life cycle. 
Before evaluating the applicability of de Jong's dynamic market model 
for our analysis, it is useful to recapitulate the main theoretical 
implications of his approach elaborated above. Basing his analysis on 
the industry life-cycle concept, de Jong has found a systematic inter-
relation between the market structure of a particular sector and the 
stages of the development path of the product involved. In essence, 
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de Jong argues that as an individual sector passes through the various 
evolutionary phases, market structure in terms of (de)concentration 
changes in a predictable fashion. Beginning with high levels of market 
concentration in the initial development stage, concentration ratios 
tend to be eroded by vigorous entry of new firms during the expansion 
phase. Yet, when a sector reaches maturity and, eventually, its demise 
comes about, concentration ratios are likely to increase again stem-
ming from firm failures and predatory behaviour of industry leaders. 
3.3 Limited applicability of de Jong's 
dynamic market model 
Despite de Jong's dynamic market model provides a useful analytical 
instrument for investigating the interaction of our key variables, 
market structure and market development and the ensuing shifts in 
concentration ratios through time, we need to be aware that the 
sequence outlined above is merely a broad generalization. This limi-
tation can be attributed to the fact that this theory relies on the product 
life-cycle concept as a scheme for explaining and predicting alterations 
in market structure. Consequendy, de Jong focuses on shifts in demand 
of a particular product as the main element of business performance. 
More explicitly, he postulates a mutual relationship between the 
strategic decision making of individual firms within a sector and 
market conditions, while leaving other, more specific circumstances 
unaddressed. Ignorance of particular causes - other than market forces 
- which may also shape the organizational structure of market partici-
pants implies inevitably a high level of aggregation and abstraction. 
Not surprisingly, many of the recent studies on business strategies have 
recognized that abstract treatments which seek to generalize about 
sectoral development and structural changes tend to be handicapped 
by the heterogeneity of sectors and of (subsets of) individual firms and 
thus by the diversity of responses which entrepreneurs may give to 
stimuli (Ballance and Sinclair 1985; Porter 1980; 1985; Kamann 1988). 
As Massey and Meegan (1979) have pointed out, each sector and, in 
fact, each individual business organization faces constraints and oppor-
tunities generated internally as well as externally which are unique and 
which therefore make a less aggregative approach to structural inves-
tigation imperative. The specificity of each competitive situation 
forces us to temper predictions regarding investment behaviour to the 
idiosyncrasies of particular (groups of) firms within sectors (Harrigan 
1982,727). It is not difficult to appreciate that precisely this uniqueness 
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may bnng about wide variations in strategic choices among companies 
active in a particular line of business even under similar market 
conditions. A glance back at chapter 1 shows that we concentrate 
especially on the differences in strategic behaviour between business 
organizations involved in oil refining and/or basic petrochemical 
production on the Western European market, which have led to a 
reshuffling process recendy. On account of the fact that de Jong fails 
to provide an explanation for the potential variations in the strategic 
decisions made by entrepreneurs at a particular point in a sector's 
development, we draw upon the work of Porter (1980). Following 
his approach we seek to identify a relation between the investment 
behaviour of firms active in the oil and/or petrochemical industry (and 
thus their competitive position resulting from this) and sector- and 
location-specific conditions respectively. In so doing, de Jong's aggre-
gated reasoning is supplemented with more detailed information 
gathered by previous studies concerning both sectors. Thus we attempt 
to escape from de Jong's preoccupation with market forces as the sole 
influence on competitive change in a sector. Although the central idea 
of his model is retained, that is, the existence of a systematic relation-
ship between market conditions and structural changes, we suggest 
that more specific sectoral and locational characteristics may affect the 
process of restructuring. We admit therefore the possibility that these 
aspects may defy the market-dnven structural adjustments assumed by 
sectoral characteristics locational characteristics 
market situation/condition ·<- -•market structure 
market concentration 
strategic behaviour of 
individual business organizations 
(conduct) 
-•market position 
(performance of 
individual 
companies and 
groups of 
companies) 
Figure 3.2 Conceptual framework 
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de Jong particularly in the short run and may yield an outcome which 
deviates from the general pattern as sketched in the preceding section. 
This basic hypothesis is portrayed in figure 3.2. 
In order to come to grips with these specific circumstances and their 
probable impact on the strategic choices of entrepreneurs, it is neces­
sary to adopt a starting point. Porter (1980) argues that mobility 
barriers in general and entry barriers4 in particular, which have to be 
regarded as important key forces largely responsible for the market 
position of firms within a sector, and thus for the degree of market 
concentration, offer an explanation for the potential variations in 
strategic options and positioning. According to Porter, barriers to 
entry (and/or to exit) are crucial to an understanding of the phenome­
non of competition in a sector and the process of restructuring. This 
view has its roots in the pioneering work of Bain (1956) on entry 
barriers and potential competition. Switching our attention now to de 
Jong's dynamic market model, the following observation has to be 
made in this respect. Although de Jong (1985, 74) acknowledges the 
presence of both types of barriers in reality, he maintains that they do 
not prevent systematically the entry or withdrawal of firms throughout 
the development of a sector. This is not to say that he neglects the fact 
that oligopolists and monopolists may employ overwhelming market 
power and may adopt entry-detemng strategies which may represent 
a serious threat to competition. But basically, he assumes that entry 
deterrence and market dominance is mosdy short-lived and, conse-
quendy, renders barriers to entry (and to exit) exogenous to his 
approach. This means, for instance, that he abstracts away from the 
institutional limitations imposed by the government on the estab­
lishment of new firms or on the collusive practices of incumbent firms. 
Yet, especially in the context of the oil and petrochemical industry it 
seems to be justified to pose the question whether this assumption is 
acceptable. Previous studies, which have thrown light on the process 
of restructuring of both sectors, have pointed out that obstacles to 
entry and/or withdrawal may provide a prime rationale behind the 
4 Whereas the concept of entry barriers refers to obstacles that prevent new­
comers from engaging in the production and sale of products in a particular 
market, the notion of mobility barriers also comprises impediments that 
discourage departure from a line of business (ι e the so-called exit barriers) 
and the forces that deter repositioning of established firms In essence, the latter 
act like an entry barrier, but for a group within a sector rather than for a sector 
as a whole (McGee and Thomas 1986, 153) 
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strategic decisions of the companies involved (Chapman 1991 ; van der 
Linde 1991). This is not the place to become embroiled in the details 
of these investigations, but it is important to note that they have 
indicated the propensity of these barriers to modify the interaction 
between the economic process (market development) and the form 
of organization (market structure). Unlike de Jong, we therefore allow 
for the influence of these barriers as an intervening variable which may 
account for the differences in (dis)investment behaviour of the actors 
involved and thus for their competitive position. In assessing the 
probable impact of these forces on the competition process of our 
sectors, a distinction can be drawn between intrinsic and extrinsic 
barriers (Willems 1991, 86). While intrinsic barriers are raised by 
sector-specific, structural characteristics, extrinsic barriers are the result 
of external, location-specific conditions. 
For estimating the direction of the effect of these intrinsic and 
extrinsic impediments on the level of market concentration in the oil 
refining and basic petrochemical industry in Western Europe, we 
apply the broader concept of mobility barriers mentioned above. The 
choice of this concept instead of the more conventional entry barriers 
rests upon the fact that we are not only interested in the forces that 
may deter a firm's entry, but also in the mechanisms that may limit 
the ability of business organizations to enlarge their market shares 
thereafter. Being especially concerned with the issue of reshuffling 
which has recendy come to the fore in the Western European oil and 
petrochemical industry, the notion of mobility barriers is obviously 
more appropriate. As both sectors have moved into the maturity stage 
and face adverse demand conditions, it is legitimate to concentrate 
principally on those obstacles which may hinder restructuring. First of 
all, intrinsic mobility barriers created by structural features indigenous 
to both sectors are dealt with. This requires that we revert to basic 
characteristics elaborated in the former chapter - that is, economies of 
scale and vertical integration in particular. Apart from these aspects, 
we also consider the influence of investments made in sophisticated 
conversion facilities, and of access to natural resources and distribution 
channels on the market position of the companies involved. Next the 
main extrinsic mobility barriers are discussed. There we look at recent 
structural changes of our sectors from a political angle — that is, shifts 
in competitive position resulting from government intervention. 
Intrinsic mobility barriers 
Economies of scale 
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, seeking to achieve scale 
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economies is an essential trait of the oil and petrochemical industry. 
In order to capture the greatest possible economies of scale, the average 
size of oil refineries and ethylene plants has increased substantially 
during the last decades. Yet, having reached the maturity stage both 
sector? are confronted with adverse sales-to-capacity relations at the 
moment. Obviously, in this period characterized by small market 
opportunities for the companies engaged it is more difficult to realize 
adequate levels of scale than if they are large. The mismatch of demand 
with production capacity implies inevitably a low utilization rate of 
manufacturing facilities. In an attempt to bolster their competitive 
position, market participants have to bring into line their output with 
slackening demand. Under these circumstances, large multiplant busi-
ness organizations possessing substantial capital assets are believed to 
be better equipped in general than their smaller competitors to attain 
an efficient scale of production. This being so, the latter group of firms 
is less likely to take advantage of scale economies in its operations. 
When competition becomes even more fierce, this category of less 
efficient-sized firms tends to be hard-pressed to stay in business due to 
the aggressive efforts of core competitors to fill their own underutilized 
plants to breakeven volumes. There is no doubt that a large proportion 
of them will be squeezed out of business or swallowed up by more 
successful rivals. It may be expected that the structural development 
which then emerges conforms to the pattern as expressed in de Jong's 
approach: an increase in market concentration in mature industry 
settings. However, this statement is not totally convincing. It is 
reasonable to postulate, that there is a chance that particularly small, 
single plant owners show reluctance to sell or close their production 
facility and thus to disappear from the oil refining and/or petrochemi-
cal scene. Indeed, compared with companies owning several sites 
which have the strategic option of retrenchment through closures and 
contractions while retaining a significant presence on the market in 
terms of market shares, single plant firms are in a less favourable 
position. For reasons of mere survival, closure is quite often not taken 
into consideration (Bacon 1990, 122). In this period of shake-out, 
many of these market occupants may decide to remain doggedly in 
business. They may display a commitment to fight it out against their 
stronger competitors before conceding the need to retire. A logic 
consequence of this strategic behaviour, which may be governed by 
commercial and financial barriers to exit, is that it tends to generate a 
pattern that deviates from the sectoral development as hypothesized 
by de Jong in the sense that the degree of market concentration may 
stabilize rather than increase in the short term. Exit deterrence among 
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single plant producers is frequently reinforced by the tact that many 
of these firms are involved in several related petrochemical processes. 
This necessitates us to return to a salient feature of the oil and 
petrochemical industry dealt with in the former chapter, namely the 
organizational form of vertical integration. 
Vertical integration 
There is great likelihood that process production which characterizes 
the oil and petrochemical manufacturing system and fosters a verti-
cally-integrated network of continuous flow operations, discourages 
companies from leaving a sick line of business. It is plausible that this 
is especially the case if the activity in question concerns an essential 
'building block' in terms of the volume of production within the 
petrochemical processing chain, say, the manufacture of ethylene and 
if the company involved is a single plant producer. Indeed, in this case, 
rationalization may necessarily entail complete withdrawal from a 
whole product line (EC 1988, 46). Whereas multiplant business 
organizations are mosdy able to embark on selective disinvestments 
without running the risk of encountering far-reaching negative reper-
cussions on their overall performance, single plant firms do not have 
this possibility. In contrast to the former whose needs of a particular 
product may be easily counterbalanced by other production facilities 
left unaffected within the corporate system, the latter category is 
frequendy deterred from divestiture for fear of a serious disruption of 
its production process (Chapman 1991, 244). Hence, it may be 
maintained that vertical integration founded on technological inter-
dependence of sequential processes may act as an impediment to 
restructuring principally among single plant companies within the oil 
and petrochemical industry. It follows from this hypothesis that in the 
era of maturity the pattern of structural change of our sectors on the 
Western European market may not correspond with the sectoral 
evolution suggested by de Jong which may be partly due to the 
presence of a larger number of small, single plant firms than theoreti-
cally expected. 
Investments in conversion facilities 
In addition to a rapid decline in the volume of demand for oil products 
since early 1980, there has also occurred a steady change in its 
composition. While traditionally demand in Western Europe has 
largely been orientated to heavy fractions such as fuel oil, it has 
significandy shifted to lighter distillates (e.g. gasoline) (Molle and 
Wever 1984, 35; Bacon 1990, 45). In order to keep pace with these 
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developments in the refining industry, investments in upgrading 
(conversion) facilities in general and in cracking capacity in particular 
have been imperative. As this tendency towards a light product 
structure has been fairly pronounced, it is justified to suggest that these 
investments play an important role in the competitive position of the 
market participants involved. In this context, the question arises 
whether all actors in this field have had equal opportunities to make 
the adjustments needed by which they can cater for the change in the 
demand-mix. Given the high financial resources required to upgrade 
plants accordingly, it is quite conceivable that small marginal operators 
have suffered a disadvantage in this respect compared with medium-
and large-sized firms (Ballance and Sinclair 1985,176). It is likely that 
a lack of capital requirements among small firms, by which they have 
increasingly become unable to match the current pattern of demand, 
has incited many of them to retreat from oil refining in Western 
Europe. As a consequence, the pattern of structural changes which 
emanates from this tends to be consistent with the findings based on 
de Jong's model (that is, an increase in the degree of market concen-
tration in the stage of maturity). 
Access to natural resources 
Vertical integration in backward direction (upstream integration) may 
serve as a mechanism for improving the access to raw material. 
Focusing on the oil and petrochemical industry, we may note that 
particularly the group of major oil companies has pursued this strategy 
in order to secure input supplies for their downstream production 
facilities. With control of a large part of supplies upstream thus gained, 
they virtually blockaded entry of potential competitors for a long time. 
Since the oil crises of the seventies, however, the dominant position 
of these global corporations in the upstream area has mainly been 
displaced by state-owned enterprises in oil producing countries. Es-
pecially companies from OPEC countries have taken measures to 
pre-empt some of the oil majors' activities (Ballance and Sinclair 1985, 
167). The losses suffered in this way by the latter has engendered a 
certain breakdown in the traditional pattern of vertical integration. 
Consequendy, entry barriers which existed previously have substan-
tially declined. It is highly possible that the erosion of entry barriers 
upstream has weakened the market position of the majors downstream 
on the Western European market. Indeed, there is reason to believe 
that in an attempt to curtail the market power of the major oil 
companies in the oil producing area firms from producer countries 
have adopted a strategy by which state-owned companies from 
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consumer countries are able to obtain, for example, crude supplies at 
lower cost than their large private rivals (Torrens 1980,40). These and 
other special deals between government-related entities of producing 
and consuming countries may imply a squeeze on the market share of 
the large international oil companies in Western Europe. This suggests 
that in the present period of tight market conditions in the Western 
European oil and petrochemical industry, we may identify a redis-
tribution of production capacity at the expense of market leaders, such 
as Shell, BP and Esso and, therefore, a decrease in market concentra-
tion. This hypothesis lends further support to the propositions made 
above, in the sense that it also denotes a positive correlation between 
the variables market structure and market development in the maturity 
stage: when the Western European oil and petrochemical industry face 
a situation of slow growth of demand and move into maturity, 
concentration ratios may decline instead of increase. 
Access to distribution channeb and marketing outlets 
Apart from the fact that the price shocks of the seventies have 
reinforced the position of national oil companies (NOCs) of oil 
producing countries at the upstream stage of production, it seems also 
to have ameliorated their conditions downstream in Western Euro-
pean consumer countries. The recent collapse in demand induced by 
the higher oil prices of the post-energy crises period has contributed 
to the willingness of some market participants to hive off production 
facilities to companies from oil exporting countries. With a substantial 
rise in excess capacity, a large part of the oil and petrochemical 
companies' production sites has become more of an embarrassment 
than an asset. This makes it easy to understand that during the last 
decade particularly OPEC companies have succeeded in overcoming 
a formerly insuperable barrier to entry downstream through which 
they have become increasingly involved in operational facilities (main-
ly oil refining) and marketing oudets in Western Europe. Their desire 
to further their accessibility to downstream activities rests, first of all, 
upon the strategic choice of this group of firms of seeking to guarantee 
oudets for the crude oil they produce. Thus they attempt to diversify 
away from a high degree of reliance upon oil alone and to diminish 
their one-sidedness. Besides, some companies from OPEC countries 
strive for secured access to refining capacity, because it enables them 
to reimport refined oil products to the home market whenever 
domestic demand exceeds supply. An additional incentive for this 
category of producers to invest in refining and distribution facilities is 
that it provides the opportunity to acquire technological and market-
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ing experience. In some cases this experience is gained in exchange 
for crude oil as partial or whole payment. There is evidence that 
principally American companies, such as Mobil and Gulf have suc-
cumbed to the temptation to sell offsurplus assets whether or not based 
on similar barter arrangements (Steenbakkers and Wever 1991, 75). It 
seems reasonable to infer that the entry of producen from oil exporting 
countries (e.g. KPC, Oilinvest) on the Western European market, by 
which they have encroached upon the territory of the majors and other 
established firms regarding oil refining, has led to a significant shift in 
market shares in favour of the former. This may imply that the increase 
in market concentration as a sector matures predicted by de Jong is 
not paralleled by the recent developments in the oil and petrochemical 
industry in Western Europe. 
Extrinsic mobility barriers 
Consumer government intervention 
Intervention by the government in these sectors frequendy labelled as 
'propulsive industries' and 'backbone of the economy' has been 
achieved in an indirect as well as a direct fashion. Indirect means of 
government involvement, which vary from environmental measures, 
price regulation and subsidization to anti-trust legislation and trade 
policies, have been widely applied. Alongside these tactics employed 
by national governments to support their oil and petrochemical 
manufacturing operations indirecdy, direct intervention through the 
creation of state-owned companies has also taken place. Of course, 
the extent of state commitment to oil and petrochemical manufacture 
both direct and indirect has not followed parallel courses within 
Western Europe. Broadly speaking, companies active in these sectors 
in Southern European countries seem to have attracted a higher level 
of state involvement than in Northern Europe. In other words, a bias 
in the degree of political influence can be identified towards countries, 
such as Spain, Portugal and Italy. In the prevailing adverse market 
conditions, the greater control of the government in these countries 
gained through nationalization and participation may result in a less 
drastic reduction of the production capacity of these activities than 
elsewhere in Europe in the short run. More specifically, the politici-
zation of these sectors and the ensuing introduction of non-commer-
cial criteria in the decision making process may have paralysed action 
in the form of plant closures and contractions and may therefore have 
retarded rationalization among the group of state-owned or state-con-
trolled companies (Bacon 1990,12). On account of the fact that many 
of these firms are nourished on government subsidies or covered in 
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other ways by the state, they may have consolidated or even enhanced 
their competitive position to the detriment of other market partici-
pants. Viewed in terms of market structure, this may imply that with 
the maturation of the market for oil and petrochemical products the 
overall degree of market concentration in Western Europe in general 
and in Southern Europe in particular is at odds with de Jong's postulate. 
We are apt to observe a decrease rather than an increase in concen-
tration ratios. 
Hypotheses 
Table 3.1 summarizes the hypotheses advanced in this section con-
cerning the effects of intrinsic and extrinsic mobility barriers on the 
level of market concentration in the Western European oil refining 
and basic petrochemical industry in the maturity stage. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed the dynamic market model of de 
Jong which construes a parallelism between the pattern of structural 
changes at sectoral level on the one hand and the various stages of the 
product life-cycle concept on the other. Notwithstanding the fact that 
we have acknowledged the value of de Jong's approach as a useful 
structural framework for analyzing the general development of the oil 
and petrochemical industry in Western Europe, we have pointed out 
to its limited applicability as regards providing an understanding for 
the strategic choices of individual firms through time. Whilst his model 
sheds light on the logic underlying changes in the aggregated sectoral 
development, it tends to conceal important differences in investment 
behaviour between players on the market. In seeking to improve the 
explanatory power of de Jong's model, we have introduced the 
concept of mobility barriers and thus the sources which may impede 
the process of restructuring or repositioning of firms within our 
sectors. These forces embody sector- as well as location-specific 
aspects. By incorporating these aspects as potential intervening vari-
ables which may have a deviational impact on de Jong's evolutionary 
pattern of market (de)concentration, we start from the premise that 
the strategic decision-making process cannot be explained solely in 
terms of market conditions. Unlike de Jong, we thus maintain that 
this process is only partly shaped by these conditions. The tentative 
assessment of the role which the sector- and location-specific impedi-
ments discerned may play in the strategic behaviour of the oil and 
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Table 3.1 Expected impact ofmtrmstc and extrinsic mobility barriers on 
the level of market concentration in the Western European oil refining and 
baste petrochemical industry in the maturity stage 
Expected impact Hypothesis 
Negative If small, single plant owners decide to stay in business in the maturity 
phase, this may yield a pattern that deviates from the sectoral 
development as hypothesized by de Jong" the degree of market 
concentration is likely to stabilize rather than increase 
Negative The organizational form of vertical integration which is highly 
characteristic of the oil and basic petrochemical industry may generate 
a lower level of market concentration than expected by de Jong 
particularly if single plant producers are involved 
Positive Investments in conversion facilities in general and expansion of 
cracking capacity in particular in the Western European oil refining 
industry, which can be characterized as highly capital intensive, may 
have enhanced the market position of medium- and large-sized firms 
as opposed to small companies Consequently, in accordance with de 
Jong's postulate the degree of market concentration may have gone up 
Negative The erosion of the dominance of the major oil companies in the 
upstream area may also have weakened their market position 
downstream in the Western European oil refining and petrochemical 
industry, through which the concentration ranos of these sectors may 
have declined. 
Negative The recent investments made by OPEC companies particularly in oil 
refining and marketing in Western Europe, which may have led to a 
significant shift in market shares at the expense of the majors and other 
established firms, may imply a decrease in market concentration. 
Negative The fact that the government has been highly involved in these sectors 
both indirectly and directly by state ownership may have produced a 
decrease instead of an increase in market concentration as predicted by 
de Jong. 
petrochemical producers on the Western European market has led to 
the formulation of hypotheses. Before testing these hypotheses (chap-
ter 6), we look at the research strategy developed which enables us to 
corroborate or reject them and to provide an answer to the research 
questions presented in chapter 1. In chapter 5, we adopt a global scope 
by investigating the investments made on the level of world regions, 
which have mainly been market-led, resource-oriented or a combi-
nation of both. 
4 
Research Design: Choices and 
Strategies 
4.1 Introduction 
Before a building of any consequence is built, it is necessary to embark 
on a design stage. Like an architect, a researcher needs to devise a plan 
in which he sets out how to reach the goal defined and to resolve the 
questions posed. Therefore, in the present chapter, which plays an 
intermediary role between theory and reality, we will, among others, 
convert the abstract concepts of the framework presented in figure 3.2 
into operational definitions. The research design underlying our study 
embraces topics such as the type of research, the population, the sample 
selection, the level of analysis, the operational definitions applied as 
well as the implementation of the design — that is, the methods of data 
collection and analysis employed — which will be reviewed separately 
below. It is important to note that during a research process an 
investigator passes through a series of choice points, where one among 
several alternative strategies needs to be selected. In reviewing the 
various elements of our design, we will give attention to the choices 
which we have made on our journey in order to achieve our central 
research objective: gaining insight into the reshuffling process among 
the companies involved in oil refining and/or basic petrochemical 
production on the Western European market primarily after the oil 
price shocks of the seventies. 
4.2 Type of research 
It should be clear from the preceding chapter (see section 3.3) that this 
study looks for explanations of potential variations in strategic beha-
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viour between individual producers active in the Western European 
oil refining and/or basic petrochemical industry. This means that our 
emphasis is explicidy on finding out why the strategic decisions taken 
by the different actors involved have varied even under similar market 
circumstances. On account of the fact that the major part of the 
questions posed and the information obtained are interpretative in 
nature, the present study can be characterized as explanatory research 
(Segen 1983, 97; Tesch 1990,115; Hedrick, Bickman and Rog 1993, 
24). 
In order to increase our understanding of possible differences in 
strategic choices among the companies engaged in these sectors, we 
have refined de Jong's dynamic market approach, which serves as our 
main structuring guide for analysis, by incorporating several sector-
and location-specific aspects as intervening variables which may mod-
ify the interaction between market development and market structure 
as postulated by de Jong's model. This has led to the development of 
some hypotheses which will be empirically tested. More precisely, we 
will examine whether or not these deductions are consistent with our 
research results. Viewed from this perspective, this study can also be 
thought of as encompassing an element of testing. 
4.3 Population, sample and level o f analysis 
Population 
The concept of population refers to the aggregate of all cases that 
conform to some designated set of specifications (Judd, Smith and 
Kidder 1991, 130). Actually, it covers all individuals, groups or 
institutions (e.g. business organizations) to which the hypothesized 
relationships between variables apply. Defined in this way, the popu-
lation in our study consists of all companies which have been involved 
in oil refining and basic petrochemical production, that is ethylene 
manufacture in particular, on the Western European market from 
1950 and 1960 to date respectively. 
Level of analysis 
It is important to be aware that we will address the changes in 
competitiveness of the producers involved in these activities on three 
different levels of analysis. We will conduct a multiscale analysis to be 
able to answer the research questions we posed in chapter 1. 
- Macro level. The first research question necessitates us to gather 
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information about trends in oil refining and ethylene capacity on 
the level of world regions. As pointed out in section 1.2, the 
international character of both industries makes it imperative to 
adopt a worldwide scope of analysis. Indeed, the reorganization of 
production in Western Europe can only be understood by placing 
it in a broader global context. In chapter 5, therefore, the changing 
spatial distribution of both sectors in terms of production capacity 
is investigated by making a comparison between world regions. 
This analysis will be based on aggregate data at region or country 
level. 
- Meso or intermediate level. A glance back at the central research 
question put in chapter 1 makes clear that we are also interested in 
the differences in investment behaviour between groups of compa-
nies involved in the Western European oil refining and basic 
petrochemical industry. Returning to the hypotheses advanced in 
section 3.3 once again, we can see that they relate to clusters of 
companies rather than individual firms. True, most of the inferen-
ces, which have been deduced from previous studies (Torrens 1980; 
Molle and Wever 1984; Bacon 1990; Chapman 1991; Grant 1993), 
concern particular categories of producers, such as the international 
majors and the state-owned companies from both oil producing 
and oil consuming cuntries. These postulates imply that we expect 
that these subsets of business organizations, which are known as 
population strata in methodological terms, exhibit a certain degree 
of internal homogeneity. In using this as a point of departure, we 
adopt the approach of strategic grouping (Porter 1980, 132; Cool 
and Schendel 1987; Johnson and Scholes 1989, 73). This means 
that our analysis of the structural changes that have come about on 
the Western European market dealt with in chapter 6 is based on 
an a priori classification of companies which display some similar 
strategic characteristics, are likely to follow similar strategies or tend 
to compete on similar bases. In addition to the categories men-
tioned above (e.g. the major oil companies and the state-owned 
enterprises from resource-rich as well as consumer countries), we 
can distinguish two other groups, namely the independent oil 
companies and the chemical companies. These groupings have also 
been identified by Molle and Wever (1984). For our purpose, it is 
quite useful to apply this intermediate approach, because it facili-
tates the description and interpretation of possible parallels and 
differences in strategic behaviour and the ensuing market position 
between individual firms within these sectors. Without doubt, it 
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allows us to compare the strategic decision making of companies 
belonging to a particular group. 
- Miao level. As can be expected, the bulk of the present research is 
carried out at the level of the individual firm. Remember that we 
chiefly aim at explaining the (variations in) strategic decisions made 
by the actors involved in Western European oil refining and basic 
petrochemical production primarily since the economic turbulence 
of the seventies, which have shaped the fluctuations in the degree 
of market concentration regarding these activities (see research 
questions 2, 3 and 4). To attain this objective, we will analyze and 
map out the shifts in market position of all Western European 
producers separately, which have occurred over time. The infor-
mation thus obtained forms the basis for the subsequent selection 
of some companies whose strategic behaviour is investigated more 
closely. The companies that will be approached for an in-depth 
interview are called the sample in methodological language. With 
the benefit of prior knowledge, we are able to select those firms 
which attract special interest, because they have already carried 
through a fundamental rationalization of their oil refining and/or 
basic petrochemical operations in Western Europe or, as opposed 
to this, have clearly lagged behind in terms of restructuring in the 
sense that they have shown a behavioural tendency towards inertia 
and reluctance to slim down their production facilities. This 
selective study of particular compames can be referred to as focused 
sampling, through which we seek to extend, complement and 
enrich our secondary analysis of existing data that are mainly of a 
quantitative nature (i.e. production capacity figures and data re-
garding the ownership structure) with qualitative research (Hakim 
1987,142). The latter is basically concerned with the interviewee's 
account of the company's motivations for the strategic behaviour 
observed. In order to make an optimal comparison between 
individual firms belonging to a particular category with respect to 
their strategic behaviour, each of the five groups of producers 
discerned above should be represented by at least two enterprises. 
For practical reasons, however, we had to limit ourselves to only 
one company in the case of the independents (i.e. Petrofina) and 
the state-controlled corporations from producer countries (i.e. 
Oilinvest). 
Having reviewed the three levels of analysis which will be employed 
within our study, the point has to be made that it is quite appropriate 
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that this book is multiscale in its attack. It is easy to appreciate that this 
approach enables us to recognize the influence which one unit of 
analysis may exert upon another (van der Zwaan 1990, 116). To 
illustrate, it allows us to assess the impact of strategic choices made by 
a particular market participant engaged in the Western European oil 
refining and/or basic petrochemical industry on the overall pattern of 
development of both sectors in Western Europe. However, in con-
ducting multi-level research, we have to issue a warning concerning 
possible errors of generalization which may occur when the unit of 
analysis is not at the same level as the unit to which we seek to 
generalize. These errors of generalization are known as fallacies of the 
wrong level Qudd, Smith and Kidder 1991, 356). If we attempt, for 
example, to generalize the research results found for a group of 
producers (e.g. the major oil companies) to the individual level (e.g. 
Shell or BP), we may well commit what is called the 'ecological 
fallacy'. Indeed, it is inappropriate to assume, on the basis of group-
level data, that the individual firm necessarily behaves in a fashion that 
is analogous to the way the group to which it belongs acts. Conversely, 
it may also be misleading to infer from data collected at the level of 
the single producer anything about, say, the investment behaviour or 
business performance of aggregates of individuals, such as the entire 
group or sector of which the firm is part. This can be referred to as 
the 'individualistic fallacy'. It is not difficult to understand that it may 
be erroneous to draw conclusions about the relationship between two 
variables (e.g. market situation and market structure) on a different 
level as the unit of analysis. Note, though, that roughly speaking, it is 
much easier to correct or avoid errors resulting from aggregation — 
individualistic fallacy - than those related to disaggregation — ecological 
fallacy (Steenbakkers 1994, 173). From this viewpoint, it may some-
times be more advisable to gather individual instead of aggregate data. 
In this context, it should be pointed out that our research on structural 
changes that have taken place in the Western European oil refining 
and basic petrochemical industry is mainly based on data collected on 
individual firms (see chapter 6). 
4.4 Operational definitions 
In order to conduct our research, we must be able to measure the 
concepts we wish to study. Measurement demands a translation of the 
theoretical concepts or variables of our conceptual framework con-
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sectoral characteristics Ideational characteristics 
- plant size 
- vertical integration 
- access to natural resources 
- access to distribution channels 
and marketing outlets 
- investments in conversion facilities 
• consumer government intervention 
market situation/condition ·*- ~ •market structure 
market concentration 
strategic behaviour of 
individual business organizations 
(conduct) 
-•market position 
(performance of 
individual 
companies and 
groups of 
companies) 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework 
strutted in section 3.3 into operational definitions. An operational 
definition specifies how we will measure a particular variable so that 
we can capture the shape of it or to assign a score to it. In reviewing 
the steps and procedures that we will follow to obtain a measurement 
of our abstract concepts, it is useful to present the conceptual frame-
work, which provides a basis for our analysis in succeeding chapters, 
once again in figure 4.1. The remainder of this section is divided into 
the elaboration of the following concepts: (a) market situation, (b) 
market concentration, (c) market position, (d) plant size, (e) vertical 
integration, (f) investments in conversion facilities, (g) access to natural 
resources, (h) access to distribution channels and marketing outlets. 
Market situation 
As we have seen in chapter 1, market situation reflects the state of a 
particular product or industry at a certain moment or a short period 
of time brought about by both demand and supply aspects. The market 
situation is gauged here in terms of the industry life cycle concept. 
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This means that we will establish whether a product or (part of) an 
industry finds itself in an introduction stage, an expansion stage, a 
maturity stage or a decline stage. Determination of the Ufe cycle phase 
into which the Western European oil refining and ethylene manufac-
turing industry have moved is based on two characteristics, namely 
the number of competitors engaged and the trend in the volume of 
production particularly in relation to demand. 
Market concentration 
Market concentration relates to the degree to which production for 
or in a particular market or industry is concentrated in the hands of a few 
Urge firms (Clarke 1985, 9; de Jong 1993, 3). In essence, it informs us 
about the relative importance of the m largest firms within a sector at 
a particular point in time. To put it briefly, measurement of market 
concentration implies that we are concerned with individual markets 
or industries, and with the number and relative sizes of firms involved 
(absolute concentration) and/or the extent to which market shares are 
(un)equally distributed among producers (relative concentration). 
Other things equal, a market is said to be more concentrated the fewer 
the number of firms in production or the more skewed the distribution 
of market shares. In accordance with de Jong (1993, 10) we will use 
the concentration ratio as a measure to determine the oscillations in the 
degree of market concentration in the Western European oil refining 
and basic petrochemical industry through time. The concentration 
ratio, which should be rated as the most widely used concentration 
index, can be defined as the proportion of industry output accounted 
for by the m largest firms, where m is an arbitrary number. The formula 
is written as 
m 
Cm=YgPi (i = l,...m,m + l,...n) 
¿=1 
where the ith firm has rank ι in a descending order of classification, 
where С is the sum of the shares of the m top firms, and where Pi is 
the share of firm i. 
In the present research, the choice of m — the number of large firms 
to be considered — depends upon the following criterion. There has 
to be a significant difference between the market share held by the 
firm which ranks Jrth in the Western European league table of 
companies involved in oil refining and/or ethylene manufacture and 
the producer which occupies the Jrth + 1 position. In other words, if 
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the latter market participant does not add substantially to the propor-
tion of the Western European total controlled by higher-ranking 
producers, we will exclude it from our analysis of the level of market 
concentration and, thus, confine ourselves to a few leading firms. In 
doing so, we seek to counter an important point of criticism which is 
often launched at the concentration ratio as a measure of concentra-
tion, namely its arbitrariness with respect to the number of large-sized 
companies that are to be included in the investigation (i.e. m, the 
numerator chosen). Another remark that needs to be made in applying 
concentration indices in general and the concentration ratio in par-
ticular has to do with the danger which we may run when drawing 
inter-industry comparisons. In interpreting disparities in concentra-
tion levels between industries, we should be careful because, to some 
extent, they have to be regarded as sector-specific. Indeed, it is easy 
to appreciate that the market structure of each industrial activity is the 
result of a specific trajectory, characterized by differences in opportu-
nities to exploit market power, in international market conditions etc. 
(Lagendijk 1993, 166). 
Market position 
Market or competitive position refers to how a business organization 
stands in relation to those other firms within a particular sector which 
are competing for the same customers as itself and/or for the same 
resources. In this study the market position of individual producers 
within our sectors is established by looking at market share as an 
indicator. Although much of the research in this area has used market 
share as a measure of market power and there is evidence that the 
former variable and profitability are positively linked to each other, 
we regard market share merely as an indication of the relative 
significance of the various actors within the Western European oil 
refining and basic petrochemical industry Johnson and Scholes 1989, 
189). We will measure the market share of individual companies at 
several moments in time on the basis of data concerning the ownership 
structure, and figures regarding oil refining (primary distillation) and 
ethylene capacity of all the Western European production facilities. 
Plant size 
In section 3.3 we have posited that as growth opportunities dry up 
and the Western European oil and petrochemical industry are ageing, 
small, single plant owners are likely to show reluctance to sell or close 
their production unit and, thus, to withdraw from the market, through 
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which the concentration ratios of these sectors may stabilize rather 
than increase in the short run. In order to verify this hypothesis, we 
need to determine the size of individual plants. This will be undertaken 
by gathering information on the primary distillation and ethylene 
capacity of the various Western European production sites. In accord-
ance with Steenbakkers and Wever (1991, 92) and Molle (1993, 51), 
we will classify the different production units as follows: 
In oil refining (primary distillation) a plant is indicated as small if 
its production capacity is less than 5 million tonnes a year (Mt/y), 
medium-sized if the capacity varies between 5 and 10 Mt/y and 
large-sized if output is above 10 Mt/y. With regard to ethylene 
manufacture, on the other hand, production facilities are described as 
small-sized when capacity is below 100 thousand tonnes a year (1,000 
t/y), medium-sized when capacity ranges from 100 to 500 (1,000 t/y) 
and large when it is over 500 (1,000 t/y). 
Vertical integration 
In essence, the term 'vertical integration' is used in two distinct ways 
in industrial economics. First, it relates to an existing state or organ-
izational structure. In this sense it refers to the extent to which a single 
business unit carries on successive stages of the vertical processing chain 
of a product. In addition, however, this term is applied in connection 
with behaviour or conduct, by which it expresses a course of action 
of a firm that seeks to move into another related stage of the production 
sequence, either through external methods, such as vertical partner-
ships or mergers, or internally by setting up new production facilities. 
Whereas backward integration, which represents the development 
into activities further back in a firm's value chain, has been imple-
mented by many chemical companies to secure their raw material 
supplies, forward integration, which involves the development into 
activities which are concerned with a firm's output, has propelled 
several oil companies into petrochemicals. In order to assess whether 
producers engaged in Western European oil refining and basic petro-
chemical production strive to realize or have already adopted a strategy 
of vertical integration, we will look at business portfolios as well as ask 
questions about recent and future changes regarding their product 
scope. 
Investments in conversion facilities 
The fundamental shift in the composition of demand for oil products 
from heavy fractions (e.g. fuel oil) towards the 'light end' of the barrel. 
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such as gasoline, naphtha and LPG, has incited many owners of 
Western European refining installations to invest in conversion capac-
ity (catalytic cracking in particular). An assessment of the investments 
that refiners operative on the Western European market have made 
in this respect will be achieved by examining the evolution of the 
catalytic cracking and hydrocracking capacity owned by (the various 
groups of) individual companies between 1985 and 1995. These 
production figures will be taken from a specialized periodical, notably 
Oil and Gas Journal. 
Access to natural resources 
As we have pointed out, since the oil crises of the seventies operators 
in the oil business have witnessed substantial changes in the control 
and access to crude supplies. It is undeniable that at the upstream end 
of the processing chain, a reshuffling process of great significance has 
taken place especially among the principal players (i.e. the major oil 
companies and the OPEC companies). The reshuffling upstream may 
also have curtailed the traditional dominance of the large international 
oil companies downstream on the Western European market. The 
alterations in access to crude oil supplies and the possible implications 
for the pattern of (dis)investment with respect to Western European 
oil refining and/or basic petrochemical production units are estab-
lished by making use of quantitative as well as qualitative information. 
More precisely, we will examine the changes which took place in the 
volume of world crude oil production of members of the five 
categories of market participants distinguished above for the period 
1980-1990. These quantitative data will be supplemented with infor-
mation obtained from personal interviews with strategy managers of 
various oil and chemical companies. 
Access to distribution channeh and marketing outlets 
There is good reason to believe that the process of repositioning has 
not only taken place in the upstream area of the oil industry, but also 
downstream among participants on the Western European oil and 
petrochemical market. Whereas some companies have withdrawn 
almost completely from the Western European scene, newcomers 
have also appeared. Especially firms from OPEC countries have 
managed to secure a foothold in this market area by joining forces 
with or acquiring the assets of other producers. In order to investigate 
the changes which have occurred in the accessibility to distribution 
channels and marketing outlets, we will again employ both quantità-
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uve and qualitative data. This means that we will look at the alterations 
which came about in the shares of the various groups of producers in 
the total Western European network of service stations between 1985 
and 1991. Apart from this quantitative approach, we will review the 
perceptions of the various strategy managers interviewed regarding the 
improvement or deterioration in relative importance observed in this 
field of operation. 
4.5 Data collection 
To achieve an adequate measurement of the variables dealt with in 
the previous section, data has been gathered in three ways. First, we 
have made use of secondary sources. More precisely, information on 
the shifts which have taken place in oil and petrochemical production 
between the individual world regions (i.e. analysis on the macro level) 
has been obtained from statistics emanating from (petro) chemical 
magazines and handbooks (e.g. Directory of Chemical Producers) as 
well as various World Development Reports published by the World 
Bank. Besides, our investigation of the market position of individual 
Western European producers engaged in the oil refining and basic 
petrochemical industry rests predominandy on secondary data. Whilst 
production capacity figures have been drawn from a variety of 
specialized periodicals, such as Petroleum Times, Oil and Gas Journal, 
and European Chemical News, the main part of the data on the 
ownership structure of Western European production facilities have 
been taken from Directory of Chemical Producers. 
Second, the remainder of the information on the latter issue has 
been collected by telephone interviews carried out with key persons 
of the public relations department of several oil refineries and ethylene 
crackers in Western Europe. The telephone interviews took place 
between May and July 1993. 
Finally, explanations of the strategic behaviour of the market 
participants selected have been distilled from face-to-face personal 
interviews conducted with upper-level managers from the department 
of strategy integration and (corporate) planning of the Western Euro-
pean headquarters of several oil and chemical companies. These 
interviews can be described as semi-structured and formal in the sense 
that the questions posed have had a standardized sequence and have 
been worked out beforehand and the wording has been tailored to 
each individual firm. We have chosen this form of interviewing, 
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because it tends to contribute significantly to the reliability of the 
research findings. 
We have done the interviews on the basis of a questionnaire which 
consisted primarily of open questions and covered three topics. The 
first part of the interview has focused on the product and geographical 
scope of the company's operations, that is to say the types of business 
and market areas it has been or intends to become involved in. In the 
second part we have discussed the strategies on which the company 
has embarked under prevailing Western European market and pro-
duction conditions. This means that emphasis has been placed particu-
larly on adaptations made in the company's pattern of investment in 
response to recent shifts in the volume and pattern of demand, and 
changes in the conditions of access to crude supplies and marketing 
outlets. In the last part of the interview we have reviewed the methods 
of external growth employed by which the firm has implemented the 
(renewed) courses of action. There consideration is given to topics, 
such as the joint ventures and mergers into which it has entered and 
the possible acquisitions that have been undertaken. 
In seeking to gain insight into these complex and multifaceted 
issues, personal interviews seem to be the most suitable mode of data 
collection. Indeed, compared with written questionnaires, for exam-
ple, personal interviews clearly offer some important advantages. In 
particular, it can be claimed that the latter method enables the 
interviewer to notice and correct the respondent's misunderstandings, 
to probe inadequate or vague responses, and to answer questions and 
allay concerns. In this context, the observation should be made that 
we have postponed conducting the personal interviews until we were 
convinced that we had collected as much secondary data as possible 
on the ownership structure and production capacity of all the Western 
European oil refineries and ethylene crackers. By carrying out the 
present research in this sequence, we have been better able to obtain 
accurate in-depth knowledge. Moreover, it has allowed us to verify 
our findings and correct possible errors regarding the secondary 
information gathered. 
The interview sessions were held in the period March-July 1994. The 
sample of 11 companies was approached by means of a letter of 
introduction which was sent to them in early 1994. Next we made an 
appointment with corporate executives of the business strategy divi-
sion of both the oil and chemical sector of these companies. In 10 
cases the researcher was invited to an interview (a response of 91 
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percent). The following companies were prepared to participate in 
our research: Shell, BP, Petrofina, ICI, Dow, BASF, Oilinvest (Tam-
oil), Elf Atochem, ENI/Enichem and Total. 
4.6 Data analysis 
The final stage is the processing and analysis of the empirical material 
collected. In essence, the information generated by our research yields 
two sets of data. One set is made up of data concerning the ownership 
structure and production capacity of Western European oil refining 
and ethylene cracking units on the basis of which we have determined 
the market shares of all individual participants and, hence, their market 
position. These facts have been classified and analyzed by applying the 
computer program dBASE 4. 
The other is composed of the information obtained from the 
conversations with strategic decision-makers of the companies men-
tioned above. The interviews have been tape-recorded and sub-
sequendy transcribed literally, which resulted in about 290 pages of 
text. We have sent provisional research reports to all managers 
interviewed for verification of our results and conclusions. In meth-
odological terms this is known as member checks. Part of the ques-
tionnaire-based findings is used to buttress the secondary data. 
Having outlined the main methodological ingredients on which the 
rest of this book is built, we are now ready to put this blueprint into 
reality. 
5 
Global Shifts in Oil and Petrochemical 
Production 
5.1 Introduction 
In seeking to understand the reshuffling process among producers 
engaged in Western European oil refining and/or basic petrochemical 
production — the main thread which binds this book together — it is 
necessary to transfer our attention to the aggregate dynamics of these 
sectors on a global scale and to provide a crude explanation of the 
pattern of structural change. Without doubt, the development of the 
oil and petrochemical industry is at root extremely international. 
Reference back to chapter 1 shows that we have already mentioned 
that it would be unrealistic, to say the least, to approach the Western 
European market as being a watertight container in which changes 
have come about in the market position of the companies involved. 
As was indicated there, the fact that some of the world's largest global 
corporations play a prominent role in these sectors necessitates us to 
adopt a worldwide scope of analysis. It is easy to appreciate that by 
being the owner of a global manufacturing system in which individual 
plants are often interlinked, decision making about reorganization of 
corporate production tends to slice through the boundaries of the 
Western European market. To take an example: Shell's decision to 
create a new ethylene cracker in South Korea may have negative 
repercussions on its production facilities in Europe. 
Although these large multinationals with sometimes worldwide 
horizons may legitimately be regarded as the principal agents of change 
as far as the development of the oil and petrochemical industry at the 
international scale is concerned, there is another reason why we have 
to alter our lens to a global perspective. In the former chapter we have 
already emphasized that many governments in Western Europe have 
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been quite keen to promote the oil and petrochemical industry 
whether by indirect means or through direct intervention. Chapman 
(1991,144) has pointed out, however, that the willingness of the state 
to support these sectors has obviously not remained confined to the 
advanced Western countries. Greater state involvement outside the 
core economies can be especially attributed to recent market trends. 
By being the handmaiden of several industries, it is plausible that these 
sectors have attracted state intervention in those countries which have 
pushed ahead with industrialization and have witnessed a rapid growth 
in manufacturing production (i.e. the so-called Newly Industrializing 
Countries). In an attempt to become less dependent on or even to 
replace imports of oil products the governments of these countries 
have strived to establish their own basic petrochemical industry. Of 
course, the variable of market conditions is not solely responsible for 
the great interest which national governments have taken in these 
sectors. Indeed, since the events of the 1970s, by which crude oil 
became a dominant element in the overall cost structure of these 
industries, governments of several oil-rich countries have stimulated 
and implemented diversification into downstream activities (oil refin-
ing, distribution and marketing in particular). The downstream invest-
ments on which they have embarked in their own home countries 
may also have induced changes in the world map of the oil and 
petrochemical industry in terms of production capacity. 
It is with the general worldwide processes of change that this 
chapter is concerned. We aim to describe and explain the main shifts 
which have been occurring in these sectors both between the various 
economic regions in the world (section 5.2) and between countries 
within Western Europe (section 5.3) especially since the early eighties. 
Like earlier studies which have examined the changing global distri-
bution of a particular industry and which have explored the array of 
forces which may act upon the investment behaviour of the producers 
involved and may underlie the consequent reorganization of produc-
tion, we will refrain from considering all of them, but restrict ourselves 
to those criteria that have been identified as the most fundamental 
determinants. In order to gain insight into the way in which the global 
oil and petrochemical industry map has been reshaped, it is sufficient 
at this stage to draw basically upon aspects, such as traditional macro-
economic conditions (i.e. market size) and resource endowment or a 
combination of both for our interpretation (Ballance and Sinclair 
1985, 72; Chapman 1991, 110; Auty 1993, 187). By making use 
primarily of these conventional dicta of international economics and 
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therefore by abstracting away from non-commercial aspects, such as 
political forces, which unmistakably also impinge on the spatial 
evolution of our sectors, we need to acknowledge that in doing so 
nothing more than a general understanding of the changing competi-
tiveness of the producers involved in the oil and/or petrochemical 
industry in a particular regional market can be provided. We have 
already underlined the dangers of explaining the (international) devel-
opment of our sectors in terms of a deterministic response to market 
forces in section 3.3. However, this applies particularly to an in-depth 
study and interpretation of the (relative) competitive position of 
individual companies and the changes in that through time. Therefore 
in chapter 6 which seeks to reveal significant variations in investment 
behaviour between players on the Western European oil and petro-
chemical market, and which investigates the developments at the level 
of individual business organizations, it is imperative to embrace also 
other factors and, thus, to probe more deeply into the main underlying 
reasons for the differences observed. 
5.2 The world context 
In presenting and analyzing statistical pictures of global patterns, we 
will deal with the oil and petrochemical industry separately. 
5.2.1 The oil industry 
Undoubtedly, one of the most significant general developments in the 
world economy during the past few decades has been the increasing 
internationalization of production and trade in the manufacturing 
sector. Indeed, it is undeniable that a growing number of countries 
have succeeded in catapulting themselves out of the non-industrialized 
ranks. It is reasonable to assume that some of them have also emerged 
as growth points with respect to the oil industry to which their govern-
ments and local companies have made a commitment as part of their 
wider industrialization programmes and objectives. The attractions of 
the oil business as an instrument of their development strategies can 
be attributed to the fact that this sector is often regarded as a strategic 
industry and as an engine of economic power. Let us look at the most 
important implications of the efforts devoted to the promotion and 
growth of this sector, which may predominandy have been made 
outside the industrialized countries, for the relative changes in its 
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Table 5.1 Changes in production (PRO) and consumption (COP) of crude 
oil and capacity of refineries (REC) by world region between 1950 and 
1993 (percentages) 
Region 
Western Europe 
North America 
Ілап America 
Middle Em 
ЛштЬш 
South East Asia 
(incl Japan and China) 
Africa 
Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet Union 
World Tool 
PRO 
COP 
REC 
PRO 
COP 
REC 
PRO 
COP 
REC 
PRO 
COP 
REC 
PRO 
COP 
REC 
PRO 
COP 
REC 
PRO 
COP 
REC 
PRO 
COP 
REC 
PRO 
COP 
REC 
1950 
0 
12 
8 
54 
64 
61 
19 
8 
12 
16 
2 
8 
0 
0 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
β 
β 
β 
100 
100 
100 
1960 
19 
17 
36 
48 
48 
IB 
7 
12 
25 
3 
6 
0 
1 
0 
3 
6 
6 
2 
2 
0 
15 
14 
11 
100 
100 
too 
1970 
1 
28 
28 
26 
34 
28 
12 
6 
11 
29 
2 
5 
0 
1 
3 
13 
10 
13 
2 
Τ 
16 
14 
16 
100 
100 
100 
1980 
4 
22 
25 
18 
30 
25 
10 
8 
И 
30 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
7 
16 
15 
10 
2 
3 
20 
18 
16 
100 
100 
100 
1990 
6 
20 
18 
16 
27 
23 
12 
β 
10 
27 
5 
7 
1 
1 
9 
20 
17 
10 
3 
4 
19 
16 
20 
100 
100 
100 
1993 
7 
21 
19 
16 
28 
23 
13 
8 
10 
30 
6 
7 
1 
1 
1 
10 
23 
19 
10 
3 
4 
13 
10 
17 
100 
too 
100 
Source: 1950,1960: Molle and Wever (1984, 31) and The Institute of Petro­
leum (1992); 1970,1980,1990 and 1993: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 1976,1990 and 1994 respectively 
spatial organization. Table 5.1 depicts the main shifts in the relative 
importance of the various economic regions in the world as regards 
world production and consumption of crude oil as well as refinery 
capacity from 1950 onwards. 
Evidently, the global structure of production in the oil industry and 
oil consumption has changed substantially with the passage of time. 
One of the most striking features is the fact that the Asian Pacific region 
has experienced a massive boost in demand for oil products particularly 
since the eighties. In terms of demand, South East Asia even outpaced 
Western Europe through which it soared to second place in the world 
league table. Although North America is still by far the world's largest 
consumer, it is quite conceivable that this premier position will be 
increasingly challenged by the Far East in the near future. In order to 
cope with this rapid upturn in consumption, the oil refining capacity 
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(primary distillation) has been expanded in the latter market area. Its 
share in the world total virtually doubled from 10 percent in 1970, to 
about 19 percent in 1993. This means that currently South East Asia 
and Western Europe both occupy the second position regarding their 
share of total world primary distillation output, that is to say they are 
running neck and neck. 
Until now North America has not only been able to continue to 
dominate regarding the consumption of crude oil, but also on the 
world refining scene. Yet, it needs to be emphasized that many refiners 
in this region have embarked on major rationalizations by which they 
have brought their primary distillation capacity more in line with the 
downward shift in the volume of demand. In the 1950-1993 period 
its share of total world refining capacity shrunk significandy from 61 
percent to 23 percent. Actually, especially North America, but also 
Western Europe have lost much ground in favour of other parts of 
the world, notably South East Asia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, 
Africa and the Middle East. Despite the relative importance of the 
refinery industry in the Middle East is rather small, it has to be 
underlined that this region has made quite substantial gains in this 
respect since the beginning of the 1980s. Whereas in 1980 its crude 
distillation capacity amounted to 176 million tonnes, it rose to 247 
million tonnes in 1993. This recent expansion can be ascribed to the 
desire of oil-producing countries to valorize their crude oil better than 
before by processing it prior to export, in order to benefit more from 
the revenues which the oil industry may generate. Besides, it has 
already been noted (see section 3.3) that this increase in production 
also rests upon their policy to diversify their economies away from a 
high degree of dependence upon oil alone. In other words, it is partly 
the result of their wish to eliminate the wide gap which still exists 
between their enormous natural resource endowment and potential, 
and their involvement in downstream activities within their home 
countries. Indeed, as table 5.1 reveals, while the Middle East was 
responsible for 30 percent of total crude oil production in the world 
in 1993, it accounted for 7 percent of world crude distillation capacity. 
The fact that the latter region still plays a marginal role in world oil 
refining is particularly attributable to its limited scale of consumption 
of oil products. Indeed, though in the Middle East demand increased 
twofold from 100 million tonnes in 1980 (3 percent of the world total) 
to 180 million tonnes in 1993 (a little under 6 percent of the world 
total), consumption was obviously lagging behind production by the 
mid-nineties. A corollary is that some companies from oil-rich coun-
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tries have made a commitment to downstream activities (refining and 
marketing in particular) amongst others in Western Europe during the 
last few decades. We will revert to these downstream investments in 
section 6.6, where the strategic decisions of state producers from oil 
exporting countries are treated in more detail. 
It is easy to appreciate that by being burdened with a mismatch 
between production and consumption in the Middle East and in most 
other world regions, there is a clear need to overcome this imbalance 
through international trade. Figure 5.1 gives an indication of the 
changing flows of trade in crude oil in 1976 and 1993 respectively. 
Figure 5.1 Major trade movements of crude oil between zones, 1976,1993 
Source: BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry (1976, 15), (1994, 
17) 
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The generalized geography of trade movements of crude oil between 
the major world regions over the last decades, as displayed in figure 
5.1, suggests that elements of both continuity and change have been 
apparent. Continuity is evident in the sense that the Middle East has 
remained the leading exporter of crude oil through time. In 1993 
almost half of all world exports of oil was generated by this part of the 
world. 
Without doubt, however, some marked changes have also taken 
place. It should not come as a surprise that the export performance of 
the Middle East has been gready challenged since the oil price 
escalations of the 1970s. Indeed, the fact that it suffered a relative 
decline in total crude oil export by about 15 percentage points 
between 1976 and 1993 (from 69 to 54 percent), bears witness to this. 
Africa and the former Soviet Union in particular have infringed on 
the export market of the Middle East through which some 'fraying-
at-the-edges' regarding the trade in crude oil of the latter has hap-
pened. These other main oil producing regions have managed to 
curtail the Middle East's leadership as a crude exporter and have made 
quite impressive inroads into, for example, Western Europe as the 
world's largest importer, because consumers in general have pursued 
a strategy aimed at diminishing their dependence on OPEC oil. That 
is, they have strived to replace it by indigenous crude or by supplies 
from elsewhere. Yet, not only the volume, but also the pattern of trade 
particularly from the Middle East has changed a great deal. In fact, 
flows of trade have become more complex and diverse from a spatial 
point of view. Previously, Western Europe was obviously the prime 
destination of the Middle East's crude exports. Quite recendy, how-
ever, these exports have been increasingly directed to other market 
areas - most notably South East Asia to the detriment of Western 
Europe. In the 1976-1993 period the share of total crude exports from 
the Middle East going to South East Asia rose from 27 percent to 49 
percent. The Western European trend was exacdy opposite to this: 
whereas Western Europe contained the lion's share of 45 percent in 
1976, it only accounted for 27 percent in 1993. This relative fall 
mirrors the aforementioned policy adopted by most European gov-
ernments to limit their reliance on imported oil from the Middle East. 
What clearly emerges from this brief survey of the manner in which 
the oil industry has relocated globally is an increased involvement of 
South East Asia and the Middle East in this sector. Conversely, it seems 
reasonable to infer that there are signs of a weakened relative position 
of the oil business in Western Europe and North America. In order 
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to shed additional light on these contrasting experiences, we will now 
examine more closely the growth rates in primary distillation capacity 
and the main variations between the individual world regions. Figure 
5.2 plots the differential patterns of growth from 1950 onwards. 
As figure 5.2 displays, both Western Europe and North America 
saw extremely impressive growth rates which exceeded by far those 
of other regions and continued to increase steadily up to 1975 and 
1980 respectively. Mark that this finding only concerns primary 
distillation capacity and not adaptations made in the form of expansions 
of conversion capacity. It is apparent, though that, apart from a slight 
recovery since the early nineties, the economic turbulence of the 
1970s has thrown their pattern of development in terms of volume of 
production into reverse. As opposed to this, some regions outside these 
1100 
1930 1955 1960 1965 1970 197S 1990 199$ 1990 1995 
year 
<· Western Europe · Asla/Pacfflc 
•* North America M Africa 
-• Latti America * Eastern Europe and 
- * Middle East former Soviet Union 
Figure 5.2 Evolution of primary distillation capacity by major world region, 
1950-1995 (Mt/year) 
Source: 1950, I960: Molle and Wever (1984, 31) and The Institute of Petro-
leum (1992); 1970-1995: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, various years 
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advanced Western economies and, especially, South East Asia have 
enjoyed a continuous absolute rise in their level of output. Indeed, 
particularly the Asian-Pacific region stands out from other non-tradi-
tional market areas, such as the Middle East and Africa in the sense 
that it has undergone the most pronounced pattern of growth. Its 
development can be apdy summarized as 'late start but fastest expan-
sion'. Figure 5.2 demonstrates that by 1994 it even succeeded to 
overtake Western Europe. Here, again, we see further evidence of the 
tact that the former region has constituted a major counterchallenge 
to Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America. Having 
sketched out the evolution of the oil refining industry in terms of 
trends in primary distillation capacity in the main economic regions, 
we can now place the relative decrease in importance of the two latter 
parts of the world pointed out above in their proper perspective. In 
essence, their declined proportion of total world crude distillation 
capacity stems not so much from their absolute reductions in output 
but rather from the spectacular emergence of other geographical areas, 
such as Asia, and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union which 
have irrefutably become substantial forces in this sector. Regarding 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, however, it is useful to 
remark that the influence of these two regions as refiners (primary 
distillation) in output terms is likely to remain rather uncertain in the 
next decades (Shell Venster 1994). 
On the basis of the previous synoptic discussion about the changing 
international distribution of the oil (refining) industry in both relative 
and absolute terms, we may come to the conclusion that the traditional 
core economies (i.e. Western Europe and the United States) fared 
worse in comparison with some other world regions during the past 
decades. In order to explain the variations in regional competitiveness 
which have governed the investment behaviour of the producers 
involved and have led to an altered world map, we will follow 
Chapman (1991, 110) in applying the concept of market size to 
account for the observed dispersal of oil refining activities on a global 
scale. Market size may give a clear indication of the extent to which 
domestic demand can influence the economic structure and, more 
specifically, the volume of output of a particular sector (Ballance and 
Sinclair 1985, 53). The size of the potential market comprises the 
wealth and structure of the economy as well as its absolute size. 
Whereas per capita GNP (Gross National Product) can be used as a 
rough economic development indicator of the former aspects (Dicken 
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Figure 5.3 Primary distillation capacity andf market size by country in 1990 
Source: Own calculations based on data in Oil and Gas Journal, Worldwide 
Refining, 25 December 1989 and World Development Report, Develop­
ment and the Environment, 1992 
1986,122; 1992,131), the latter can be expressed in population terms. 
Measuring market size, then, involves multiplying the per capita GNP 
by the country's population in the same year. In figure 5.3 we have 
related the crude distillation capacity to market size (as indicated by 
per capita GNP based on 1990 dollars and exchange rates X popu­
lation in 1990) of some countries spread all over the world. 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates that broadly speaking, there prevails a straight-line 
(linear) relationship between both variables. But it also shows that the 
position of some countries departs from the market size versus pro-
duction capacity trend line. Several of them produce more than their 
national markets seem to justify, including Mexico, Thailand, Saudi 
Arabia and the Netherlands, whilst others, such as Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom lie somewhat below this line. These imperfections 
imply that the sector's development is not solely explainable by means 
of the size of the domestic market. On the basis of a stricdy commercial 
logic, only part of the story can be told. The point has already been 
made (see section 3.3) that the oil industry has become largely 
politicized in a wide range of countries either through state ownership 
or by indirect government intervention. Consequendy, in interpreting 
the anomalies of figure 5.3 which reflect the investment decisions 
taken by individual producers within these countries, we need to 
incorporate not only commercial criteria, but also political considera-
tions. Moreover, there are good reasons for supposing that through 
dependence on oil and natural gas as feedstocks resource endowment 
may also exert a deviational influence on the interaction between 
demand conditions and the significance of the industry in volume 
terms. Indeed, in cases where there is an abundant natural resource 
base (e.g. Saudi Arabia or other OPEC countries), strategic choices 
may be dictated by endowment rather than by market factors. 
The role of governments and their policies adopted, by which they 
may have defied market forces and may have affected comparative 
advantage and, therefore, the pattern of (dis)investment in Western 
Europe, is further explored and discussed in chapter 6. 
Before dealing with the strategic behaviour of state-controlled 
companies and other categories of producers within these sectors, the 
transformation of the geography of the world basic petrochemical 
industry will be treated. Next, a description of the differences in 
expansion and contraction of oil refining and petrochemical manufac-
ture between individual countries within Western Europe will be 
given. 
5.2.2 The basic petrochemical industry 
In investigating the worldwide dispersal of the basic petrochemical 
industry, we will restrict ourselves to ethylene which can be regarded 
as a key petrochemical product. This prominent status is attributable 
to its volume of production as well as its versatility in the sense that a 
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large number of the most significant commodities are derived from it. 
As a consequence, it may be assumed that ethylene capacity provides 
a reliable indication of the spatial configuration of the basic petro­
chemical sector in general and, hence, that actual petrochemical 
production is basically consistent with the scale of output of ethylene. 
Just as in our preceding discussion of the world oil industry, we 
will proceed in more or less the same way in the following analysis of 
the global restructuring of petrochemical manufacture. 
Table 5.2 is devoted to the historical and estimated production of 
ethylene both in absolute (1,000 tonnes/year) and relative terms for 
the various geographic regions. 
Drawing a comparison between the relative changes in the various 
world regions with respect to primary distillation capacity as presented 
in table 5.1 and those regarding production of ethylene shown in table 
5.2, we can see that broadly speaking trends have followed parallel 
courses. Like in the case of oil refining, once again North America in 
general, and the United States in particular, as well as Western Europe 
have lost relative strength and have, to some extent, undergone an 
erosion of their previous competitive edge in ethylene in favour of 
other market areas. On closer examination, however, it appears that 
although their proportion of total world ethylene capacity has shrunk, 
their position has not flagged as much as in world oil refining. Actually, 
in 1990 these two regions still accounted for a majority share of over 
60 percent of world production of ethylene. If the core economy of 
Japan, whose share of world output has dropped slightly, is added to 
this, the figure even reached almost three-quarters of the total in the 
same year. 
Table S.2 World ethylene capacity by geographic region in the 1950-2000 
period 
1950 I960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
(estimated) 
1,000 % 1.000 S 1,000 % 1.000 4 1,000 % 1,000 % 
tonna tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes 
USA2 7 « 981 2.800 78 4 9.299 44 7 17,478 39 18,350 35J 22,660 31 7 
Western Europe 14 19 695 19 5 7,725 37.2 17,060 38 14.740 28.4 17J50 24.3 
Japan - 0 42 11 2,664 12.8 5,362 12 5.537 10.6 7,203 10.1 
Othet» - 0 34 1.0 1,100 5.3 4,954 11 13,367 25.7 24,177 33 9 
Tool 757 100 3.517 100 20,788 100 44,479 100 51.7B4 100 71J90 100 
'Excluding the communist Ыос 
including Puerto Puco 
Sonne data from ICI ОктиаЬ and Pdymets ltd 
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Whereas from a relative viewpoint, the importance of the three 
Triad regions has decreased through time, in absolute terms their 
production capacity of ethylene is expected to continue to grow 
towards the end of the century (see table 5.2). The absolute figures 
listed in table 5.2 are translated graphically in figure 5.4. The curves 
in figure 5.4 indicate the development of ethylene production by 
geographic region over the period 1950-2000. 
It is worth noting that the ethylene production patterns of the 
United States and Western Europe displayed a clear congruence until 
around 1980. These two growth trends behaved identically in the 
1950-1980 period in the sense that output of both regions rose steadily. 
Yet, between 1980 and 1990 the development of their output curves 
differed. In the United States total ethylene capacity continued to 
increase, although at a much slower rate than prior to 1980. This is in 
contrast with Western Europe which saw a downturn in its volume 
- • Japan 
-A Rest (ritte world 
Figure 5.4 Ethylene capacity by geographic region, 1950-2000 (1,000 ton-
nes/year) 
Source: Data from ICI Chemicals and Polymers Ltd. 
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of production. But, since the early nineties growth has resumed in the 
latter region as a result of the fact that several new ethylene plants have 
been commissioned. Additional cracking units have recendy been 
brought into operation by BP in Grangemouth, by BASF and Petto-
rina in Antwerp, by Veba in Gelsenkirchen and by Enichem in 
Brindisi. What also attracts attention is that some regions which 
constitute the category of the rest of the world have been able to attain 
a spectacular rate of growth particularly since the 1980s. A glance at 
figure 5.4 makes clear that through this globalization reflected in a big 
jump in production capacity in the geographical area outside the Triad 
regions, the group labelled Others' managed to surpass Western 
Europe at the beginning of the 1990s and it is likely to overtake the 
United States before the turn of the century. We must be careful to 
note, however, that not all regions in this group are significant 
ethylene producers. This broad classification masks some considerable 
variations between individual regions as figure 5.5 demonstrates. 
Like the evolutionary path which the oil refining industry has 
followed in Asia, the biggest increase in ethylene production seems to 
come from this part of the world. Asia clearly contains the bulk of 
ethylene output outside the Western core economies and another 
round of capacity expansion is forecast for the near future. Apart from 
the Asian region, the Middle East also appears to be responsible for 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
REGION 
Figure 5.5 Present and future ethylene capacity by world region, various years 
Source: SRI: Ethylene Supplement, October 1993 
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the growth of productivity outside the traditional centres of activity. 
The main motives underlying the enlargement of ethylene capacity 
in the Middle East broadly coincide with those which have triggered 
investments in oil refining, such as the wish to add value to oil 
products. In addition to this, however, output has been stepped up to 
meet rapidly growing demand (SRI - Ethylene Supplement 1991, 
3-4). 
Table 5.3 quantifies the trends in ethylene consumption in the 
various regions of the world for the period 1992-2000. 
The biggest boost in consumption is likely to occur in the Middle 
East/Africa and Asia. Annual growth rates of 13 and 9 percent 
respectively, are expected in these regions throughout the present 
decade. Notwithstanding the fact that North America as well as 
Western Europe tend to experience about the lowest rates of growth, 
it is reasonable to suppose that they will remain the key markets for 
base chemicals in the immediate future. Contrary to our expectations, 
it is believed that the prospects for a rise in ethylene demand in Japan 
in the next few years will be even poorer than those in North America 
and Western Europe, as table 5.3 reveals. We do not have an 
explanation for this bleak oudook. 
Having analyzed the shifts in the pattern of world ethylene production 
and consumption, it can be said that in Asia and the Middle East the 
basic petrochemical industry has evolved more or less in accordance 
with the oil refining sector. More precisely, both regions have become 
quite significant competitive forces on the international market for 
ethylene, at least in relative terms. Indeed, it cannot be denied that 
Table 5.3 Growth in ethylene demand (million tonnes) 
Western Europe 
North America 
Eastern Europe 
Middle Eau/Afiica 
Laan America 
Japan 
East Asia/ Oceania 
Toral 
1992 
16 
21 
6 
3 
3 
6 
7 
62 
1995 
17 
23 
7 
4 
4 
7 
9 
71 
2000 
19 
26 
10 
В 
S 
7 
14 
69 
% annual change 
1992-2000 
2.2 
2.7 
6.6 
13.0 
6.6 
1.9 
9.1 
46 
Source: Chemical and Engineering News (from Chem Systems ltd) 
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these market areas have gained ground at the expense of North 
America and Western Europe in this line of business, although to a 
lesser degree than in the case of oil refining. 
To elucidate these changes in the fortunes of individual regions 
with respect to ethylene production, we will adopt a similar approach 
as we did in our examination of the worldwide distribution of the oil 
refining industry by using the notion of market size. Figure 5.6 
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Figure 5.6 Ethylene capacity and market size by country in 1990 
Source: calculated from data in Oil and Gas Journal, Annual Petrochemical 
Report, 10 September 1990 and World Development Report, Development 
and the Environment, 1992 
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illustrates the relationship between ethylene capacity and market size 
(as expressed by per capita GNP based on 1990 dollars and exchange 
rates X population in 1990). We have limited the analysis to the same 
countries as in figure 5.3 (including the United States). 
Reference back to figure 5.3 shows that there is a remarkable degree 
of correspondence with the diagram of figure 5.6. Indeed, this diagram 
indicates once again a positive correlation which is not perfect. In 
essence, virtually the same countries deviate from the market size 
versus production capacity pattern as already noted on the basis of the 
graphic representation of figure 5.3. Countries such as the Nether-
lands, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Brazil apparendy lie above this trend 
line. Switzerland, India and Iran, on the other hand, are positioned 
below it. The fact that figure 5.4 and figure 5.6 yield almost a similar 
outcome emphasizes the high level of interwovenness between oil 
refining and ethylene manufacture. Put differendy, it tends to lend 
support to the dictum that 'if the refinery industry sneezes, the basic 
petrochemical sector catches cold (and vice versa)'. 
From this survey of the shifts that have occurred in the geographical 
pattern of the world oil and basic petrochemical industry it follows 
that the dominance of Western Europe and North America has been 
reduced. Its relative position within these sectors has been increasingly 
challenged by the rapid growth in production in Asia and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, the Middle East. In the two latter regions total 
production capacity has increased in response to a rise in consumption 
of oil products and base chemicals which seems to offer a multitude 
of attractive investment opportunities not only for already established 
firms but also for newcomers from Western Europe, for example. 
Before focusing on the strategies on which individual producers active 
on the Western European market have embarked and through which 
they have obviously contributed to the re-sorting of the global jigsaw 
puzzle dealt with above, we will consider the repercussions of this 
reorganization process on the various Western European countries. In 
the following section we will therefore highlight the differences in the 
spatial evolution of the oil refining and basic petrochemical industry 
within Western Europe, that is to say we will answer the question 
which countries in particular have borne the brunt of the recent 
relocation of production undertaken by the companies involved. 
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5.3 Shifts in production within Western Europe 
In describing the development of the oil refining and basic petro-
chemical industry in Western Europe, it is important to be aware of 
the fact that the commercial structure of both sectors is highly 
fragmented. Whilst in Northwestern European countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium private 
enterprises play a prominent role in these activities, in the southern 
part of Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece) oil refining and 
ethylene manufacture is still predominandy in the hands of state-con-
trolled companies (see section 3.3). As we have already pointed out, 
political influence may imply that the restructuring and, thus, the 
shedding of capacity of these sectors has been delayed in Southern 
Europe. This may have brought about possible variations in the speed 
of adjustment of production in oil refining and ethylene manufacture 
between countries. Let us examine each of these sectors in tum. 
5.3.1 Oil refining 
Table 5.4 reproduces the changes in primary distillation capacity for 
sixteen individual countries within Western Europe from 1950 on-
wards. 
Compared with 1975, which can be regarded as the breaking point 
in Western European oil refining (Steenbakkers and Wever 1991,71), 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Belgium have 
suffered a quite massive decline in production during the past two 
decades. Obviously, during the period 1975-1995 these countries 
experienced reductions in primary distillation capacity which even 
exceeded the drop in the level of output ofWestem Europe as a whole. 
In spite of these severe rationalizations, it has to be underlined that by 
1995, more than half of total European refining capacity (57 percent) 
was concentrated in this group of five countries. 
By contrast, countries like Spain, Greece, Portugal, Sweden and 
Norway have enjoyed spectacular production increases since the 
mid-seventies. Note, though, that the figures presented in table 5.4 
are, to some extent, misleading and must be kept in perspective. It 
needs to be recognized that, with the exception of Spain, the swift 
growth of the refinery industry can be attributed to a rather low 
volume of production in 1975. This is particularly apparent in the case 
of Portugal whose share of the Western European total rose from 
about 1 percent in 1975 to a mere 2 percent in 1995. 
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Table 5.4 Oil refining capacity (primary distillation) m Western Europe, by 
country, between 1950 and 1995 (1975 = 100) 
Country 
Germany 
UK 
Inly 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Greece 
Norway 
Sweden 
Finland 
Switzerland 
Austria 
Portugal 
Spain 
Total 
capacity 
Western 
Europe 
1950 
21 
6.9 
30 
85 
27 
22 
09 
37 
0 
12 
0 
0 
0 
114 
73 
2J 
42 
1955 
88 
200 
103 
160 
117 
12 9 
09 
37 
0 
12 
13 8 
0 
0 
193 
236 
57 
12.3 
'Include former East Germany 
1960 
19 4 
315 
16J 
218 
17 7 
17 4 
09 
74 1 
92 
12 
261 
11 
0 
211 
273 
13 5 
200 
1965 
496 
48J 
400 
389 
295 
34 4 
144 
74 1 
13 4 
386 
290 
30 
32 4 
42 1 
32 7 
266 
39 6 
1970 
76 8 
76 8 
76 0 
73 2 
67 9 
70 8 
865 
100 
310 
723 
891 
94 
75 
42 1 
709 
669 
73 6 
1980 
103 6 
87 5 
973 
1014 
95 1 
1155 
955 
1037 
155 6 
156 6 
166 7 
156 
100 
121 1 
338 2 
1361 
104 9 
1985 
701 
638 
75 9 
698 
75 0 
725 
76 6 
1037 
134 5 
149 4 
155 8 
119 
100 
868 
2818 
1281 
793 
1990 
518 
S8.9 
57 9 
53 2 
686 
75 9 
829 
103 7 
133 1 
174 7 
152 9 
119 
61 8 
886 
2818 
121 1 
67 9 
1995 
76 1' 
608 
53 6 
518 
58 9 
649 
838 
963 
138 7 
1687 
1529 
99 
971 
912 
2727 
120 2 
69 3 
Source: 1950-1980: Molle and Wever (1984, 56); 1985-1995: Oil and Gas 
Journal (various issues) 
5.3.2 Ethylene crackers 
Analyzing the pattern of change in the production of ethylene in 
Western Europe, it can be noticed that as opposed to oil refining the 
overall performance of the former activity has been quite satisfactory 
in most individual European countries since the early 1980s. Table 5.5 
summarizes the broad trends in ethylene manufacture in the different 
countries of Western Europe in the 1960-1993 period. 
From table 5.5 it can be deduced that since 1980 - the turning 
point in the evolution of ethylene manufacture in Western Europe 
which started a few years later than in oil refining (Steenbakkers and 
Wever 1991, 74) - significant capacity reductions have only been 
undertaken in Spain. More precisely, Spain's share in total Western 
European ethylene output went down from less than 9 percent in 1980 
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Table 5.5 Ethylene capacity in Western Europe, by country, between 1960 
and 1993 (1980 = 100) 
Country 
Germany 
UK 
Italy 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Greece 
Norway 
Sweden 
Finland 
Switzerland 
Austria 
Portugal' 
Spain 
Total 
capacity 
Western 
Europe 
1960 
53 
116 
49 
28 
04 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
41 
'Include former East Germain 
= 1985=100 
1965 
227 
25 6 
217 
10 3 
15 
481 
0 
0 
0 
227 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
15 7 
1970 
45 6 
55 5 
632 
465 
368 
962 
100 
100 
0 
75 8 
0 
933 
26 4 
0 
89 
45 3 
1975 
97 3 
681 
994 
87 3 
82 9 
100 
100 
100 
0 
100 
909 
100 
39 6 
0 
227 
78 0 
1985 
861 
923 
922 
1010 
85 8 
100 
0 
100 
100 
1091 
1212 
100 
107 5 
100 
657 
91 4 
1990 
712 
78 5 
870 
103 4 
88 6 
100 
0 
100 
126 7 
1091 
139 4 
83 3 
120 8 
100 
65 6 
864 
1993 
984' 
100 6 
991 
124 7 
106 6 
187 5 
0 
too 
135 
127 3 
139 4 
100 
128 3 
1167 
880 
109 6 
Source: 1960-1975: Molle and Wever (1984, 84); 1980-1993: Oil and Gas 
Journal, Directory of Chemical Producers Western Europe (various years) 
to about 7 percent in 1993. Besides, it shows that Denmark withdrew 
from this field of operation altogether in the late 1970s. In the 
remaining countries, on the other hand, production either remained 
fairly stable or showed a tendency to grow. Truly impressive increases 
were especially recorded by Finland and Belgium. The share of 
Belgium of the Western European total almost doubled from 3 percent 
to 5.2 percent between 1980 and 1993. 
5.4 Summary 
The world map of oil refining and ethylene production has altered 
quite considerably since 1980. Although up to now North America 
has managed to retain its leadership in both sectors, it has to be 
emphasized that its dominant position has come under increasing 
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challenge. The most important challenge has been posed by South 
East Asia. Actually, the latter region has already surpassed Western 
Europe in oil refining and it is likely to be close at its heels or even to 
outpace it as far as ethylene manufacture is concerned by the end of 
the century. 
Viewed at a less aggregated scale of the individual countries within 
Western Europe, it is evident that there exist significant variations in 
levels of development of both sectors in terms of trends in output. 
Generally speaking, in contrast to the United Kingdom, Italy, France 
and the Netherlands, countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain, Norway 
and Sweden have come to account for a growing proportion of total 
refining and, to a lesser extent, ethylene capacity in Western Europe. 
Despite their increased relative importance, the gains which the latter 
group has made in absolute terms should be characterized as modest. 
Indeed, by the mid-1990s these countries still contained far less than 
a quarter of the Western European total of these activities. 
With the general sectoral tendencies in mind which proved to be 
strongly differentiated geographically, we will now devote our atten-
tion to the strategic decisions taken by the individual business organi-
zations involved on the Western European oil and basic petrochemical 
market through which they have sculptured the spatial evolution 
observed. 
6 
Structural Changes in the Western 
European Oil Refining and Basic 
Petrochemical Industry 
6.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter we have reached the conclusion that Western 
Europe has, to some extent, experienced an erosion of its former 
competitive advantage in oil refining and ethylene manufacture par-
ticularly since the early 1980s. This chapter examines the transforma-
tion of the competitive structure of both sectors in more detail by 
focusing on the strategic responses in terms of market shares and the 
underlying reasons for the (dis)investment behaviour of individual 
producers active on the Western European scene. In investigating the 
evolution of the Western European oil and basic petrochemical 
industry, we will apply the dynamic market model of de Jong (1985; 
1989) as a framework of analysis. As we have seen, this theory suggests 
that as an individual sector passes through the various phases of the 
industry life cycle, market structure in terms of (de)concentration 
changes in a predictable way. Roughly speaking, it may be stated that 
growing sectors show declining concentration ratios. By contrast, 
stagnating and mature sectors tend to display an increase in market 
concentration. In essence, the central questions which we seek to 
answer in this chapter are 'how far does the actual pattern of market 
(de)concentratdon correspond to the sectoral development theoretically 
expected?' and 'how can possible deviations from the line of reasoning 
adopted by de Jong be explained?' In chapter 3 we have attempted to 
enhance the explanatory power of de Jong's approach by embracing 
sector- and location-specific aspects as potential intervening variables 
which may exert a distortional influence on the evolutionary pattern 
of market (de)concentration as identified by this model. This has 
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resulted in the derivation of several hypotheses which will be verified 
below. 
The first part of this chapter sets forth the development of the oil 
refining (section 6.2.1) and basic petrochemical industry (section 
6.2.2) in Western Europe as a whole. Here the focus is particularly on 
the changes in the degree of market concentration within both sectors 
through the successive stages of the industry life cycle. 
The second part is organized around the classification of companies 
presented in chapter 4, namely the major oil companies, the chemical 
companies, the state-owned companies from both oil producing and 
oil consuming countries and the independent private oil companies. 
At that place we will describe and interpret the pattern of (disinvest-
ment of these five categories of producers and of individual firms 
within each of these groups. Our primary concern there is with issues, 
such as the rationalization of oil refining and ethylene capacity through 
contractions and closures implemented primarily in the aftermath of 
the oil price shocks of the seventies, the investments made in conver-
sion facilities and the changes which have come about in the access to 
natural resources as well as distribution channels and marketing outlets. 
Moreover, we will discuss the methods of external growth which have 
been applied by the market participants involved to put the strategies 
adopted into effect. This means that we will deal with the changes in 
the ownership structure of production sites which have come about 
through joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions. 
6.2 Industry life cycle 
Viewed from the perspective of the industry life cycle, we can discern 
some phases which the oil refining and basic petrochemical industry 
in Western Europe have followed. 
6.2.1 Oil refining 
Pioneer phase 
The refining industry in Western Europe remained limited in size until 
the end of the Second World War. Before the War oil refining facilities 
remained principally in areas where crude was produced like Eastern 
Europe (Romania and Russia), the United States and the Middle East. 
In the period 1950-1955 oil refining was introduced in some 
Western European countries: the United Kingdom and France. How-
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Table 6.1 Changes in the number of oil refineries and in their composition 
regarding size class in Western Europe m the 1950-1995 period (1975 =100) 
(1975 - 100) 
number of units accor-
ding io sue elafi (Mt/y) 
STUB (0 - 5 Mt/y) 
medium (5 - 10 Mt/y) 
large (over 10 Mt/y) 
total number 
1950 
89 
-
-
44 
1955 
116 
3 
-
59 
1960 
121 
7 
8 
64 
1965 
127 
33 
21 
78 
1970 
144 
52 
54 
98 
1980 
95 
100 
108 
99 
1985 
86 
72 
71 
79 
1990 
59 
66 
71 
63 
1995 
54 
72 
67 
63 
ever, in countries such as Greece, Finland and Switzerland this industry 
did not exist at all in this period. 
As indicated in section 3.2, this stage, known as the pioneer phase, 
is characterized by the fact that only a few suppliers in separate markets 
(monopolies) are present. In terms of market concentration, concen-
tration ratios are high. Only a few entrepreneurs accept the high risks 
in this phase. 
The fluctuations in the number of oil refineries and the changes in 
the composition of production units with regard to size class, which 
have presented themselves in Western Europe in the course of time, 
are illustrated in table 6.1. 
Before 1955, less than half of the total number of oil refineries active 
in 1975 (the breaking point in Western European oil refining) was 
represented. All of them belonged to the category of the small 
production units. The three main oil companies (Shell, BP and Esso) 
accounted for about 56 percent of the total Western European 
distillation capacity during this period. 
Expansion phase 
After 1950 till about the mid-seventies a period of fast growth started 
for the oil refining industry in Western Europe. The principal factors 
governing that growth were: 
1. the general economic growth which boosted energy consumption; 
2. the shift of energy demand from mostly solid fuels to cheaper oil; 
3. the economic and political pressure to refine imported crude oil in 
Europe (Molle 1993, 49). 
The spectacular growth in this period is shown in table 6.2. The extra 
capacity needed in this stage was realized by creating new refineries 
or expanding the existing ones. 
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Table 6.2 Changes m refining capacity (primary distillation) in Western Eu-
rope; components of change (Mt/y), 1950-1995 
Crcaoon 
Externum1 
Contraction1 
Closure 
Net tool 
1950-75' 
334 
597 
-7 
-6 
+918 
1975-80" 
43 
72 
-62 
-13 
+40 
1980-85* 
-
9 
-112 
-169 
-272 
198S-905 
-
12 
-46 
-77 
-111 
1990-95' 
9 
26 
-23 
-14 
-2 
1
 Existing five yean earlier (based on five-year penodt) 
2
 Saune 1950-1980 Molk and Wever (1984. 57) 1980-1985' Molle (1988, 46) 
3
 Based on data from Oil and Gas Journal (vanous Bsues) 
It has already been mentioned in section 3.2 that in the beginning of 
this phase the industry is still fairly new and is considered to have a 
bright future. That is, the potential market is estimated to be large 
compared to actual sales. Consequendy, new entrepreneurs will enter 
the market and will create new capacity. Established producers will 
expand their output. Low absolute and relative concentration will be 
the result (de Jong 1993,17). More precisely, in this stage the industry 
generally consists of a large number of firms operating in a competitive 
set-up. This is also the case regarding oil refining. The share of the 
three main oil companies (Shell, BP and Esso) in the total primary 
distillation capacity decreased from 56 to about 44 percent. Table 6.1 
shows that at the start of this phase especially the number of small oil 
refineries increased very rapidly. As the expansion phase moved on, 
however, the share of the small production units decreased in favour 
of the medium-sized and large units. 
Saturation phase (Maturity) 
In the 1970s the development of the oil refining industry in Western 
Europe changed. After the energy crises of 1973 and 1979 growth 
slowed down. Up to 1980, however, the negative adaptations of total 
(distilling) capacity were limited, because a lot of investment decisions 
had already been made before the crises. Only after 1980 a reduction 
of oil refining capacity was executed, especially in the form of closures. 
This disinvestment concerned primarily distillation capacity. 
Yet, at the same time investment activities were going on to enlarge 
the equipment for conversion processes, as pointed out in chapter 1. 
These investments had to be made to adjust to the shift of demand 
from heavy to light oil products. The main reasons for this were the 
replacement of fuel oil with other energy sources for the generation 
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of electricity, and the relative increase in the demand for gasoline. 
It has been found that contractions and closures are mainly re-
stricted to plants which lack conversion facilities in general and 
cracking capacity in particular (and are thus unfit to meet future 
demand) and to refineries in which hardly new investments have been 
made. A large majority (about 81 percent) of the oil refining units 
which were shut down in the 1980-1995 period had not been 
upgraded. By contrast, large and more sophisticated refineries with 
above-average conversion capacity have proved to be capable to 
continue. During the last decade Western European refinery activities 
have become more and more concentrated in these large and efficient 
refineries. 
In the context of the industry life cycle, it can be observed that the 
oil refining industry in Western Europe in general reached maturity 
after the mid-seventies. Signs of market saturation can be noticed. 
Companies, which had expanded capacity in Une with previous rates 
of growth, then discovered that excess capacity is of a structural nature. 
The resulting price batde has forced high cost producers to withdraw 
from the market. 
In this saturation phase (horizontal) market concentration tends to 
increase. This stage is characterized by a declining number of oil 
refineries and of the small units in particular (table 6.1). The observa-
tion made above, that oil refining in Western Europe falls mainly into 
the hands of a few large and efficient refineries affirms this tendency 
of high concentration. These refineries have the ability to respond in 
a flexible way to changes in the supply and demand situation. Since 
the end of the seventies almost half of the small refineries have ceased 
production or they have become bigger by co-operation with other 
refineries. Joint ventures and takeovers are therefore of frequent 
occurrence during this phase. In spite of this, it should be noticed that 
the share of Shell, BP and Esso (the three main oil companies) in the 
total Western European refining capacity has not increased again. In 
comparison with the expansion phase, it has decreased even further 
from 44 to 34 percent. Apparendy, they have not yet been able to 
re-establish their strong position regarding oil refining. It is quite likely 
that they have lost ground in favour of other (categories of) producers. 
We will examine the reshuffling process in this field of operation more 
closely in the second part of this chapter. 
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6.2.2 Petrochemical industry 
The growth cycle of the basic petrochemical industry in Western 
Europe - again considering ethylene production representative for this 
sector - shows more or less the same pattern as for oil refining. The 
main difference is that the ethylene cycle started some ten years later 
than for oil refining. And partly connected with that, the basic 
petrochemical industry has not proceeded along the cycle as far as oil 
refining. 
Pioneer phase 
The basic petrochemical industry was long confined to the United 
States. In Western Europe this sector was introduced after the 1960s. 
From the first modest beginnings, the industry grew at a fast rate. 
Various factors were responsible for this change. On the demand side, 
the increasing need for products such as plastics, synthetic fibres and 
synthetic rubber caused a rising demand for chemical feedstocks. On 
the supply side, a decreasing coal and an increasing oil-supply base had 
to answer for this change (Molle and Wever 1984, 17; Molle 1993, 
57). Like in the case of oil refining, concentration ratios were high in 
this introduction stage of the basic petrochemical industry. Before 
1970 the four largest producers with respect to ethylene manufacture 
(BASF, BP, Shell and Esso) were responsible for about 50 percent of 
the total production capacity of ethylene in Western Europe. 
Expansion phase 
From the end of the 1960s till the beginning of the 1980s, the capacity 
of Western European petrochemical industry increased considerably 
as a reaction to the swift rise in demand. In this period the absolute 
Table 6.3 Changes in production capacity of ethylene crackers in Western 
Europe; components of change (Mt/year), 1960-1993 
Adaptaoon 
Opening 
EJUCIBJIMI 
Coffincnon' 
Скииге' 
Net tool 
1960-19701 
3J 
3.7 
-
-
7.0 
1970-19801 
2.4 
6J 
-0.1 
-0.2 
8.4 
1980-1993' 
1.0 
4.2 
-1.0 
-2.7 
1.5 
1
 Exsang five yean earner (based on five-year periods) 
'Source 1960-1980· Molk and Wever (1984, 87) 
3
 Based on data from Oil and Gas Journal and Directory o f 
Chemical Producen - Western Europe, various years 
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and relative concentration on the market diminished. During this 
phase, the share of the four largest firms (Shell, Elf Atochem, BP and 
Esso) of total Western European ethylene output went down from 50 
to no more than 36 percent. 
The required growth of the production capacity resulted in the 
expansion of existing units and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in the 
creation of new plants, as table 6.3 shows. 
Saturation phase (Maturity) 
Since 1980, however, about five years later than in the case of oil 
refining, a major restructuring process in the Western European basic 
petrochemical industries has been going on in Western Europe. It first 
led to the closure of some units with insufficient market potential, 
including some of the older and smaller plants (Molle 1993, 51). 
The period after 1980 can be described as the maturity stage. It 
should be pointed out that, as opposed to oil refining, concentration 
ratios have increased slighdy again at the end of the expansion phase, 
when the basic petrochemical industry moved into maturity. This 
finds expression in the growth of the market share of the four leading 
firms in ethylene production in this period (BP, Enichem, Shell and 
Elf Atochem) which came to account for 38 percent of total European 
ethylene capacity between 1980 and 1993. 
Until now this restructuring process has been less severe as in oil 
refining. Some previously active companies (e.g. Texaco, Mont-
edison, Marathon) have withdrawn from the market and the position 
of some large state-owned producers (Enichem and Elf Atochem) has 
been reinforced. However, this has not yet resulted in massive 
concentration through mergers, takeovers, closures and contractions. 
This will also probably not happen in the near future, because most 
of them were already adapted to the requirements of energy-saving 
environmental standards and feedstock flexibility in the seventies. 
6.2.3 Conclusions 
From the analysis of the postwar development of oil refining and basic 
petrochemical industry — that is, ethylene manufacture — the conclu-
sion can be drawn that both sectors have passed through a period of 
expansion and growth and next through a phase of crisis and restruc-
turing. Concentration ratios fluctuate during the life cycles. In the 
initial stage (introduction) the level of concentration was high. During 
the expansion phase new firms moved in and déconcentration took 
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place. After this growth stage both industries in Western Europe were 
faced with crises and restructuring. This has prompted the implemen-
tation of rationalization schemes, particularly in the refining industry, 
through which both total Western European production capacity and 
the number of production sites have been reduced to restore profit-
ability. Broadly speaking, rationalization processes tend to involve 
organizational concentration of production as a relatively few large 
firms acquire the assets of their less efficient counterparts. As has been 
seen, however, whilst the overall level of market concentration in 
ethylene manufacture in Western Europe has only displayed a mod-
erate increase since 1980, concentration ratios in oil refining (primary 
distillation) even decreased during the last decades. The main issue, 
therefore, which has to be dealt with in this chapter is why the recent 
patterns of structural changes in Western European refining and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, basic petrochemical production have been at 
odds with normal behaviour of competitive markets. In other words, 
we are particularly interested in the reasons for the strategic decisions 
taken by the market participants involved through which significant 
capacity reductions of both sectors have been delayed. In order to shed 
light on the behavioural responses primarily to the prevailing mature 
market circumstances of the oil and petrochemical industry, we will 
examine separately the strategic decision making of each of the five 
categories of producers which have already been distinguished in 
chapter 4. This means that we will discuss the basic trends in strategy 
adjustment and organizational restructuring of the following (groups 
of) firms: 
1. the international major oil companies and, especially, those strate-
gies pursued by Shell, BP and Total (section 6.3); 
2. the chemical companies — in particular ICI, BASF and Dow 
(section 6.4); 
3. the national oil companies from oil consuming countries and, 
particularly, ENI/Enichem and Elf/Atochem (section 6.5); 
4. the state-owned companies from oil producing countries in which 
we focus on Oilinvest (section 6.6); 
5. the independent private oil companies and, more specifically, 
Petrofina (section 6.7). 
In describing the changes that have occurred in the strategic approaches 
and market positions of the different actors within these sectors, the 
secondary research material will be supplemented and complemented 
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with information on investment behaviour collected via personal 
interviews with top managers of the individual firms mentioned above. 
Having identified and interpreted the patterns of (disinvestment of 
the various (groups of) players on the Western European oil and 
(petro) chemical market, we will provide a summary presentation of 
the most salient findings of our research and draw together the main 
strands of this chapter into a comprehensive discussion of the recent 
rationalization of Western European oil refining and basic petro-
chemical production faculties. 
6.3 The international major oil companies 
As we noted in section 3.3, the category of the integrated majors 
occupied a very dominant and stable position on the international oil 
market before the turmoil of the seventies. Indeed, it is indisputable 
that the producers belonging to this group have traditionally been able 
to maintain a relatively equal vertical balance of output between the 
upstream and downstream stage of production together with a wide 
geographical spread of their operations. When we attempt to answer 
the question which companies exacdy constitute the category of the 
majors, we become aware that there is some disagreement involved 
among oilwatchers. Some writers (Molle and Wever 1984, 38; Molle 
1993, 47) regard the former 'Seven Sisters' as the major oil companies 
and, therefore, confine themselves to Shell, Esso, BP, Texaco, Mobil, 
Chevron (Standard Oil of California) and Gulf (until its acquisition by 
Chevron in 1984). By contrast, others (Ellis Jones 1988, 165; Bacon 
1990, 115; Grant 1993, 41) apply a somewhat broader definition in 
the sense that they include CFP-Total on the basis of the important 
role it has played in the Middle East as well as the extensive interna-
tional spread of its highly integrated oil operations. Actually, CFP-To-
tal should be characterized as a mixed-ownership company, because 
the French government still owns a minority interest of 35 percent in 
this corporation. As opposed to Molle and Wever (1984) and Molle 
(1993), we will classify CFP-Total here as a major oil company instead 
of a state-owned enterprise. The fact that the government is currendy 
hardly engaged in CFP-Total and that the vice-president of this 
company emphasized in the interview that the firm's oil and (petro)-
chemical activities are certainly not conducted with particular regard 
to the promotion of the national interest of France provide support 
for employing the latter classification. 
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Until recently, the members of this category had a maximum 
freedom and flexibility in the control and management of crude oil 
production and pricing. Particularly the traditional seven giants which 
joined hands by establishing the 'International Petroleum Cartel' used 
to control the supply of crude oil, the transportation, the processing 
plants and the marketing and distribution system. It was a closed circuit 
with a high degree of vertical and horizontal integration, where the 
companies involved made all the main decisions. 
Over time, however, it seems that the dominance of the majors 
both upstream and downstream has, to some extent, waned. In 
considering the market position of the majors with respect to down-
stream activities in general and oil refining in particular, it has to be 
pointed out that it changed quite substantially in the post-war period. 
In 1950 they controlled as much as 78 percent of total Western 
European oil refining capacity. By 1985, however, the major oil 
companies accounted for less than 49 percent of the total and their 
market share declined even further to 44 percent in 1995 (Oil and Gas 
Journal, December 1984; 1994). 
Turning our attention to basic petrochemical production and, more 
precisely, to ethylene manufacture, it is worth noting that the relative 
position of this group of players has not flagged as much as regarding 
oil refining in Western Europe. Whereas during the sixties, when the 
Western European petrochemical industry could be found in the 
introduction stage, the majors were responsible for about 40 percent 
of total ethylene capacity in Europe, by 1993 their proportion had 
shrunk to 24 percent. 
The reduction of the degree of vertical integration and gradual 
cracking of the closed circuit of oil marketing and trading operations 
by the major oil companies is dealt with more extensively below. This 
means that we will focus primarily upon the transformation experi-
ences and restructuring efforts of these market participants through 
which they have sought to come to terms with the energy crises of 
1973 and 1979 and the ensuing new external conditions of both 
sectors. It seems that the established oil majors have been particularly 
hard hit by the winds of recent instability which have beset these areas 
of operation, harder than other groups of players. As has been said in 
section 3.3, there is good reason to believe that state-owned enterprises 
in general (and those of oil producing countries in particular) have 
made successful inroads into previous strongholds of the major oil 
companies and have managed to capture a significant piece of the 
Western European oil and petrochemical market. 
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First, we will provide a detailed picture of the (spatial) development 
of the majors in oil refining and ethylene production respectively 
resulting from the strategic decisions which they have taken in these 
fields in the course of time. In doing so, emphasis is placed upon the 
negative adjustments which the individual actors belonging to this 
category have made whether by forging joint ventures and mergers 
or by selling (parts of) production facilities to other companies, or 
through contractions and closures of plants in these lines of business. 
Second, we will look at the investments which they have undertaken 
with respect to sophisticated conversion facilities. Third, we will 
analyze the alterations that have occurred in the access to crude oil 
supplies as well as distribution channels and marketing outlets of the 
various market participants involved. 
Oil refining 
When considering the oil refining units of the major oil companies, 
it is obvious that the postwar development and behaviour of this group 
of players is broadly in Une with the general pattern of change of the 
Western European oil industry. Table 6.4 gives insight into the 
number of oil refining facilities in which the major oil companies were 
involved in Western Europe in the period 1950-1995. 
Three different stages can be distinguished: an introduction phase, 
an expansion phase and a maturity phase. In the introduction phase, 
which covers the period 1950-1955, companies such as Texaco, 
Table 6.4 Number of oil refining units of the major oil companies in Wes­
tern Europe in the period 1950-1995 
Company 
Shell 
Eso 
BP 
Texaco 
Mobil 
Chevron 
Gulf 
CFP-Tota! 
Total major oil 
companies1 
Tola) Western 
Europe 
1950 
14 
10 
В 
1 
6 
1 
-
3 
43 
72 
1955 
15 
11 
10 
1 
6 
1 
-
3 
47 
96 
1960 
15 
13 
10 
2 
6 
1 
-
4 
51 
105 
1965 
IB 
IB 
14 
4 
В 
2 
3 
6 
72 
127 
1970 
22 
20 
17 
5 
9 
2 
4 
9 
B7 
160 
1975 
21 
20 
16 
5 
10 
3 
5 
11 
90 
163 
1980 
20 
20 
17 
6 
10 
3 
4 
11 
90 
161 
I9S5 
17 
14 
11 
4 
β 
1 
-
9 
64 
129 
1990 
13 
10 
7 
3 
5 
1 
-
6 
45 
104 
1995 
13 
10 
7 
2 
5 
1 
-
β 
46 
102 
'In some cas«, several major oil companies arc involved in a particular гебпегу plant 
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Chevron and CFP-Total were hardly represented in the Western 
European refining industry. Gulf was not active at all in Europe until 
the mid-1960s. It is important to emphasize that Texaco, Chevron 
and Gulf have never had a very dominant position in this sector. The 
latter company has even completely disappeared from the Western 
European market since Chevron took over its assets in the mid-1980s. 
By contrast, companies such as Shell, Esso and, to a somewhat lesser 
extent, BP have accounted for a substantial part of all European 
refinery sites from the end of the fifties onwards. It is worth noting 
that CFP-Total surpassed BP in the early 1990s by acquiring a minority 
share of about 12 percent in Petrogal. 
Although the expansion stage lasted from 1955 until about the 
mid-seventies and a period of stabilization started after the energy crises 
of 1973 and 1979, negative adjustments concerning oil refineries of 
the major oil companies in Western Europe were quite inconsiderable 
before the beginning of the 1980s. Table 6.5 shows the evolution of 
the primary distillation capacity of the major oil companies in the 
1950-1995 period. 
Drawing a comparison between table 6.4 and table 6.5, it is 
apparent that among the three leading majors — Shell, Esso and BP — 
the latter producer has scaled down its refining output most drastically. 
A manager strategy integration and planning of BP Oil Europe in 
Brussels brought up the point that BP has undoubtedly taken a leading 
position relative to other European players in terms of plant closures. 
The reason why BP has been in the forefront in this respect has 
Table 6.5 Oil refining capacity (primary distillation) of the major oil com­
panies in Western Europe between 19 SO and 1995 (Mt/year) 
Company 
ShcD 
Еш> 
BP 
Tenco 
Mobil 
Chevron 
Gulf 
CFP-Tool 
Total capacity of 
the majon 
1950 
10 6 
45 
71 
0.1 
3 9 
10 
-
4 8 
32 
1955 
29.6 
17 4 
202 
0 6 
6 9 
17 
-
8 
844 
1960 
446 
32 7 
299 
19 
104 
2 8 
-
118 
1341 
1965 
669 
648 
504 
9 4 
13 4 
53 
45 
228 
237 5 
1970 
106 
108 1 
83 
16 5 
27 6 
15 
151 
37.8 
4091 
1975 
122 6 
135 
115 6 
24 
406 
239 
19 9 
648 
5464 
1980 
122 7 
126 1 
108 6 
306 
44 5 
24 9 
16 4 
643 
5381 
1985 
909 
942 
73 2 
28 
341 
4 6 
-
46.3 
3713 
1990 
78 8 
792 
47 
26 6 
182 
5.2 
-
36 7 
2916 
1995 
798 
82.8 
468 
158 
209 
55 
-
33 4 
285 
Tool capacity 41 118 192 386 705 965 1004 751 635 643 
Waten. Europe 
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year 
Щ Shell § § Mobil 
Щ Esso § ü Chevron 
В BP • Gulf 
Щ Texaco Щ CFP-Total 
Figure 6.1 Oil refining capacity of the major oil companies totally as a per­
centage of total refining capacity in Western Europe, 1950-1995 
probably to do with the fact that it has recently had a poorer record 
of profitability in this area of operation in comparison with other 
market participants. 
Besides, table 6.5 reveals once again that the role played by 
Chevron in this sector has become negligible since the beginning of 
the 1980s. Figure 6.1 displays graphically the trends in the shares of 
the individual major oil companies and the majors as a group in total 
oil refining capacity in Western Europe in the 1950-1995 period. 
With the exception of Esso, Shell and Mobil, the group of the 
majors at large as well as the rest of the companies separately have 
shown a declining trend particularly since the early 1980s. The slightly 
increasing share of the former players between 1990 and 1995 can be 
ascribed to the expansion of existing refinery sites. The recent enlarge­
ment of their production faculties seems to be attributable to their 
attempt to achieve internal scale economies. 
Negative adaptations between 1980 and 1995 
In view of the fact that most contractions and closures have taken place 
since the eighties, special attention is paid to the development of the 
major oil companies in the 1980-1995 period. Particularly Shell, Esso 
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Table 6.6 Changes in refinery capacity (primary distillation) of Shell, Esso, 
BP, Texaco, Mobil and CFP-Total in Western Europe in the 1980-1995 pe­
riod; components of change (Mt/year) 
Company 
Shell 
Eso 
BP 
Texaco 
МоЫ 
CFP-ТоЫ 
Tool 
1980-1995 
creation 
otte по ση 
conoacnon 
closure 
tool 
cica non 
atcmion 
contraction 
closure 
tool 
cicanon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
crea Don 
extension 
conrracDon 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
cicaoon 
extension 
contracnon 
closure 
total 
cicaoon 
ex tensón 
contraction 
closure 
total 
_ 
2 
-30 
-15 
-43 
. 
-
-9 
-34 
-43 
. 
5 
-17 
-52 
-64 
_ 
7 
-20 
-13 
_ 
2 
-1 
-24 
-23 
. 
2 
-22 
-11 
-31 
_ 
24 
-79 
-200 
-255 
and BP deserve notice, because they occupy a commanding position 
amongst the majors. Table 6.5 makes clear that the decrease of refining 
capacity of the majors as a group has been sharper than of all oil 
refineries together. 
Looking mote closely at the absolute contribution of the compo-
nents of change to the overall decreasing position of the established 
oil majors - Shell, Esso, BP, Texaco, Mobil and CFP-Total in 
particular — in Western European oil refining from 1980 onwards, as 
illustrated in table 6.6, we see that the restructuring crisis has taken its 
greatest toll of BP in terms of primary distillation capacity. 
During the period 1980 to 1995 BP was responsible for approxi-
mately 25 percent of the reduction in Western European output of 
the major oil companies totally. It shed capacity through the closure 
of entire production units rather than contractions. In addition to BP, 
however, Shell and Esso should be recognized as major causes of the 
diminished importance of the group as a whole in this field. As table 
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Table 6.7 Composition of the oil refining units of the major oil companies 
by size class and by inland/coastal location in Western Europe in the 1980-
1995 period 
1980 1995 
number of unio according to sue 
class (Mi/y) 
null (0 - 5 Ml/y) 34 11 
medium (5 - 10 Mt/y) 32 22 
large (ovtr 10 Ml/y) H 9 
number of unie situated on the 
coast or at an inland location 
coast 55 32 
inland 25 10 
total number 60 42 
6.6 displays, Shell has predominantly embarked upon divestiture in 
the form of contractions, while Esso has mainly slimmed down its 
volume of production via closures. Actually, Texaco showed the least 
unfavourable performance in the same period which is due to its 
takeover of the гебпегу of Chevron in Rotterdam in 1983 and to the 
acquisition of a 35 percent share in the Netherlands Refining Com­
pany (Nerefco)/Rotterdam in 1989. Note that the former Chevron 
refinery amalgamated with Nerefco in 1990. It has to be pointed out 
that in early 1996 BP, which owns the remaining 65 percent in 
Nerefco, decided to close down part of this refinery (Het Financieele 
Dagblad, 15January 1996). 
With regard to the overall disinvestment trend of the majors, it is 
evident that their rationalization has been largely brought about by 
complete closures. More specifically, as a result of this spectacular 
restructuring process the major oil companies witnessed a decline in 
the number of refineries which were wholly or partly under their 
ownership by 49 percent between 1980 and 1995. What should also 
be taken into consideration is the fact that on account of these 
disinvestments the composition of the oil refineries controlled by the 
majors has changed significantly. This composition is shown in table 
6.7. 
Viewed in isolation the figures of table 6.7 are, to some extent, 
misleading. Indeed, we have to be aware that the changed composition 
is not only the result of closures and contractions, but abo of takeovers 
of production facilities from the majors by other companies. We will 
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Figure 6.2 Spatial pattern of oil refineries of the major oil companies in 
Western Europe m 199 S 
discuss these takeovers in some detail below. Bearing this in mind, 
however, we can identify the following pattern of change. Table 6.7 
displays that capacity reductions by the majors were not evenly 
distributed across the size spectrum. Obviously, the major oil compa-
nies have primarily given up their small-sized units. Besides, it has to 
be observed that some large plants have trimmed their production 
capacity by which they have become medium-sized. Moreover, it 
seems that they have mainly withdrawn from oil refineries situated 
inland. Of the refineries at inland locations operative in 1980 60 
percent has been closed down, whereas only 20 percent of the units 
located on the coast has stopped production. It is interesting to note 
that virtually all the plants which were sold by the majors between 
1980 and 1995 were situated on the coast (12 production units). In 
fact, only one refinery that changed hands in this period was located 
inland. The geographical consequences of the retrenchment of the 
major oil companies in this area of operation are pictured by figure 
6.2. 
Structural Changes in Western Europe 105 
Figure 6.2 demonstrates that the major oil companies are predomi-
nantly represented in the northwestern part of Europe. By contrast, 
they have hardly shown interest in Southern Europe up to now. The 
main reason for this bias in their pattern of investment against Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece is the fact that in these countries the 
majority of the oil refining industry is still in the hands of state-con-
trolled firms, as mentioned in chapter 3. In Italy part of this sector is 
also owned by several small independent oil companies. We will deal 
with the latter category of producers in section 6.7. Despite the recent 
process of liberalization and dismandement of the external protection 
of the Southern European oil market, only few production facilities 
have been sold to private producers so far (Correljé 1994, 109). 
Actually, among the group of the majors, only Esso, BP and CFP-To-
tal are active in oil refining in Southern Europe at the moment. Esso, 
which operates in Italy, has a 100 percent ownership of the Augusta 
refinery and a majority share of 67 percent in the San Martino refinery, 
known as Sarpom, in which it works together with two Italian 
independents, notably ISAB (60 percent owned by Edoardo Garrone) 
and Fintermica. BP and CFP-Total, on the other hand, have gained 
access to this line of business on the Iberian market since the early 
1990s, that is to say Spain and Portugal respectively. BP managed to 
acquire Petromed in Castellón de la Plana/Spain almost completely at 
the end of 1991. According to a strategy manager of BP Oil Europe, 
the main rationale behind the decision to buy this refinery site was the 
fact that BP believed that it could gain a competitive advantage. He 
said that BP expected to achieve a favourable balance between refining 
and marketing in Spain. Unfortunately, the growth prospects for the 
Spanish demand for in particular heavy petroleum products proved to 
be overestimated. In other words, forecasts of demand, especially for 
heavy fuel oil, exceeded the actual consumption (Correljé 1994,171). 
Apart from the anticipated evolution of demand, however, he empha-
sized that location-specific aspects such as the level of production costs 
have also played a part in making the above-mentioned acquisition. 
The importance of the level of production costs for the choice of 
location and the ensuing competitiveness of industry was also recog-
nized by Dunning (1980; 1988). In his eclectic theory Dunning 
proposes a set of three general and interrelated principles which, he 
suggests, are fundamental to an understanding of international pro-
duction. According to Dunning, a firm will engage in international 
production when three conditions are satisfied. These closely related 
conditions are those of ownership-specific advantages, internalization 
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Figure 6.3 Spatial pattern of the closed oil refineries of the major oil compa-
nies, 1980-199S 
and location-specific factors. This means that in Dunning's view 
location-specific aspects are of great significance, in combination with 
the internalization of ownership-specific advantages, in determining 
whether or not — and where — overseas production occurs. In the case 
of BP, this may imply that, in addition to the desire to reap the benefit 
of lower production costs (which is a type of location-specific advan-
tage), the other two categories of advantages (i.e. ownership-specific 
advantages and internalization advantages) may have encouraged BP 
to invest in Spain. 
CFP-Total acquired a minority share of around 12 percent in the 
refinery sites of Petrogal in Portugal in 1992. The Portuguese state is 
still the main shareholder in Petrogal, although it intends to privatize 
its assets before the turn of the century. The vice-president of 
CFP-Total said that this joint venture arrangement which involves 
refining as well as distribution and marketing signifies the company's 
commitment to enlarge its presence in Southern Europe. As far as 
distribution and marketing is concerned, it must be pointed out that, 
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on top of these three companies, Shell has recently succeeded to 
establish a relatively firm position in the Spanish market by taking a 5 
percent share in CHL (Het Financieele Dagblad, 15 June 1993). A 
strategy manager of Shell in The Hague indicated that Shell also strives 
to become engaged in oil refining in this area. 
Notwithstanding these investments in the southern part of Europe, 
countries such as the United Kingdom, France, former West Germany 
and the Netherlands still constitute the centre of gravity for the majors 
in terms of the number of plants. Indeed, this region encompassed 69 
percent of all Western European refining facilities in 1995. In 1980 
their share was little under 73 percent. This decline is partly the 
consequence of plant closures. Figure 6.3 maps the closed oil refineries 
of the major oil companies between 1980 and 1995. 
It should not come as a surprise that the bulk of the closures has 
occurred in the core nations mentioned above. From the interviews 
it can be deduced that the primary motives for shutting down these 
plants were probably the lack of investment in conversion facilities 
and pollution-preventing equipment. With regard to the former 
aspect, it can be confirmed that most of the closed refinery sites, as 
depicted in figure 6.3, had not been endowed with cracking capacity. 
Obviously, production units which have not been updated in this way 
have increasingly become unable to match the current pattern of 
demand, by which they have fallen victim to rationalization. More-
over, it turned out that some of these closures can be ascribed to a 
rather isolated location in the sense that plants did not have access to 
a major pipeline network or were not associated with an adjacent 
petrochemicals plant. This implies that these characteristics tend to 
favour the shuttering of sites. This has also been found by Bacon (1990, 
7) and Molle (1993, 52). 
Turning our attention again to the oil refining units which have 
been kept in business by the major oil companies, the point has to be 
made that the vast majority of these sites (76 percent) is wholly owned 
by them. However, ten out of the forty-two surviving plants in 1995 
were controlled by one of the majors in cooperation with other 
(major) oil companies in Western Europe, as shown in table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 reveals that apart from Chevron, all major oil companies, 
which operated in Western European oil refining in 1995, were 
engaged in one or several joint venture agreement(s). It seems, 
therefore, justified to state that in general collaboration is quite 
prevalent and commonplace among this group of producers. In spite 
of the fact that the majors show an overall positive attitude towards 
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joint participation, the following marginal note has to be made. As 
can be expected, most companies give preference to do things 
themselves as much as possible and, thus, wish to exercise total control 
(Ohmea 1985, 147). Without any doubt, this also holds good for the 
major oil companies. Yet, this does not mean that we cannot perceive 
a certain disparity in approach in this respect between the individual 
producers belonging to this category. From the interviews conducted, 
it can be inferred that particularly Shell favours a solitary stance above 
cooperation with partners. As a strategy manager of Shell in The Hague 
puts it: 'Shell strives to be the master of its own destiny.' Notwith-
standing Shell's reservations about the formation of joint ventures in 
general, he admitted that in some cases this organizational form 
represents the only way to achieve the strategic objectives of the 
company. Indeed, it is easy to appreciate that even a company like 
Shell cannot master everything on its own and, hence, sometimes has 
to enter into a partnership, especially to gain access to particular market 
areas. True, governments of several countries make collaboration with 
a local company frequendy the price of admission for foreign firms 
(Alter and Hage 1993). It appears that this has been the case in the 
Reichstett/Strasbourg refinery in France, where Shell and a few other 
major oil companies have joined hands with the French semi-state 
company Elf. Note, though, that a strategy manager of Shell has 
pointed out that alliances between Shell and state-owned companies 
are the exception rather than the rule in this area of operation. In his 
view the reluctance on the part of Shell to work together with national 
producers has to do with differences in business culture as well as in 
organizational objectives. It is evident that, as opposed to Shell, the 
strategic decision-making process of state-owned companies is often 
influenced by non-commercial criteria. Of course, these dissimilarities 
in cultural and strategic respect also exist between the other majors 
and national oil companies. As table 6.8 makes clear, however, we 
should take into account that this has hardly deterred players, such as 
BP and Total in particular from setting up joint ventures in Western 
European oil refining with the latter category of actors. A strategy 
manager of BP Oil Europe commented that BP does not hold a 
prejudice against particular companies as possible joint venture part-
ners. He said that, in essence, joint ventures are always perfecdy 
conceivable, as long as BP can capitalize on competitive advantages. 
In other words, it is not so much the character of the potential partner 
as the economic attractiveness of the relationship in terms of synergies 
or technology that can be acquired or the competitive position that 
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can be attained which tend to determine BP's willingness to enter into 
a joint venture. Like BP, CFP-Total has also basically forged joint 
venture agreements with other companies in oil refining for economic 
reasons, such as risk-sharing and the acquisition of technological 
capabilities. In joining forces with a partner, the vice-president of 
CFP-Total claimed that this company mostly seeks to reach an equal 
or majority ownership position. As previously indicated, however, at 
the moment CFP-Total has to reconcile itself to a minority participa-
tion in both Petrogal refineries in Portugal. But it is reasonable to 
assume that the latter will manage to increase its share in these refinery 
sites in the immediate future due to the intention of the EC to curtail 
the state monopoly and thus to open up the Portuguese market for 
private refiners. 
In addition to the formation of joint ventures, most majors have 
also attempted to enhance their competitiveness in this field of 
operation through divestment in the form of the outright sale of entire 
oil refining facilities or the sale of their part interest in a site to other 
(major) oil companies in Western Europe. Table 6.9 lists the transfer 
of ownership of refineries from the majors to other (major) oil 
companies in Western Europe between 1980 and 1995. 
As table 6.9 shows, the five American major oil companies have 
clearly dominated as sellers of oil refining units in Western Europe. 
Actually, Gulf has gone farthest in handing over plants. It has sold two 
refinery sites to Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) in 1983. By 
contrast, CFP-Total has not hived off plants at all. Shell, BP, Esso and 
Texaco transferred ownership of Ireland's only refinery to the Irish 
National Petroleum Corporation (INPC) in 1982. INPC bought this 
asset, because otherwise Ireland would be wholly dependent upon 
imports (Bacon 1990, 104). In addition to this, BP sold its majority 
interest (78 percent) in the Gothenburg refinery in Sweden to the 
independent producer OK Petroleum as well as its 50 percent stake 
in the Antwerp site to Petrofina at the end of the eighties. With regard 
to Shell, it is worth mentioning that this company has been hardly 
engaged in transactions of some importance so far. A strategy manager 
of Shell/The Hague indicated, however, that the market leader cur-
rendy aims at selling several Western European plants and, in particu-
lar, a refinery site in France. On account of the fact that asset trading 
is an extremely sensitive issue, which has to be treated with the utmost 
secrecy, he refused to give detailed information about the takeover 
target and the potential acquisition candidate (s) involved. 
It is interesting to note that national and independent companies 
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were responsible for almost all acquisitions. The majority of the 
purchases concerned small-sized production units. 
Investments in conversion facilities 
Above attention was primarily focused on disinvestments in the form 
of closures and contractions. These negative adjustments have led to 
an overall reduction in primary distillation output. As we have seen 
earlier, however, for conversion capacity the pattern of development 
has been just the opposite. In order to bring supply into a more 
balanced relationship with the changed composition of demand, high 
investments in upgrading (conversion) facilities have been crucial for 
the competitiveness of the producers involved in the Western Euro-
pean refinery industry. In section 3.3 we have hypothesized that given 
the financial capability required especially medium- and large-sized 
firms, such as the major oil companies, have been able to make 
adaptations in this respect. Let us look now to what extent the majors 
have put this ability into practice. The development of both the 
catalytic cracking and hydrocracking capacity owned by the major oil 
companies between 1985 and 1995 is made explicit in table 6.10. 
As table 6.10 demonstrates, Shell was the front runner in terms of 
upgrading capacity in Western Europe during the last decade. This 
pre-eminent position can be ascribed primarily to Shell's investments 
in conversion installations in both Rotterdam/the Netherlands and 
Stanlow/the UK. In fact, the Stanlow refinery has been outfitted with 
the largest catalytic cracker of Shell in Europe. Upgrading of the 
refinery site in Rotterdam has been achieved through Shell's Hycon-
project (hydrocracking). Having succeeded in surmounting its teeth-
ing troubles, this project now seems to come to fruition. In this 
context, the observation should be made that Shell has recendy 
embarked on a major modernization programme of this refinery, 
known as 'Per+'. Per+ involves among others the construction of a 
new hydrocracking plant which comes on stream in early 1997. 
Although the latter company has clearly retained its premier place 
as far as the volume of Western European conversion capacity is 
concerned — this continued dominance was acknowledged by strategy 
managers of BP Oil Europe and of CFP-Total during the interviews 
— it is important to stress that particularly its arch-rival Esso has virtually 
catched up on Shell's lead. Especially Esso's investments in catalytic 
cracking facilities in Fawley/UK and Augusta/Italy as well as the 
equipment of the Rotterdam complex with the so-called Flexicoker 
have propelled this company to a quite strong position. A strategy 
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Table 6.10 Catalytic cracking and hydrocracking capacity of the major oil 
companies m Western Europe between 1985 and 1995 (Mt/year) 
1985 1995 
Catalytic cracking 
Shell 9 7 116 
Eso 112 121 
BP 6 6 7 2 
Texaco 4 2 3 8 
Mobil 5 1 4 8 
Chevron - 1 5 
Gulf 14 16 
CFP-Tool 5 6 6 
Total capacity 43 2 49-2 
HfunKnckJug 
Shell 17 4 1 
Eso 17 
BP 2.1 2 3 
Texaco 
Mobil 0 5 
Chevron 
Gulf 
CFP-Tool - 1.2 
Total capacity 4 3 9.3 
manager of Shell in The Hague was fully aware that the gap which 
previously existed between Shell and other producers in this respect 
has narrowed considerably through time. According to him, especially 
Esso, BP and CFP-Total have undertaken quite spectacular invest-
ments. The point that the two latter producers have, indeed, stepped 
up their upgrading capacity significandy is supported by table 6.10. 
Between 1985 and 1995 CFP-Total witnessed an increase of 32 
percent and BP's output grew by 9 percent as far as catalytic cracking 
is concerned. Apart from the latter three producers, he mentioned the 
importance of Elf and Veba as investors in conversion. 
Access to natural resources 
As we noted in section 3.3, the previously undisputed leadership of 
the major oil companies in the upstream area has largely been eclipsed 
and displaced by state-owned firms from oil producing countries since 
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the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Particularly companies from OPEC 
countries have succeeded to make inroads into the traditional domi­
nance of the established oil majors with respect to the control and 
access to crude oil supplies and oil production. Indeed, it seems that 
the former players have tightened their grip on crude oil at the expense 
of the position of the major oil companies upstream. Having said this, 
it is time to find out whether this hypothesis is consistent with reality. 
We will do this by examining the changes which took place in the 
production of oil of the individual majors in the 1980-1990 period. 
In addition to this quantitative approach, we will review the percep­
tions of the various strategy managers interviewed regarding the 
overall improvement or deterioration in terms of ease of availability 
and acquisition of crude. Both types of information will be treated 
together below. Table 6.11 provides insight into the development of 
world production of oil of the major oil companies (excluding Gulf, 
for which data are unavailable) between 1980 and 1990. 
It is evident from table 6.11 that the major oil companies as a group 
saw a decline in their level of crude oil output by 13 percent in the 
1980-1990 period. Their share in the world total dropped from 23 
percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 1990. Of course, such a broad 
grouping conceals substantial variations which occurred in the perfor­
mance between the individual major oil companies. Actually, the 
trend of Shell and Chevron was totally opposite to the general pattern 
of production of the majors: while Shell experienced an increase of 
more than 50 percent during the 1980s, Chevron's volume of world 
oil production even doubled - albeit from a low base level of 23 
Table 6.11 World production of oil of the major oil companies between 
1980 and 1990 (Mt/year) 
Company 
SheU 
Eao 
BP 
Temco 
Mobil 
Chevron 
CFP-Toul 
Total crude oil 
producbon of 
the majon 
World total 
I960 
203 
87 
68 
161 
99 
23 
46 
687 
2.927 
1981 
181 
69 
67 
157 
91 
24 
32 
621 
2,750 
1982 
187 
71 
65 
100 
83 
24 
28 
558 
2,622 
1983 
193 
79 
62 
№ 
66 
24 
25 
529 
2.612 
1984 
222 
83 
64 
83 
65 
47 
21 
585 
2.673 
1985 
218 
85 
70 
74 
59 
52 
20 
578 
2,645 
1986 
248 
89 
67 
64 
36 
51 
16 
571 
2.755 
1987 
270 
90 
70 
50 
35 
49 
16 
580 
2.777 
1988 
281 
95 
76 
48 
36 
48 
19 
603 
2,885 
1989 
290 
89 
70 
36 
38 
47 
20 
590 
2.939 
1990 
308 
84 
63 
32 
38 
46 
28 
601 
2,962 
Source: Grant (1993) 
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million tonnes in 1980 to 46 million tonnes in 1990. Shell clearly 
retained its leading position upstream among the majors. By 1990, its 
share of total world oil production had even risen from about 7 percent 
in 1980 to 10 percent. The favourable performance of the market 
leader was confirmed by a strategy manager of Shell in The Hague. 
He had the impression that Shell's success in replacing its oil produc­
tion and adding to reserves can be traced to the enormous increase in 
its exploration budget as well as its effectiveness in finding oil. But he 
did not expect that supply security will cause problems for producers 
from consumer countries in general at least at the medium term, 
because there is a glut of crude oil on the world market at the moment. 
In accordance with him, a strategy manager of BP Oil Europe in 
Brussels also recognized that access to crude oil supplies is currendy 
not a key issue. As table 6.14 reveals, BP has indeed managed to retain 
a fairly stable position in absolute terms. Λ similar static trend is 
apparent as far as Esso is concerned. 
By contrast, however, the remaining three major oil companies, 
notably Texaco, Mobil and CFP-Total underwent an absolute and 
relative decline in their global oil production. Their reduction in total 
oil output is probably partly due to the tact that their exploration and 
production activities failed to generate a satisfactory yield. Besides, 
political risks in particular areas, such as the Middle East, may have 
deterred these producers from making new investments or may even 
have incited them to sell some of their upstream assets. It appears that 
particularly Texaco's sharp fall in crude oil production can be mainly 
ascribed to its withdrawal from the Middle East (Grant 1993, 179). 
Texaco stands out from Mobil and CFP-Total in the sense that its 
global total decreased most dramatically by 80 percent between 1980 
and 1990. Although CFP-Total has obviously been less hard hit by 
the events of the 1970s in comparison with the other two companies 
(its world crude oil production fell by 39 percent during this period), 
it is fully aware of its deteriorated situation upstream as acknowledged 
by the vice-president of this company in the interview. 
Access to distribution channels and marketing outlets 
In section 3.3 it was suggested that the reshuffling process has not only 
emerged in the upstream area of the oil industry, but also downstream 
on the Western European oil market. Especially some national oil 
companies of oil producing countries have managed to acquire (a part 
interest) in refining and marketing facilities in Western Europe. We 
have already made the point that the subgroup of the American majors 
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in particular has succumbed to the temptation to sell off surplus assets 
to OPEC companies (see section 3.3). Indeed, as we have observed 
earlier, Gulf and Mobil have handed over several refinery plants to this 
group of actors. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that 
producers trom oil exporting countries have gained ground downstream 
(refining and marketing) at the expense of the majors and other 
established firms. In order to examine whether this hypothesis holds 
good, we will again make use of two sources of information. As in the 
case of the previous issue (access to natural resources), we will adopt 
both a quantitative and a qualitative approach. Figure 6.4 portrays the 
changes which came about in the relative importance of various 
categories of producers in Western Europe's total network of service 
stations between 1985 and 1991. 
This figure provides empirical support for the proposition made 
above. Although the majors still dominated in terms of the total 
number of Western European marketing oudets controlled in 1991, 
their leadership was much reduced and their commanding position 
clearly challenged by firms from OPEC countries and, to a somewhat 
lesser extent, local producers and independent oil companies. In the 
1985-1991 period the majors' share of the Western European network 
of service stations declined from approximately 38 percent to 32 
percent, while the OPEC companies' share increased from 3 to about 
7 percent. What may seem odd, however, is how the relative expan-
sion of the latter type of market participants is perceived by the major 
oil companies which participated in the interview. Drawing a parallel 
between the opinions expressed by the interviewees of CFP-Total, of 
Shell/The Hague and of BP Oil Europe/Brussels, we can reach the 
conclusion that none of them regards the downstream investments of 
companies from oil producing countries as a threat. In essence, BP's 
sale of its marketing network to Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 
(KPC) in Denmark in 1988 reflects the impartial attitude of this 
company once again. A strategy manager of BP Oil Europe was 
convinced that the presence of this group of players will not exert a 
negative influence on the downstream business performance of BP in 
Western Europe, because of the tact that the company's brand name 
and those of other established market participants is generally rated 
higher. Shell and CFP-Total, on the other hand, have not yet handed 
over part of their European retail operations to OPEC firms. Note 
that both the vice-president of CFP-Total and a strategy manager of 
Shell underlined that their companies would have been certainly 
prepared to carry out transactions with participants from OPEC 
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Euromonitor, Roland Berger and Partner 
countries, if there had been opportunities to do so. They argued, 
however, that the OPEC companies lack of interest to invest in their 
downstream facilities has to be placed into a broader perspective. 
Actually, they appear to be no longer desperately keen to embark on 
downstream investments in Western Europe at large due to the less 
satisfactory returns obtained from them. It is, therefore, reasonable to 
expect that in the immediate future the relative position of OPEC 
companies will remain stable or deteriorate rather than improve in this 
area of operation in Western Europe by which further encroachment 
upon the territory of the majors is unlikely to occur. 
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Ethylene crackers 
In section 6.2.2 it was already indicated that overall ethylene manu­
facture in Western Europe finds itself in a phase of restructuring and 
stabilization at the moment. Analysis of the production of ethylene of 
the major oil companies separately, however, yields a less uniform 
outcome (table 6.12). 
Since the mid-eighties the three leading major oil companies -
Shell, Esso and BP - have been entirely responsible for total ethylene 
production of this category of producers in Western Europe. At the 
beginning of the 1990s they even increased their ethylene output 
through expansion of existing plants. The observation has to be made 
that in 1993 Shell and BP were undoubtedly in the forefront. Indeed, 
in this year ethylene production of the former two companies was 
more than two times greater than that of Esso. Texaco, Chevron and 
Gulf, on the other hand, are currendy no longer represented on the 
Western European market. Actually, these American actors already 
ceased production during the 1980s. As we have seen above, this 
means that by leaving this business the latter company in particular 
behaved in a similar fashion as in the case of Western European oil 
refining. Note that Mobil and CFP-Total have never been engaged 
in ethylene manufacture in Europe. 
Drawing a parallel between the ethylene capacity of the individual 
major oil companies and total output in Western Europe, the above-
mentioned developments are once more underlined in the sense that 
the region as a whole also experienced a growth in production in the 
early 1990s. Notwithstanding the fact that this sector in general as well 
as the three leading majors in particular displayed a pattern of growth 
in recent years, it is worthwhile to look more closely at the negative 
Table 6.12 Ethylene capacity of the major oil companies in Western Europe 
in the 1960-1993 period (1,000 t/year) 
Company 1960 1965 1970 197S 1980 1985 1990 1993 
ShcD 
Eso 
BP 
Texaco 
Gulf 
Chevron 
Tool ethylene capacity of the majOB 305 1.035 2.722.5 4.547.5 4,870 4,230 3,540 
925 
85 
127 5 
-
-
. 
285 
290 
330 
95 
-
35 
745 
705 
592 5 
220 
300 
160 
1,420 
1,195 
1Д32.5 
240 
300 
160 
1,500 
1.190 
1,480 
240 
300 
160 
U55 
1,215 
изо 
205 
-
125 
1.540 
640 
1.360 
-
-
-
1.765 
835 
1,820 
-
-
-
Tool ethylene opacity in Wesiem 695 2,675 7.725 13,310 17,060 15,586 14,740 18,245 
Europe 
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adaptations which have been made by the various members of this 
group. 
Negative adjustments in the 1980-1993 period 
In considering the negative adaptations regarding ethylene crackers 
controlled by the major oil companies between 1980 and 1993, the 
following changes can be identified. 
As the first column of table 6.13 depicts, total decline of ethylene 
capacity between 1980 and 1985 was for the most part due to 
contraction of existing cracking plants primarily owned by Shell and 
BP and for another part carried out by complete closure of production 
units. By contrast, in the 1985-1990 period the decrease of ethylene 
capacity can be fully ascribed to closures. Esso contributed most to this 
cut in ethylene output by shutting down its cracking unit in Cologne. 
Reference back to the disinvestments on which the majors have 
embarked in the case of Western European oil refining makes clear 
that Shell and Esso have implemented restructuring of ethylene 
manufacture in a similar manner. It appears that contrary to Esso, Shell 
prefers reductions in ethylene capacity of individual crackers to the 
shutdown of entire production facilities. Actually, this was confirmed 
by a strategy manager of the chemical division of Shell in London. He 
commented that Shell generally regards closures as its last resort. Of 
course, this attitude bears similarity to that of other (major oil) 
companies. However, compared with many of its rivals. Shell's 
earnings held up better in this field of operation during the eighties 
(Grant 1993, 88). As a result, Shell has often been more successful in 
keeping most of its steam crackers running in recent years. Besides, it 
should be noticed that the overall decrease in production of the majors 
in the latter period was half of the 1980-1985 reduction. This less 
marked decline was caused by the opening of a new cracker joindy 
owned by Esso and Shell in Mossmorran in the UK. In the early 1990s 
Table 6.13 Changes in ethylene capacity of the major oil companies in Wes­
tern Europe in the 1980-1993 period; components of change (Mt/year) 
Adaption 19B0-1985 19Я5-1990 1990-1993 
Creadon - 0.5 
Extension 0.5 0.1 0.9 
Connection -0.7 
Closure -0.4 -0.9 
Tool -0.6 -0J 0.9 
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this trend was even reversed through the expansion of crackers by 
Shell and BP in particular. In the present mature industry setting of 
the basic petrochemical industry, both Shell and BP follow a more 
selective strategy in the sense that they attempt to exploit market 
niches. More explicidy, they concentrate on a particular market 
segment in which they seek to become a key player. Strategy managers 
of Shell and BP Chemicals, both based in London, have emphasized 
that their companies consider the ethylene chain as one of their core 
businesses on which they wish to focus in the near future. Their 
commitment to ethylene finds expression in the recent enlargement 
of their ethylene capacity in Western Europe. Despite these adjust-
ments, the composition of ethylene crackers controlled by the major 
oil companies has remained almost the same in terms of size and 
location (coastal/inland). 
Whereas several medium-sized units (100 - 500 thousand t/y) 
situated on the coast were closed down or sold, the number of large 
plants (over 500 thousand t/y) increased. This growth was only 
achieved by extending existing crackers. Examples of closures or 
takeovers which occurred in the middle of the size spectrum from the 
1980s onwards were Esso's ethylene cracker in Stenungsund/Sweden 
which was sold to the Norwegian state-controlled company Statoil in 
1986 and the cracking plant of BP in Baglan Bay/ the UK which ceased 
operation at the end of 1993. According to a strategy manager of BP 
Chemicals, production of this cracker was stopped because of its 
inefficiency and isolated location. It concerned a small, old plant which 
lacked access to the UK (olefin) pipeline network. Although the 
rationalization process took mainly place among medium-sized units 
at coastal locations, it has to be pointed out that the majority of the 
surviving crackers of the major oil companies can still be characterized 
as such. 
As can be expected, the spatial pattern of ethylene manufacture of 
the majors more or less paralleled that of its oil refining activities at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Indeed, like in the case of oil refining, the 
production of ethylene is almost completely concentrated in the 
northern part of Western Europe at the moment. The majority of the 
cracking operations of Shell, BP and Esso can be found in the United 
Kingdom and France. Since the Greek state took over Esso's small-
sized cracker in Thessaloniki/Greece in the mid-1980s, the majors are 
no longer operative in this line of business in Southern Europe. 
Ethylene production is currendy mosdy undertaken by the three 
leading major oil companies alone. However, five ethylene crackers 
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Figure 6.5 Spatial pattern of ethylene crackers of the major oil companies 
m 'Western Europe in 1993 
were managed in partnership with another (major oil) company, as 
table 6.14 depicts. Again we see that BP is much more prepared to 
establish joint ventures than Shell. 
Table 6.14 illustrates that the majors have predominantly estab-
lished a joint venture arrangement with a chemical company. The 
main implication for both categories of producers of these joint 
ventures is vertical integration. While the major oil companies have 
thus taken upon themselves the manufacture of base chemicals in 
general and ethylene in particular by integrating forward, the chemical 
companies have become engaged in oil refining through backward 
integration. Looking more closely at the choice of joint venture 
partners, the following needs to be said. As a strategy manager of Shell 
in The Hague has indicated, the selection process of firms with which 
the market leader is willing to cooperate is clearly biased in favour of 
large privately owned players, such as Esso and BASF. Unlike Shell 
and probably also Esso, it may be stated that BP generally adopts a less 
selective approach. A strategy manager of BP Oil Europe in Brussels 
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t 
.δ 
e 
о 
-I 
S 
о. 
»s 
1 
fe 
о 
к 
s 
ч 
8 
'δ 
w 
О 
-S 
3 
-Sí 
г
ч 
* S 2 
*. о 
ili 
'И 
•Sai 
fil 
ε Si 
•3 
E 
в * 
1 i 
Я ν Я « 
È· S 
I i 
Ε о 
ΐ Г 
i ϊ 
(О (Λ 
Η 
fi 
i J 
•fi S 
I 
Structural Changes in Western Europe 123 
underlined that the main driving force behind most joint ventures set 
up by BP was the value that could thus be created. Broadly speaking, 
whether or not the joint venture partners were well-matched was 
virtually in all cases of minor importance. His comment is supported 
by a strategy manager of BP Oil Downstream in London who said 
that BP has established a large number of relationships with almost 
every company in the industry. He summarized the selection process 
succincdy as horses for courses. As to the size of the joindy owned 
assets, it is interesting to observe that without exception they can be 
characterized as large (over 500 thousand tonnes). Obviously, by 
joining forces it remains feasible to run a large-sized cracker and, 
hence, to reap the benefit of scale economies. 
Since the beginning of the eighties the majors have sold only a few 
ethylene crackers to other producers. Actually, only Esso and Texaco 
have been involved in transactions. Esso hived off its production 
facilities in Thessaloniki/Greece and Stenungsund/Sweden to the 
Greek state in 1984 and the Norwegian national oil company Stato il 
in 1986 respectively. Texaco handed over its ethylene plant in 
Heide/Germany to the German independent private firm R W E / 
DEA in 1988. Until now no acquisitions have been made by the major 
oil companies in this field of operation. 
Conclusion 
It can be stated that the market position of the major oil companies as 
a group not only upstream (crude oil production) but also downstream 
(oil refining, conversion, marketing and ethylene manufacture) has 
weakened particularly in relative terms since the beginning of the 
eighties. 
Especially regarding oil refining, downward adjustments have had 
the upper hand in the form of closures of complete units, contractions 
of existing plants or the outright sale of facilities. Although the major 
oil companies also decreased their ethylene capacity in Western 
Europe from 1980 onwards by which they have lost relative impor-
tance in this line of business, retrenchment was clearly less severe 
compared with oil refining. Since the early 1990s they have even 
experienced an absolute increase in their volume of production again. 
It has to be pointed out, however, that the category of the major 
oil companies at large masks important differences in the changes 
which have come about in the fortunes of individual producers and, 
therefore, in the underlying strategic decisions. More explicidy, in oil 
refining primarily BP, Mobil, Chevron and CFP-Total have been 
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responsible for the waning of the dominance of the majors in Western 
Europe, whereas Gulf has even completely withdrawn from this 
sector. As to ethylene manufacture, it is worth noting that the American 
majors in particular have contributed to the overall decreasing share 
of the major oil companies. Actually, Texaco, Chevron and Gulf are 
no longer active on the Western European market at the moment. By 
contrast, Shell and BP have seen an expansion of ethylene capacity 
since the mid-1980s. Looking at the world crude oil production of 
the majors, Texaco, Mobil and CFP-Total accounted for the vast 
majority of the total reduction in output of the category as a whole. 
All things considered, it appears that whilst Shell has managed to 
retain its strength in the Western European oil and (basic) petrochemi-
cal industry and hence still occupies a leading role within these sectors, 
this cannot be said of the American major oil companies. True, apart 
from Esso, the American majors have undoubtedly suffered a deterio-
ration in their competitiveness in these areas of activity. 
6.4 The chemical companies 
It goes without saying that for chemical companies even more than 
for oil companies the manufacture of basic petrochemicals, such as 
ethylene is natural. Indeed, many of them have taken upon themselves 
this activity. In some cases, however, chemical companies have even 
broadened their business portfolio in the sense that they have moved 
into oil refining through backward integration in order to secure their 
necessary supply of raw materials. Quite often, backward integration 
has been implemented by the establishment of joint venture arrange-
ments with, and sometimes via acquisitions of, oil companies. 
One of the main aims of this section is to review and explain the 
differences in the scope of activities of the individual chemical pro-
ducers involved in the Western European oil refining and basic 
petrochemical industry and the possible changes which have recendy 
come about in their operational boundaries. Without doubt, a wide 
disparity can be perceived in the spectrum of products in which the 
various market participants belonging to this category are at present 
engaged as well as in the adjustments made in this respect. Certainly, 
whilst some players are still virtually active in the entire range of 
petrochemicals and, thus, seek to hedge their bets, others have clearly 
become much leaner and meaner with regard to their product scope. 
Besides, we will deal with the restructuring process in terms of 
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capacity adjustments on which the individual chemical actors have 
embarked in oil refining and/or ethylene manufacture. Just as in the 
previous section of this chapter, we will proceed in more or less the 
same fashion in the following analysis. We are concerned once again 
with the pattern in the evolution of both sectors regarding the 
chemical producers active on the Western European market and 
particularly with the extent of their rationalization experiences. More-
over, we will review the investments made in conversion facilities, 
and the possible changes which have come about in the access to both 
crude oil supplies and marketing oudets as far as these issues are 
germane to this group of market participants. 
Oil refining 
In the preceding section we have established that the postwar devel-
opment of the oil refining operations of the major oil companies 
corresponds very closely to the general trend of the Western European 
oil refining industry at large. The same seems to apply to the chemical 
producen which have become involved in this sector with the passage 
of time. The number of oil refineries which were wholly or partly 
owned by the chemical companies in Western Europe between 1950 
and 1995 is presented in table 6.15. 
In accordance with the overall Western European refining industry, 
the primary distillation facilities controlled by the chemical actors have 
also gone through several stages of the industry life cycle in the past 
decades by which the category as a whole finds itself in the saturation 
phase at the moment. Looking more closely at the individual firms 
within this group, it is worthwhile to note that particularly Veba, 
BASF and Du Pont are currendy almost entirely responsible for the 
total number of refinery plants in Europe. Du Pont has quite recendy 
made a commitment to oil refining through its acquisition of Conoco 
in 1981. Actually, this is a good example of the strategy of backward 
integration which was pursued by many chemical companies to meet 
the feedstock needs of their petrochemical activities especially in the 
period following the oil price shocks. Their move into oil refining 
was primarily driven by the uncertainties surrounding the future 
supply and cost of the raw materials required. Put differendy, they 
obviously feared that they would be squeezed by oil companies on 
naphtha supplies. Apart from the companies mentioned above, ICI 
and Dow are also still active in this line of business as single plant 
producers. The observation has to be made, however, that nowadays 
chemical producers in Europe may dismiss their immediate concerns 
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Table 6.15 Number of oil refining units of the chemical companies m Wes­
tern Europe in the period 1950-1995 
Company 
BASF 
Dow 
ί α 
Du Pont 
Veta 
Hoechst 
Montedison 
Total chemical 
companies' 
Total Weuem 
Europe 
1950 
2 
-
-
-
-
-
2 
72 
1955 
3 
-
-
2 
1 
-
6 
% 
1960 
3 
-
-
2 
1 
-
Б 
105 
1965 
4 
-
1 
5 
1 
-
11 
127 
1970 
4 
-
1 
5 
1 
2 
13 
160 
1975 
4 
1 
1 
6 
1 
2 
15 
163 
1980 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
12 
161 
1985 
3 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
11 
129 
1990 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
-
-
8 
104 
1995 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
-
-
8 
102 
Ίο one сак, пооЫу а геблсгу ш Karlmihe, еЬа and Du Pont are both involved in the same refining asset 
about supply security because of the availability of a variety of sources 
of input. The fact that this matter justifiably arouses less apprehension 
among Western European chemical players than in the early 1980s 
was recognized by the vice-president strategic planning of Dow 
Europe in Horgen (Zürich) during the interview. He said that Dow's 
urgency of involvement in oil refining reduced significandy in the last 
10 to 15 years. For this reason, Dow is even prepared to sell its minority 
interest in the Total refinery in Vlissingen (the Netherlands). In the 
latter case, such a transaction would imply a complete disappearance 
from the Western European refining scene. As table 6.15 shows, this 
is exacdy what has occurred as far as Hoechst and Montedison are 
concerned. Indeed, both companies withdrew from this sector by 
selling (part of) their oil refining facilities to RWE/DEA around the 
mid-1980s and ENI in 1990 respectively. 
Unlike the long delays in the adjustment of primary distillation 
output to the drop in demand in Western Europe as a whole, the 
category of the chemical companies already began to make significant 
disinvestments in the immediate aftermath of the oil crises of the 
seventies. This disparity in the pace of retrenchment in response to 
the situation of overcapacity seems to reflect that most oil companies 
attach greater importance to oil refining compared with the chemical 
industry in general. In essence, this point arised most clearly in the 
conversation with a strategy manager of BASF in Ludwigshafen who 
emphasized that oil refining constitutes a stand-alone business within 
the BASF Group and is regarded as a non-basic activity. Nevertheless, 
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Table 6.16 Oil refining capacity (primary distillation) of the chemical com-
panies m Western Europe, 1950-199S (Mtfyear) 
Company 
BASF 
Dow 
ICI 
Du Pom 
Vela 
Hoechu 
Montedison 
Tall 
¿¡•Si 
Tool capacity 
Western Europe 
1950 
03 
-
-
-
-
-
0 3 
41 
1955 
12 
-
-
35 
04 
-
51 
IIB 
1960 
3 
-
-
4 7 
0 8 
-
10 5 
192 
1965 
74 
-
05 
115 
0 8 
-
202 
386 
1970 
12 
-
27 
16 3 
11 
14 3 
464 
705 
1975 
17 
14 
2 7 
273 
16 
17 8 
67 8 
965 
1980 
10 8 
15 
27 
205 
16 
202 
57 3 
1,004 
1985 
88 
15 
24 
82 
74 
-
14 8 
431 
751 
1990 
33 
33 
24 
82 
74 
-
-
24 6 
635 
1995 
41 
3 3 
24 
8 6 
7 9 
-
-
26 3 
643 
as long as this field of operation yields an attractive return on 
investment, there is no reason for BASF to exit from this sector. The 
post-war trend in primary distillation capacity of the chemical com-
panies for the period 1950-1995 is quantified in table 6.16. 
Table 6.16 reveals that among the chemical companies which were 
still operative in Western European oil refining in 1995, particularly 
BASF and Veba underwent a pronounced decline in their level of 
output from the mid-seventies onwards. More explicidy, BASF ex-
perienced a capacity reduction of about 76 percent during the period 
1975-1995. At the same time, Veba saw a relative fall in production 
by 71 percent. Consequendy, the latter has lost its premier place in 
the league table of the chemical producers as it was surpassed by Du 
Pont at the beginning of the 1980s. What attracts attention is that the 
total Western European refinery capacity of Du Pont as well as ICI 
showed a relatively stable pattern in the past decade. They appear to 
have come virtually unscathed through the restructuring crises of the 
1980s. Moreover, it is remarkable that Dow stands out from the other 
players belonging to this group in the sense that it was the sole chemical 
company which more than doubled its volume of production — albeit 
from a rather low starting point of 1.4 million tonnes in 1975 to 3.3 
million tonnes in 1995. This expansion was due to an increase of its 
share in its single refinery site in Vlissingen which Dow achieved in 
exchange for building a hydrocracker at the end of the eighties. Finally, 
table 6.16 provides further empirical evidence that Hoechst and 
Montedison ceased production after 1980, as was mentioned above. 
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Especially Montedison used to play an important role within this sector 
in terms of production capacity as far as the group of chemical 
producers is concerned. Hence, the takeover of its refining activities 
by the Italian state company ENI has clearly contributed to a relative 
decrease in importance of the entire category in Western European 
oil refining. 
Negative adaptations between 1980 and 1995 
Although the chemical companies in general and Veba in particular 
had already reduced their overall presence in this area of activity in 
the late 1970s, the bulk of disinvestments occurred from 1980 on-
wards. For this reason, it seems to be justified to highlight primarily 
the negative adaptations made by these market participants in the 
period 1980-1995. As in the case of the major oil companies, the 
primary distillation capacity of the chemical companies at large has 
declined at a far higher rate in relative terms compared with the 
Western European oil refining industry as a whole (see table 6.16). 
Table 6.17 portrays the absolute significance of the various compo-
nents of change which have resulted in an impairment of the market 
position of the chemical producers in general and of most individual 
firms within this group (apart from Ehi Pont, Dow and ICI) in this 
sector since 1980. 
Again, table 6.17 makes plain that amongst the chemical players 
Montedison and Veba in particular bore the main burden of retrench-
ment. More specifically, these two firms accounted for more than 85 
percent of the total fäll in production of all the chemical companies 
together in Western Europe between 1980 and 1995. It is apparent 
that Montedison and Veba as well as the chemical actors as a group 
have implemented rationalization via closures or the sale of (a part 
interest in) a refinery site - the latter is included in the closure figure 
— rather than by contractions. The fact that Du Pont fared rather well 
contrary to virtually all of its European chemical rivals and even 
managed to emerge as the leader within this group, as we have seen 
already, is confirmed by table 6.17. We pointed out earlier that Du 
Pont owes this commanding position in this field of operation to the 
takeover of the oil refining assets of Conoco in the early 1980s. 
The overall outcome of the attempt of the chemical producers to 
wipe out excess capacity was a decrease in the number of refinery 
plants which were wholly or partly under their control by 33 percent 
in the 1980-1995 period. It is important to note that this disinvestment 
has not so much been carried out by closing down entire production 
Structural Changes m Western Europe 129 
Table 6.17 Changes in refining capacity (primary distillation) of the chemi-
cal companies in Western Europe in the 1980-1995 period; components of 
change (Mtfyear) 
Company 
BASF 
Dow 
ICI 
Du Pont 
Vet» 
Hoechst 
Montedison 
Total 
1980-1995 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creanon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
crea oon 
extension 
contnenon 
closure 
total 
crea oon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
ex tensón 
contraction 
closure 
total 
crea non 
extension 
contnenon 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
tool 
_ 
-
-1 
-10 
-11 
1 
1 
-
-
: 
-
7 
7 
_ 
-
-6 
-7 
-13 
_ 
-
-2 
-2 
_ 
-
-16 
-16 
-
В 
-7 
-35 
-U 
units as by selling oil refining facilities to other types of market 
participants. The transfer of ownership undertaken by the chemical 
companies is treated below. We now want to go briefly into the 
alterations which have occurred in the composition of oil refineries 
owned by the chemical producers in terms of size as well as inland 
versus coastal location, and the spatial implications of these changes. 
A synoptic picture of this composition is given in table 6.18. 
Table 6.18 demonstrates that during the period 1980 to 1995 no 
considerable changes took place in the composition of refinery sites 
managed by the chemical companies as far as size and inland/coastal 
location are concerned. Expressed more precisely, in common with 
the situation in 1980, in 1995 the majority of the refinery plants still 
belonged to the category of the small-sized units (six, or two-third of 
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Table 6.18 Composition of the oil refining units of the chemical companies 
by size class and by inland/coastal location m Western Europe in the 1980-
199S period 
190O 1995 
number of unin according ro inc­
e l a (Mt/y) 
шаН (0 - 5 Mi/y) 8 6 
medium (5-10 Mt/y) 3 2 
large (over 10 Mt/y) 1 
number of units situated on the 
coast or at an inland location 
coast 4 3 
inland β 5 
total number 12 θ 
the total number) and were located inland (five of the eight existing 
units). Indeed, although the chemical players have chiefly disposed of 
their small refineries at inland locations, most of the assets that 
remained in business can still be described as such. Due to the sale of 
a large-sized oil refining facility by Montedison in 1990 the chemical 
companies currendy no longer own this type of refineries in Western 
Europe. Figure 6.6 maps the spatial distribution of the surviving 
Western European refinery sites of the chemical companies in 1995. 
The figure illustrates that the oil refining activities of the chemical 
companies are entirely concentrated in the northwestern part of 
Europe and particularly in Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. The fact that their operations are basically confined to 
this region should not come as a surprise since the bulk of total Western 
European ethylene production is also located in this area, as already 
assessed in section 5.3.2. Actually, this convergence in the spatial 
configuration of both sectors mirrors once again the aforementioned 
strategy of backward integration adopted by many chemical market 
participants. Although North-West Europe and, especially Germany, 
was and is likely to remain the major host for the investments made 
in oil refining by this group of producers, it has to be pointed out that 
until 1990 one chemical actor, notably Montedison, was represented 
in the South of Italy. More precisely, this Italian producer was the 
owner of two production facilities: the Priolo refinery which, as we 
observed earlier, was hived off to the state-owned company ENI and 
a small plant in Brindisi which was shut down in the early 1980s. In 
addition to the Brindisi refinery, one other refinery site was also closed 
Structural Changes in Western Europe 131 
Figure 6.6 Spatial pattern of oil refineries of the chemical companies in 
Western Europe in 1995 
down by this type of producen, namely BASF's production unit in 
Mannheim at the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the latter closure as 
well as the disinvestments undertaken by the chemical companies in 
the form of transactions, to which we will revert later in this section, 
did not have far-reaching implications for the location pattern of oil 
refining facilities, as displayed by figure 6.6. Expressed differently, in 
the case of the chemical players the spatial consequences of restruc-
turing were almost negligible, because their negative adaptations were 
primarily restricted to the three core nations mentioned above. 
One final point should be made before leaving this brief discussion 
of the spatial dimension of the realignment of the individual firms 
belonging to this group. Faced with pressures for change, management 
of this type of actors has predominandy given up plants which lacked 
cracking capacity. In this respect the disinvestment behaviour of the 
chemical producers bears similarity to that of the majors, as has been 
seen in section 6.3. 
As to those oil refineries which have remained open, it is important 
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to stress that in most cases (five out of the eight existing sites) the 
chemical companies work in concert with oil companies. Table 6.19 
lists the Western European refinery àtes in which both types of 
producers had pooled their resources in joint ventures by 1995. 
With the exception of BASF, all the chemical companies, which 
were present in the refinery business in Western Europe in 1995, were 
involved in a (number of) joint venture tie-up(s). On account of the 
fact that the lion's share of the oil refining faculties of the chemical 
producers concern jointly owned plants, it is quite legitimate to regard 
the formation of partnerships as a common method of implementing 
upstream integration among this group of actors. Joining hands 
predominantly with oil companies has undoubtedly enjoyed vogue as 
an organizational form of most chemical players, and of Veba in 
particular. It should be recognized, however, that this type of firms, 
like business organizations in general, prefers to be solely responsible 
for the control of a particular asset to sharing tasks and talents with a 
partner. More precisely, this statement proves to hold good for the 
three producers, notably Dow, ICI and BASF, which took part in our 
research. Actually, a strategy manager of BASF in Ludwigshafen made 
no bones about BASF's attitude towards the establishment of joint 
ventures: 'It is only attractive to enter into an alliance, if one company 
is deaf and the other blind'. Yet, he is fully aware that it is not always 
possible to go it alone. Take the example of BASF's current attempt 
to expand its presence outside Western Europe. In doing so, the latter 
company pursues a strategy of geographical diversification. In order 
to accomplish this objective, it is sometimes necessary from a legal 
viewpoint to link up with a (local) firm. True, especially in the Far 
East and Eastern Europe alliances are often essential as vehicles for 
gaining a foothold in new market areas. In accordance with BASF, 
Dow's organizational structure also tends to be heavily weighted 
towards wholly owned operations. This is not to say that Dow did not 
forge successful partnerships during the last decades. The vice-presi-
dent strategic planning of Dow Europe claimed that Dow views the 
joint venture arrangement with Total in its single refinery site in 
Vhssingen as a prime example of an appropriate tie-up. He underlined, 
however, that Dow's preparedness to form a joint venture is highly 
governed by specific benefits which can be reaped from it, particularly 
in the form of chemical knowledge and technological capabilities. 
Without doubt, this stance parallels more or less that of several other 
chemical companies. Obviously, the one thing most (chemical) firms 
do not have in common with Dow is that the latter judges carefully 
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every potential cooperation with other producers against a list of 
principles. Over the years, it has sought to capture its experiences in 
this respect by means of some guidelines which represent, according 
to him, Dow's Ten Commandments. In essence, this hst of principles 
provides a background on the basis of which Dow assesses whether or 
not the advantages of a particular partnership outweigh the disadvan-
tages. The main issues covered by this check Hst can be summarized 
as follows. One of the key aspects concerns the importance of 
reviewing whether there is a good chemistry fit between the individual 
firms involved. More specifically, Dow examines closely the extent to 
which the (chemical) know-how of the various companies is well-
matched. Another aspect is about the necessity to consider what each 
partner may contribute to a possible relationship. Last but not least 
Dow regards it as essential to draw up a divorce clause which makes 
a provision for the way in which a partnership can be dissolved in case 
it does not work. Yet, by applying this list of criteria Dow, of course, 
hopes to avoid the need for breaking off a relation and, therefore, to 
further the selection of suitable joint venture partners. When taking a 
closer look at the choice of firms with which Dow has built up an 
alliance, it is evident that it has barely worked together with state 
companies. The interviewee of Dow Europe suggested that this bias 
against national producers is attributable to dissimilarities in both 
business culture and strategic objectives. Although these disparities also 
apply to ICI, it turns out that it has not hindered this company from 
joining forces with this type of market participants. A good example 
which can be quoted in this context is the joint venture arrangement, 
known as European Vinyls Corporation (EVC), which ICI has built 
up with the Italian state company Enichem in the polyvinyl chloride 
business for technological reasons. At the moment ICI and Enichem 
still have a 16 percent share in EVC (Het Financieele Dagblad, 5 
March 1996). The remaining shares are privately owned. Broadly 
speaking, it seems therefore reasonable to state that ICI has adopted a 
less selective and cautious approach in this respect compared with 
Dow. Notwithstanding this difference, it has to be said that ICI's 
attitude towards joint ventures shows some congruence with Dow in 
the sense that the former also does not advocate this organizational 
form if it is not really mandatory. A strategy manager of ICI in Wilton 
(UK) argued that there has to be a strong justification for entering into 
a joint venture, because it entails a lot of management time and often 
brings about a great deal of complexity. But simultaneously he 
admitted that sometimes you have to throw away the old shackles of 
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internai development and to be willing to share control with other 
companies in order to spread financial risks, to create competitive 
strength or to tackle new market areas. 
Apart from collaboration, one company, notably Du Pont, has used 
outright acquisition as a tactic to bolster its competitive position in 
Western European oil refining, as discussed above. More explicidy, 
Du Pont took over the entire oil refining facility of Conoco in South 
Killingholme (the United Kingdom) as well as the latter's 25 percent 
share in Oberrheinische Mineralölwerke in Karlsruhe (Germany) in 
1981. However, some of the chemical producers have followed the 
opposite course by selling (part of) their plants to oil companies. True, 
it has already been mentioned that both Hoechst and Montedison 
sacrificed an oil refinery in Western Europe. Hoechst decided in 1984 
to hand over its minority interest (25 percent) in the Wesseling refinery 
in Germany to the independent company RWE/DEA, and Mont-
edison behaved in a similar fashion in 1990 by disposing of the Priolo 
refinery to ENI, as we have seen already. 
Investments in conversion facilities 
Having dealt with the considerable restructuring process through 
which chemical producers have brought their primary distillation 
capacity more in line with the absolute decline in consumption, we 
will now devote our attention to the investments in upgrading capacity 
made by this group of players to meet the change in the composition 
of demand for oil products. As has already been referred to in section 
3.3, the name of the supply game in the Western European refining 
industry today is 'expanding production of light distillates at the 
expense of heavy fractions'. It was postulated there that this changed 
supply game has not favoured all companies across the continuum of 
sizes to the same extent. Differences in ability to finance the necessary 
adjustments in response to these developments tend to have given 
large- and medium-sized firms an advantage over their small competi-
tors, as argued in chapter 3. In section 6.3 we have found that many 
of the large established oil majors, indeed, increased their conversion 
capacity significandy during the past decade. It is interesting to 
establish to what degree upgrading has also appealed to chemical 
companies as a way to enhance their competitiveness in the European 
refinery business. Just as variations seem to exist in the level of 
investment in conversion facilities between large- and medium-sized 
companies on the one hand and small operators on the other, so it 
may be possible to identify a divergence in commitment in this respect 
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of the chemical companies compared with oil companies. We have 
good reasons for supposing that conversion has held litde attraction 
for the chemical producers, because their overall involvement in oil 
refining in general is smaller than those of most oil companies. The 
quantitative significance of the evolution of the catalytic cracking and 
hydrocracking capacity controlled by the chemical companies in the 
1985-1995 period can be appraised from table 6.20. 
As table 6.20 shows, Du Pont experienced the greatest expansion 
in catalytic cracking capacity between 1985 and 1995 (a more than 
fourfold increase). Consequendy, it succeeded to raise itself to a 
commanding position amongst the chemical companies in terms of 
the total volume of conversion capacity. Here, again, like in the case 
of crude distillation, we see evidence of the emergence of Du Pont as 
a dominant force. Actually, this status was achieved primarily through 
the equipment of the South Killingholme refinery with a catalytic 
cracker. In addition to Du Pont, Veba has abo witnessed a significant 
enlargement of catalytic cracking capacity: its level of output virtually 
doubled from 0.7 million tonnes in 1985 to 1.3 million tonnes in 1995. 
It is worth noting that Veba's catalytic cracking unit in Gelsenkirchen 
Table 6.20 Catalytic cracking and hydrocracking capacity of the chemical 
companies m Western Europe m the 1985-1995 period (Mt/year) 
Caafyúc cncUng 
BASF 
Dow 
I d 
Du Pom 
Veh 
Montedbon 
1985 
-
-
-
0.8 
0.7 
1.5 
1995 
-
-
-
3.4 
I J 
_ 
Tool capancy 3.0 6J 
BASF 
Dow 
I d 
Du Pom 
Vet» 
MODttuttOIl 
Tool capacity 
0.9 
-
-
-
0.7 
-
1.6 
1.0 
0.9 
-
-
0.7 
-
2.8 
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accounted for the main part of this increase. As a matter of fact, the 
significant role played by Veba with regard to these kind of adaptations 
was fully recognized by a strategy manager of Shell in The Hague (see 
section 6.3) and the vice-president of Dow Europe in Horgen. 
Similarly, Dow as well as BASF have outfitted their refineries in 
Vlissingen and Lingen respectively with hydrocracking plants. It has 
to be pointed out, however, that their scale of production is still rather 
limited and well behind many oil companies. As can be seen from 
table 6.20, ICI is not engaged in conversion at all. A strategy manager 
of ICI commented that it is not really necessary to upgrade its single 
refinery site in North Tees (UK), because the production process of 
this facility is predominandy based on light North Sea crude oil. This 
implies that ICI is currendy not plagued by an imbalance between 
supply and demand. 
Access to natural resources 
In contrast to oil companies in general, the issue of crude oil supplies 
and oil production hardly bears relevance to the category of the 
chemical companies. Essentially, most chemical producers have ceased 
their crude oil production activities and basically purchase theñ-
necessary input supplies on the world market at the moment. This 
behaviour is not surprising considering that there is room for manoeu-
vre caused by an abundant supply of this raw material, as indicated in 
section 6.3. What is more, until now many chemical companies have 
only played a minor part in oil refining, let alone in oil production. 
For these reasons, it seems legitimate to confine ourselves to a brief 
discussion of this issue. Our survey will rest entirely on a qualitative 
approach due to a lack of quantitative information. Therefore, the 
state of affairs of the chemical companies is judged on the basis of the 
perceptions of strategy managers of firms belonging to this group, and 
of Dow and ICI in particular, with regard to the changes which have 
come about as far as the availability and acquisition of crude oil are 
concerned. The interviewees of Dow Europe and of ICI argued that 
the reshuffling process which occurred at the upstream end of the 
processing chain in the aftermath of the oil price hikes of the seventies 
has barely had implications for their operations as well as for the 
chemical industry as a whole. In fact, the view of the interviewee of 
ICI was paralleled by the vice-president of Dow Europe, who believed 
that the company's position regarding the access to crude supplies has 
remained fairly stable or has even shown a tendency to improve. What 
matters, according to these two interviewees, is not the access to 
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natural resources, but the issue of vertical integration. The vice-presi-
dent of Dow Europe stressed that the key topic which occupies much 
management time within Dow and is thus of critical strategic impor-
tance for the Group is the extent to which the company should 
vertically integrate. He said that Dow subscribes to the vertical 
integration theory of Stuckey and White (1993) whose primary 
message is that it is only sensible to pursue this strategy when it is 
absolutely necessary to create or protect value. On the basis of the 
ideas of these writers about the (dis)advantages of this organizational 
form Dow has established that it is not vital to be involved in oil 
production. From the interview with a strategy manager of ICI it can 
be inferred that ICI has reached the same conclusion in this respect. 
He commented that the unattractiveness of backward integration into 
oil production is certainly beyond dispute as far as ICI is concerned. 
He proceeded to observe, however, that the entry into oil refining by 
chemical companies often makes sense, because in many cases they 
seem thus to be able to gain a competitive advantage, for example, in 
the form of synergies over their non-integrated rivals. 
Access to distribution channels and marketing outlets 
Like in the case of the preceding issue which was concerned with the 
production of crude oil and the access to this raw material, it should 
be recognized that the theme of the alterations which have taken place 
regarding the access to distribution channels and marketing outlets 
scarcely applies to this group of producers. True, there are only a few 
chemical companies which have a network of service stations at their 
disposal in Western Europe. More explicidy, Veba and BASF sell part 
of their refinery output through Aral, in which the former owns a 
majority share of 56 percent and the latter has a 15 percent stake. Mobil 
is responsible for the remaining 29 percent. In addition to the two 
former companies, Du Pont operates via Conoco a retail chain known 
as 'Jet'. At the beginning of the 1990s Conoco had petrol stations in 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Austria, Switzerland, Swe-
den, Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
Once again, therefore, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a concise 
consideration here. A comprehensive examination not only appears 
to be of litde value in this case, but it is also impossible because we are 
constrained by a deficiency of sufficiendy detailed data in a quantitative 
form. As figure 6.4 (see section 6.3) reveals, 'the chemical companies' 
are subsumed within the broader category labelled as 'others'. The 
category in its entirety has come to account for a greater proportion 
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of Western Europe's total network of service stations: its share 
increased from about 21 percent to 23 percent between 1985 and 
1991. It is apparent that a clear relationship tends to exist between the 
overall pattern of the wider context (i.e. the category 'others') and 
those of the various (sub groups of) producers that constitute this 
category. With certain reservations, it may therefore be expected that 
the trend of the chemical companies at large conforms more or less 
with the positive development of the category 'others' as sketched 
above. In making this assumption, we suggest automatically that the 
pattern of evolution of the group of the chemical firms almost 
resembled those of local producers and independent oil companies as 
well as OPEC companies in relative terms in the 1985-1991 period. 
Expressed differently, it is plausible that, in accordance with the two 
latter groups of players, the chemical producers at large also saw an 
increase - or at least a stabilization — in relative importance as a 
marketer of oil products in Western Europe. Of course, the degree of 
relative expansion differed between these three groups. As will be 
discussed in section 6.6, the category of OPEC companies obviously 
experienced the most satisfactory growth, although its share of the 
Western European distribution network (almost 7 percent in 1991) 
was still rather modest in the early nineties. Given this recent enlarge-
ment of the presence of firms from OPEC countries downstream, the 
interviews with management of the chemical companies have pre-
dominandy concentrated on the way in which the investment behav-
iour of the former is perceived. The interviewees of Dow Europe and 
ICI share a common attitude towards the downstream investments 
made by OPEC companies in the sense that they regard these strategic 
decisions as positive. According to the vice-president of Dow Europe, 
Dow holds the view that every producer, irrespective of its identity 
(e.g. privately or state-owned companies), should have the right to 
gain a foothold in a particular market area. Needless to say, this also 
applies to OPEC companies. In fact, Dow even welcomed the entry 
of newcomers from oil producing countries during the eighties, 
because it believes that the best possible boost to competitiveness 
comes from competition itself. A strategy manager of ICI was con-
vinced that the operations of this group of market participants should 
be respected rather than criticized or feared. He brought up the point 
that there is much more reason to be worried about the reluctance of 
the established European players in eliminating surplus capacity. The 
resistance to retrenchment can partly be ascribed to the classical 
oligopolistic stalemate which inhibits every producer from disinvest-
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ing for fear that rivals take advantage of this fint move. Implicit in the 
prevailing managerial perceptions of these two chemical companies -
ICI and Dow - of the increased downstream involvement of national 
oil companies in general is their preparedness to do business with them, 
for example, in the form of transactions. Up to now, however, none 
of the assets which have been sold by Dow as well as ICI has been 
transferred to this type of actors. This is not surprising since most of 
the OPEC companies have hardly made a commitment to (basic) 
petrochemicals in Western Europe which can be considered as the 
central focus of many chemical companies. Yet, we have to be aware 
that the fact that these activities hold little attraction for the latter is 
itself a reflection of an even more fundamental trend, namely a 
geographical shift of the oil and petrochemical industry. As has already 
been seen in chapter 5, the entire Western European market has 
somewhat lost its appeal to producers involved in these sectors in 
favour of other market areas. It seems that this can abo be said of OPEC 
companies (see section 6.3). In this context, a strategy manager of ICI 
remarked that the latter are currendy playing an industrialization game 
in these lines of business in their own home countries and the Far East 
rather than in Western Europe. 
Ethylene crackers 
As can be expected, the chemical companies in general have taken a 
great interest in ethylene production and have undoubtedly contrib-
uted significandy to its development in Western Europe. It has already 
been noted that on an aggregated level Western European ethylene 
manufacture has reached the mature stage of its life cycle. It is 
interesting to examine now whether the experiences of the chemical 
producers as a whole and the individual members of this category run 
parallel to the nature of changes which have come about within this 
sector at the Western European scale. The evolution of the ethylene 
capacity of the chemical companies in the period 1960-1993 is made 
explicit in table 6.21. 
It is remarkable that the share of the three biggest chemical 
companies - BASF, Dow and ICI - in total ethylene production of 
this category of market participants in Western Europe rose consider-
ably from about 60 percent between 1960 and 1985 to approximately 
80 percent in the 1985-1993 period. They achieved this relative 
expansion by means of an enlargement of existing production faculties. 
Note, though, that since 1986 BASF and Dow have been entirely 
responsible for this favourable performance, owing to the closure of 
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Table 6.21 Ethylene capacity of the chemical companies in Western Europe 
in the 1960-1993 period (1,000 t/year) 
Company 
BASF 
Dow 
ICI 
Veba 
Hoechst 
Montedison 
Hüb 
Solvay 
Celanese 
Bayer 
Abismase- Lonza 
Total ethylene capacity 
companies 
Total ethylene capacity 
Europe 
of the chemical 
in Western 
1960 
62 S 
-
125 
10 
20 
85 
-
-
-
225 
-
325 
695 
1965 
375 
-
125 
45 
20 
237 5 
50 
50 
25 
65 
-
992.5 
2,675 
1970 
510 
400 
650 
185 
50 
365 
50 
169 
25 
145 
25 
2.574 
7.725 
1975 
785 
900 
650 
750 
-
540 
50 
169 
25 
2225 
30 
4,121.5 
13,310 
1980 
975 
900 
1J0O 
800 
-
545 
-
119 
25 
370 
30 
5,064 
17.060 
1985 
775 
1,310 
1,295 
350 
-
-
-
85 
-
370 
30 
4,215 
15.586 
1990 
775 
1,290 
600 
350 
-
-
-
89.3 
-
370 
25 
3,499.3 
14,740 
1993 
960 
1.600 
620 
595 
-
-
-
106.3 
-
370 
30 
4,281.3 
18,245 
ICI's ethylene cracker in Wilton (UK). In contrast to the two former 
producers which even experienced an additional growth in produc-
tion capacity through the creation of a new steam cracker in Antwerp 
in 1994, ICI clearly undertook major capacity reductions in its basic 
petrochemical operations in general and within this in ethylene 
manufacture in particular. We will discuss the rationalizations upon 
which ICI and other chemical producers have embarked below, when 
we review the negative adaptations made by this group of players in 
this line of business after 1980. This restructuring process is important 
enough to warrant a separate treatment. 
Before dealing with the issue of retrenchment of the chemical 
companies in this field of operation, let us return to table 6.21. From 
table 6.21 it can be deduced that apart from Dow and BASF, Veba 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Solvay also witnessed a significant 
upturn in volume terms in the early 1990s. As far as Veba is concerned, 
it has to be pointed out that it has recently enjoyed a further absolute 
rise in its level of ethylene output in Western Europe through the 
establishment of a new cracker in Gelsenkirchen/Germany (see sec-
tion 5.2.2). With regard to Bayer and the Swiss company Alusuisse-
Lonza, it needs to be observed that they succeeded to maintain a rather 
stable pattern of production from the early 1980s onwards. The 
remaining four companies, namely Hüls, Celanese, Hoechst and 
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Montedison completely disappeared from the Western European 
scene. In the case of the two latter producers (Hoechst and Mont-
edison), the behaviour therefore was consistent with what they did in 
the refining industry. 
When considering the trend in the share of all the chemical 
companies together in total ethylene capacity in Western Europe in 
the period 1960-1993, it is apparent that the market position of this 
group of actors weakened, relatively speaking, considerably. By 1960, 
the chemical companies as a whole were producing about 47 percent 
of the Western European total; by 1993, their share had shrunk to a 
mere 23 percent. Given this dramatic decline in relative significance, 
it is worthwhile to look more closely at the rationalization schemes 
which have been implemented by individual firms within this group 
and have led to their overall diminishing performance. 
Negative adjustments in the 1980-1993 period 
Analyzing the negative adjustments made by the chemical companies 
in Western European ethylene manufacture in the 1980-1993 period, 
it turns out that major alterations came about within this span of time. 
Table 6.22 reveals a marked contrast between the 1980-1985 
period on the one hand and the 1985-1990 period on the other. In 
the former period the trimming of ethylene capacity was for the most 
part brought about through contraction of cracking units operated by 
Veba and BASF in particular and for another part through closures 
which were mainly carried out by Montedison. Conversely in the 
second half of the 1980s retrenchment took entirely the form of the 
shutdown of a single plant, notably ICI's ethylene cracker in Wilton. 
By shuttering this large production faculty, ICI has clearly come out 
on top in terms of rationalization. The pre-eminent position of ICI 
in this respect was recognized by several managers of rival firms. The 
vice-president of Dow Europe, for instance, brought up the point that 
ICI has cut back even more drastically on output in base chemicals 
compared with Dow. He underscored that the issue of restructuring 
in this area of operation displays a wide diversity of involvement across 
the entire spectrum of oil and chemical companies. According to him, 
there exists a continuum of producers which ranges from those that 
are truly cast in the capitalist mould and have therefore already taken 
far-reaching disinvestment decisions based on economic criteria to 
those that are state-supported or -owned and have, burdened with 
political considerations, hardly made any significant moves towards 
the shedding of capacity. He claimed that ICI, followed closely by 
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Table 6.22 Changes m ethylene capacity of the chemical companies in Wes-
tern Europe in the 1980-1993 period; components of change (Mt/year) 
Adaptation 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-199} 
Cicaoon -
Entnaon 0.5 0.1 0.8 
Contnction -0.8 
Closure -0.6 -0.8 
Tool -0.9 -0.7 0.8 
Dow, have undoubtedly been front runners in taking drastic measures 
to decrease overproduction in Western Europe. This means that in 
his view both companies can be found at the active end of this range, 
where strategic initiatives to combat the overcapacity problem prevail. 
A strategy manager of ICI regarded the fact that ICI has acted more 
decisively and swiftly than its competitors in shutting down capacity 
as a key strength of this company. He argued that this alert respon-
siveness to the onset of market maturity has enabled ICI to enhance 
its competitive position in commodity chemicals in Western Europe. 
More explicidy, most of the few surviving production facilities which 
have been kept in business by ICI are currently star performers in terms 
of profitability and rank high in the world league table. He quoted 
ICI's single Western European ethylene cracker in Wilton/the UK in 
which it owns a majority interest of 80 percent as a prime example of 
a plant that shows an outstanding performance. 
Turning our attention to the overall volume of production of the 
chemical companies, another pronounced difference can be per-
ceived. While ethylene output fell significandy during the 1980s, with 
the greatest decline occurring in the first half of this decade, at the 
beginning of the nineties this negative pattern of development was 
clearly thrown into reverse. This upward shift in ethylene capacity can 
be totally ascribed to the extension of existing steam crackers. Particu-
larly Dow, BASF and Veba were responsible for this increase. As was 
mentioned above, these three companies realized an additional growth 
of production in Western Europe by starting up new cracking units 
in 1994. It has to be taken into account that it concerns here two 
facilities, namely BASF's cracker in Antwerp and a new plant which 
was added to Veba's Gelsenkirchen complex. Dow, on the other hand, 
seized the opportunity to participate in the former production site -
that is, in the Antwerp cracker which is wholly owned by BASF. BASF 
has signed a buying-and-selling contract with Dow by which the latter 
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Table 6.23 Composition of the ethylene crackers of the chemical companies 
by size dass and by Mandi coastal location in Western Europe in the 1980-
1993 period 
number of urna according to su* 
eh» (1.000 t/y) 
anali (0 - 100) 
médium (100 - 500) 
boy (over S00) 
number оГшнп nutated on the 
cose or s an inland location 
coas 
inland 
total number 
1980 
4 
7 
< 
S 
10 
IS 
1993 
2 
6 
3 
3 
8 
11 
is entitled to 30 percent of the total output of this cracker. By setting 
up this cracking acuity, BASF has reached the final stage of its 
investment programme at Antwerp. Germany's largest chemical en­
terprise generally commences at the downstream end of the vertical 
processing chain of the petrochemical industry (i.e. the manufacture 
of fine chemicals) on a particular location. This behaviour can be 
explained in terms of level of demand. More precisely, the reason why 
BASF's commitment usually remains restricted to downstream activi­
ties such as, for example, plastics fabrication lies in the fact that these 
lines ofbusiness are often characterized by smaller plants in comparison 
with base chemicals. This being so, there is less cause for concern that 
the production facilities suffer from a low capacity utilization rate. As 
soon as BASF is convinced that the upstream operations meet a 
growing demand and the market for base chemicals is likely to become 
buoyant, the company may decide to integrate backward. A strategy 
manager of BASF indicated that this is exacdy what happened in the 
case of Antwerp, where BASF considered it to be legitimate to build 
a large ethylene cracker. 
When the consequences of these adaptations for the composition 
of ethylene crackers owned by the chemical companies are investi­
gated (table 6.23), it turns out that, as in the case of oil refining, only 
some moderate shifts came about in the number of production facilities 
classified according to size class and inland/coastal location between 
1980 and 1993. Small-sized plants (less than 100 thousand t/y) in 
particular failed to survive the process of rationalization undertaken 
by this group of players. The cracking units of Montedison in Mantova 
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Figure 6.7 Geographical distribution of ethylene crackers of the chemical 
companies in 'Western Europe in 1993 
(Italy) and of Celanese in Spondon (the UK) are the two cases in point 
here. As table 6.23 displays, the number of closures and takeovers 
which occurred on the coast equalled those which took place at inland 
locations. Nevertheless, the fact that the bulk of the crackers of the 
chemical companies was situated inland ensured that the relative 
impact of these changes was obviously not the same. Indeed, in relative 
terms, the ethylene crackers on the coast were affected twice as strong 
by retrenchment than their inland counterparts between 1980 and 
1993. Figure 6.7 portrays the spatial pattern of ethylene manufacture 
of the chemical companies in Western Europe in 1993. 
It is no coincidence that the ethylene production pattern of the 
chemical companies is broadly similar to that of their oil refining 
operations in Western Europe. In essence, this bears witness to the 
proposition put forward in chapter 2 that the high degree of techno-
logical and commercial interdependence which exists between these 
two sectors tends to result in a geographical distribution that is largely 
identical to both types of business activities. True, like in the case of 
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oil refining, the largest concentration of ethylene manufacture is 
currently in North-West Europe and in Germany in particular. 
However, there are a few minor exceptions to this general pattern. 
Figure 6.7 shows that three cracking units which are in the hands of 
the chemical players can be found in or below the Alps. One of those 
is Dow's cracker in Tarragona (Spain). Dow decided to purchase this 
cracking facility from the Spanish semi-national oil company Repsol 
for cost efficiency reasons in 1982. It is noteworthy that in the view 
of the vice-president of Dow Europe the Tarragona cracker occupies 
a medium position in the Western European league table in terms of 
profitability and clearly lags behind the production units of Dow in 
Terneuzen and Antwerp. He said that it is quite likely that in the 
foreseeable future Dow will fully utilize the production capacity of 
the two latter low-cost crackers, whereas the plant in Tarragona will 
be primarily used to make up the remaining deficit, thus becoming 
solely responsible for meeting swing demand. 
In addition to the striking similarity in geography between oil 
refining and ethylene manufacture in Western Europe, there is also a 
marked resemblance in organizational form of both activities as far as 
the chemical companies are concerned. Just as the oil refining opera-
tions of this group of market participants are mainly run in collabora-
tion with a partner, so their ethylene manufacturing facilities rest 
predominandy on shared ownership at the moment. Table 6.24 
reproduces the ethylene crackers in which the chemical producers 
worked together with another company in 1993. 
As table 6.24 demonstrates, all these joint ventures consist of one 
of the chemical companies with an oil company. Again, this points to 
the strategy of vertical integration which is pursued by both types of 
actors. What attracts most attention is that the choice of joint venture 
partners falls into two categories: the major oil companies and the 
state-controlled companies. Whereas the three chemical giants -
BASF, Bayer and ICI - have obviously forged partnerships with the 
established oil majors (BP and Shell in particular), the remaining two 
companies — Veba and Solvay - have joined hands with state-owned 
enterprises. Sometimes the collusive behaviour with a particular firm 
is explainable by the partner choice which has been made in (an)other 
stage(s) of the processing chain. This seems to hold good in the case 
of ICI and Veba. Indeed, reference back to table 6.19 shows that Veba 
has set up a joint venture tie-up with the national oil company 
Petroven in oil refining which implies that its cooperation with the 
latter has not remained confined to ethylene manufacture alone. This 
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can abo be said of ICI. ICI has not only joined hands with BP in 
ethylene production, but also upstream, namely in oil exploration and 
production. As to the Wilton cracker, a strategy manager of ICI 
remarked that both ICI and BP use joint venturing as a method of 
reducing the investment outlay required and sharing the risks in-
volved. An important point about the joint venture arrangements 
listed in table 6.24 is that all chemical companies, with the exception 
of Solvay, hold an equal or majority ownership position. Besides, most 
of these joindy owned production sites (apart from the steam crackers 
in Münchmünster and Feyzin) appear to be large-sized. 
So tar little effort has been made within the group of the chemical 
players to sell production facilities to other market participants. From 
the 1980s onwards no more than a single ethylene manufacturing asset 
was handed over. It was Montedison which decided to hive off its 
ethylene plant in Priolo/Italy to the Italian state company Enichem in 
1983. Apparendy, the latter transaction between Montedison and 
Enichem was implemented a few years earlier than that which was 
undertaken in oil refining at the same location, as was mentioned 
above. 
Conclusion 
Since the cataclysmic events of the seventies the market position of 
the chemical companies at large has either remained fairly stable 
(conversion and marketing) or has impaired considerably (oil refining 
and ethylene manufacture). Undoubtedly, the leading role formerly 
performed by the chemical companies in Western European ethylene 
production has been clearly challenged during the past decade, al-
though some members of this group have recendy expanded their 
ethylene output again. Quite evidently, too, the chemical players as a 
group have also seen a decrease in relative significance in oil refining 
in Western Europe. Note, though, that this loss of importance has 
been much more manifest in ethylene production than in oil refining. 
The deterioration in relative strength in the latter field of operation is 
probably attributable to the fact that the chemical players in general 
have followed the strategy of'back to basics'. 
Of course, within this broad category significant variations can be 
perceived in (dis)investment behaviour between the individual chemi-
cal enterprises. In the case of oil refining, BASF and Veba have 
contributed most to the overall weakening of the position of the entire 
group. As opposed to this, Du Pont has fared rather well in this sector. 
With regard to investments in conversion facilities, it is interesting to 
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observe that once again Du Pont has made the greatest commitment 
to upgrading which has found expression in a substantial enlargement 
of catalytic cracking capacity. ICI, on the other hand, has not been 
engaged in conversion at all up to now and is unlikely to be so in the 
near future. Turning to ethylene production, it is worth mentioning 
that especially ICI has been responsible for the reduced dominance of 
the chemical companies in Western Europe, while Hüls, Celanese, 
Hoechst and Montedison have even totally exited from this line of 
business. Conversely, Dow, BASF and Veba experienced a significant 
upturn in volume terms at the beginning of the 1990s. 
In spite of the fact that the strategic decisions upon which the 
various producers have embarked in each of the different areas of 
activity are far from uniform, it seems reasonable to infer that all in all 
ICI in particular has led the way in rationalization. 
6.5 The national oil companies from consumer countries 
In section 6.3 it was contended that it is quite likely that the former 
market power of the major oil companies upstream as well as down-
stream has been curtailed primarily by national oil companies of 
producing and consuming countries. At this point we will examine 
whether this hypothesis is valid as far as the state-owned enterprises 
from consumer countries are concerned. Section 6.6 then expands the 
analysis by looking in detail at the investment behaviour of OPEC 
companies in Western Europe and therefore by considering empirical 
evidence on their possible infringement upon the oil refining and 
ethylene manufacturing activities of the majors. A glance back at figure 
6.5 shows that the major oil companies have clearly lost relative 
strength in Western Europe's total network of marketing oudets in 
the 1985-1991 period in favour of the OPEC companies. An inves-
tigation as to whether the reshuffling process has yielded the same 
outcome in the sectors under review (i.e. oil refining and ethylene 
production) is made in section 6.6. 
We will, however, begin by exploring the actions taken by Euro-
pean public enterprises in strategic respect. As noted in chapter 3, this 
type of market participants is especially highly represented in Southern 
European countries. Indeed, although this region is currendy in the 
grip of a process of liberalization and privatization, both sectors are 
still to a large extent politicized in this part of Europe. Like in the 
preceding sections, we will predominandy touch upon four issues: (a) 
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the behavioural responses of the national oil companies to the changed 
market circumstances of the oil and basic petrochemical industry and 
particularly their moves towards rationalization; (b) their investments 
in conversion facilities; (c) the alterations in their access to crude oil 
supplies; (d) the changes in their access to distribution channels and 
marketing oudets. Let us switch our attention now to the strategic 
decisions which the state-owned producers have taken with regard to 
their oil refining operations in Western Europe. 
Oil refining 
It seems that the evolutionary path which the Western European oil 
refining industry of private producers in general has followed deviates 
from the pattern of development of the national oil companies. Whilst 
it can broadly be said that most private companies have already reached 
maturity with regard to oil refining, some of their public counterparts 
from consumer countries have not yet passed beyond the expansion 
phase within the industry life cycle. Table 6.25 demonstrates the 
number of oil refineries in which the national oil companies were 
engaged in Western Europe in the 1950-1995 period. 
Table 6.25 Number of oil refining units of the national oil companies in 
Western Europe in the period 1950-1995 
Company 
Sociiti Nationale ЕИ" 
Acquioine 
ENI 
Repsol 
(Campsa/EMP) 
Petrogal 
ÓMV 
Neste Oy 
Sarod 
Norsk Hydro 
Svcruka Petroleum 
НсПспк/DEP 
Saarberg 
Insti National 
Petroleum 
Corponuion (INPQ 
Total nanonal oil 
companies1 
Tool Western Europe 
1 9 » 
3 
4 
1 
1 
5 
-
-
-
-
14 
72 
1955 
5 
6 
1 
1 
5 
-
-
-
-
18 
96 
1960 
-
22 
105 
1965 
8 
13 
2 
1 
2 
1 
-
1 
1 
29 
127 
1970 
14 
15 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
-
2 
41 
160 
1975 
14 
15 
5 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
42 
163 
1980 
12 
15 
6 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
43 
161 
1985 
6 
13 
6 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
37 
129 
1990 
8 
11 
6 
2 
2 
5 
2 
1 
-
2 
-
1 
39 
104 
1995 
8 
11 
6 
2 
2 
6 
2 
1 
-
2 
-
1 
40 
102 
ID some caes, several national oil companies aie involved in one particular refinery 
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As far as the individual members of this category are concerned, 
marked differences and in a few cases even contrasting developments 
can be observed. It was only in the second half of the seventies that 
the Norwegian state-controlled company Statoil and the semi-public 
player Norsk Hydro decided to establish a joindy owned site in 
Mongstad (Norway). As we have seen in section 6.3, the Irish 
government was even not involved in this sector until the early 1980s 
when the Irish National Petroleum Corporation (INPC) purchased 
Ireland's single refinery from a consortium consisting of BP, Shell, 
Esso and Texaco. At the same time, however, both the Swedish actor 
Svenska Petroleum and the German state-supported company Saar-
berg obviously took the decision to leave the refining scene. Société 
Nationale Elf Aquitaine (Elf) and ENI, and in recent years Repsol and 
Neste Oy, on the other hand, have been responsible for a considerable 
proportion of all European refinery plants. Yet, an important point to 
emphasize is that Elf halved its total number of production facilities 
between 1980 and 1985. But, in 1990 the latter saw a slight increase 
again through the acquisition of a minority interest in the Spanish 
private firm CEPSA. Actually, these changes are reflected in fluctua-
Table 6.26 Oil refining capacity (primary distillation) of the national oil 
companies m Western Europe between 1950-1995 (Mt/year) 
Company 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Société Nationale Elf 15 29 41 12 8 32 3 416 45 6 256 275 306 
Acquitainc 
ENI 2 5 9 2 118 42 5 66 9 89 3 85 1 62 
Repsol 0 3 15 41 8 6 14 7 261 43 β 33 β 
(Campsa/EMP) 
Petrogal 0 4 13 15 18 3 9 5 5 186 155 
ÖMV 11 18 19 43 4 3 114 13 8 9 9 
Neste Oy - 11 3 0 9 4 10 15 6 119 
Statoli - - - - - - 3 1 3 1 
Norsk Hydro - - - - - - 36 36 
Svenska Petroleum - - - - 1 1 1 3 1.2 1 1 -
HeUemc/DEP - - 13 19 - 32 62 9 3 8 7 9 5 
Sttibctg - - - 0 7 21 3.2 3 8 3 8 
ImhNanonal - - - - - - - 2 8 2 8 2 6 
Petroleum 
Corporaoon (INPQ 
Total capacity of the 5 8 16 7 25 8 75 6 134 7 193 6 240 4 182 4 173 7 183 5 
national oil 
47 8 
319 
15 5 
137 
13 3 
10 3 
22 
519 
39 9 
113 
14 
113 
10 2 
22 
Tool capacity 41 118 192 386 705 965 1004 751 635 643 
Western Europe 
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Table 6.27 Changes in refining capaàty (primary distillation) of the natio-
nal oil companies in Western Europe m the 1980-1995 period; components 
of change (Mtlyear) 
Company 1980-1995 
Elf creation 
extension 
conoacoon 
closure 
total 
10 
-2 
-23 
-13 
creation 
extension 
contncoon 
cloture 
total 
Repsol 
Petrogal 
ÖMV 
NcueOy 
extension 
contncoon 
closure 
total 
crea non 
extension 
contncoon 
closure 
total 
12 
-17 
-21 
-26 
3 
-7 
-4 
-4 
Nonk Hydro 
HeUeroc/DEP 
INPC 
Svenska Petroleum 
contncoon 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contncoon 
closure 
total 
creaoon 
extension 
conoacoon 
closure 
total 
creaoon 
exwnsion 
conoacoon 
closure 
tool 
creaoon 
extension 
conoacoon 
closure 
total 
creaoon 
extension 
conoacoon 
closure 
total 
creaoon 
extension 
conoacoon 
closure 
total 
Saarberg creaoon 
extension 
conoacoon 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
conoacoon 
closure 
tool 
43 
-39 
-50 
-46 
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tions in the level of output, as shown in table 6.26. This table provides 
insight into the evolution of the primary distillation capacity of the 
national oil companies between 1950 and 1995. 
It is worth noting that Elf s trend in primary distillation capacity 
has virtually paralleled those of some other national oil producers since 
1980. Indeed, like Elf, ENI, Repsol and the Austrian state-controlled 
company ÖMV witnessed reductions in primary distillation capacity 
during the 1980s followed by a small recovery in volume terms at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Amongst these producers, ENI has always 
occupied a leading position. Although the latter experienced the 
greatest fall in production during the period 1980-1995 with a relative 
decline of around 39 percent, it still heads the league table of the 
national oil companies in Western Europe at the moment. Petrogal, 
Neste Oy and Norsk Hydro underwent an absolute decline in output 
after 1980 which was not thrown into reverse like in the case of the 
aforementioned players. By contrast, Statoil and the Greek govern-
ment-owned enterprise Hellenic/DEP stepped up production from 
the early 1980s onwards. All in all, however, disinvestment rather than 
investment was clearly the main feature of the oil refining activities of 
the national oil companies. For this reason, it seems legitimate to look 
more closely at the negative adaptations which have recendy been 
made by the state-owned refiners. 
Negative adaptations between 1980 and 1995 
Contrary to most other categories of producers, the decline in primary 
distillation capacity of the national oil companies as a whole was 
obviously much smaller than for the entire Western European oil 
refining industry in the 1980-1995 period (see table 6.26). This means 
that, relatively speaking, their market position has improved. While 
by 1980 the national oil companies at large were producing about 24 
percent of the Western European total, by 1995 their share had risen 
to approximately 29 percent. Notwithstanding the fact that retrench-
ment has been less common in its occurrence among state-controlled 
refinery owners, it is interesting to establish which differences in 
disinvestment behaviour can be perceived between the individual 
members of this group and how they have put the process of 
restructuring into practice. Table 6.27 displays the role that each of 
the various components of change played in this process in absolute 
terms between 1980 and 1995. 
Again, we find that especially ENI and, to a lesser extent, Elf have 
made an attempt to rid this sector of excess capacity. In the period 
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1980-1995 ENI and Elf accounted for around 57 and 33 percent 
respectively of the total decline in Western European output of the 
national oil companies as a whole. As a result of this retrenchment, Elf 
was surpassed by Repsol at the beginning of the 1980s. In spite of the 
fact that the bulk of the disinvestments within this group has been the 
work of ENI, which was already pointed out above, the latter 
continued to dominate in terms of production in Western Europe. 
More precisely, in the early 1990s the Italian state producer even 
managed to outpace BP through which it soared to the third place in 
the Western European league table after Esso and Shell. 
Yet, it seems that most of the other European public actors have 
been rather unwilling to acknowledge the prevailing unfavourable 
trends with which the industry is confronted, because they have barely 
embarked on major rationalizations. It is typical that Elf and ENI have 
achieved divestiture primarily by permanent closure of individual 
refining units, whilst the majority of the remaining state enterprises 
has trimmed capacity in the form of contractions. Note, though, that 
as tar as ENI is concerned the cutbacks in the volume of production 
through closures have only slighdy exceeded those undertaken via 
contractions. According to a strategy manager of ENI in Rome, it is 
quite likely that in the foreseeable future the converse will be the case 
since ENI intends to carry out further retrenchment by decreasing the 
size of existing production facilities rather than by closing down entire 
plants. When considering the negative adjustments made by all the 
national oil companies together, it turns out that disinvestment took 
predominandy the form of plant shutdown. The consequence of the 
restructuring process for the group under study is that the number of 
refineries that were completely or partly controlled by its members 
dropped by 7 percent between 1980 and 1995. It is important to stress 
that in comparison with other categories of market participants (e.g. 
the majors) the relative fall experienced by the national oil companies 
was fairly insignificant. 
We now turn to the changes that have come about in the compo-
sition of the refinery plants managed by the national oil companies in 
terms of both size and inland/coastal location. Table 6.28 presents this 
composition for 1980 and 1995. 
Once again it should be recognized that the changes in the 
composition of assets have only partially been created by closures and 
contractions. Indeed, they are also, to a certain extent, due to takeovers 
of refineries from the national oil companies by other types of 
producers. The latter issue will be examined later on in this section. 
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Tabel 6.28 Composition of the oil refining units of the national oil compa-
nies by size class and by inland/coastal location in Western Europe in the 
1980-1995 period 
1980 1995 
number of units according to sue 
elm (1,000 Mt/y) 
small ( 0 - S Mt/y) 25 24 
medium (5 - 10 Mt/y) 11 11 
large (over 10 Mt/y) 7 5 
number of units situated on the 
coast or at an inland location 
coast 25 32 
inland 18 8 
tool number 43 40 
Therefore, readers are urged to take account of this point when 
reading the analysis which follows. As table 6.28 makes clear, the 
reorganization undertaken by the European state-owned enterprises 
in the refining sector has hardly had an influence on the distribution 
of assets owned by them in size terms. Obviously, the number of 
production facilities in the three size classes distinguished stayed 
practically equal in the period 1980-1995. It is worth mentioning that 
especially ENI has slimmed down the level of output of a few large 
refineries through which they have become part of the category of the 
medium-sized units. Like the majors and the chemical companies, the 
state-supported players have mainly given up their oil refineries 
situated inland. Between 1980 and 1995 the total number of inland 
refineries was more than halved which was almost entirely caused by 
complete closures. Conversely, their counterparts on the coast saw an 
increase of 28 percent: from 25 units in 1980 to 32 units in 1995. As 
a result, by 1995 the number of refinery sites situated on the coast was 
four times greater than those located inland. Of course, some coastal 
production sites abo ceased their operations in this period, but this 
decrease was amply counterbalanced by the acquisition of this type of 
plants implemented by the national oil companies. Figure 6.8 visual-
izes the geographical dimension of the restructuring process of this 
category of actors in Western European oil refining. 
This figure confirms the aforementioned impression (see chapter 
3) that Southern Europe is still the dominant focus of this group of 
players with regard to oil refining. The feet that the majority of the 
investments within this sector in terms of the number of plants is 
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Figure 6.8 Spatial pattern of oil refineries of the national oil companies in 
Western Europe in 1995 
concentrated in the latter area can be ascribed to the acquisitions 
carried out by Elf and the Greek state company Hellenic/DEP in Spain 
and Greece respectively. True, Hellenic/DEP purchased the Aspro-
pyrgos refinery from the independent producer Stevros Niarchos in 
1984 and Elf managed to take a 35 percent stake in the Spanish private 
company CEPSA, as we have seen already. It is noteworthy that Italy 
contained one-quarter of all production facilities under control by the 
state-owned producers in 1995 compared with about one-third in 
1980. This relative decrease reflects once again the various closures 
that have been undertaken by ENI during the past decade. Actually, 
in relative terms a similar, though less severe, downward trend has 
occurred in France, owing to the disinvestment decisions made by Elf. 
As opposed to this, Spain and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the 
Scandinavian countries as a whole gained, relatively speaking, in 
significance between 1980 and 1995. The enhanced position of Spain 
is entirely attributable to the above-mentioned acquisition activities 
of Elf. In the case of Scandinavia, the modest gain in attracting 
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investments by the national oil companies was primarily the outcome 
of the fact that the Finnish producer Neste Oy succeeded to acquire 
a 50 percent interest in both Nynas Petroleum refineries in Gothen-
burg and Nynashamn in Sweden in the late 1980s. At present the 
remaining 50 percent in these two production sites are owned by the 
Venezuelan company Petroven, with which Neste Oy quite often 
cooperates in Western Europe. Teaming up with a partner in this line 
of business has clearly not remained confined to Neste Oy. Several 
other government-controlled corporations have behaved in a similar 
fashion. It is apparent from table 6.29 that by 1995 in thirteen out of 
the forty existing sites (or less than one-third) the state-supported 
companies had forged collaborative agreements with other (national 
oil) companies in Western Europe. 
Unlike most other categories of market participants, no more than 
half of the publicly owned enterprises, which were active in the 
European refinery industry in 1995, worked in conjunction with 
(an)other producers). Apart from Norsk Hydro, all the public refiners 
that were engaged in joint venture arrangements in the early 1990s 
were multiplant companies. With certain reservations, it seems there-
fore reasonable to state that single plant actors are generally more 
reluctant to share control than their multiplant counterparts. More 
precisely, whereas single plant operations can often be conducted in 
the form of a 100 percent ownership of production facilities, involve-
ment in several sites mostly necessitates the creation of partnerships. 
In this context, it is useful to point out that a strategy manager of Elf 
Aquitaine in Paris claimed that Elf tends to adopt a pragmatic approach 
to the establishment of joint ventures. In his view, it is an important 
prerequisite for a sound business performance that a company takes a 
critical look at its own resources and capabilities. He said that most of 
the alliances which Elf has built up are based on an accurate assessment 
of the company's strengths and weaknesses in comparison with those 
of its (potential) partners. Judgement of the competence of Elf has led 
to the recognition that in some cases joining forces is absolutely 
essential to reach particular strategic objectives. Let us consider the 
example of Spain where Elf has recendy moved into oil refining as 
well as marketing. There is no doubt that Elf would not have managed 
to gain a foothold in Spain if it had not tied up with Spanish producers. 
In other words, in order to enter into the Spanish market, acceptance 
of a good deal of local capital participation was (and still is) the rule. 
In addition to political reasons, financial and commercial considera-
tions (i.e. in particular the reduction of risks and costs, and the 
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achievement of synergies) have essentially been the dominant motives 
why Elf has formed joint ventures. It follows from this that the strategic 
behaviour of Elf in this respect is virtually identical to that of many of 
the other (types of) rival firms (e.g. Shell, BP, BASF and ICI) dealt 
with in the preceding sections. As to the determinants underlying the 
choice of joint venture partners, Elf also regards — in line with the 
majority of its competitors — similarities in business culture and organ-
izational objectives of crucial importance, as voiced by a strategy 
manager of Elf Aquitaine. 
Switching our attention now to the companies with which Elf has 
allied itself, as illustrated in table 6.29, we can see that Elf has primarily 
set up a partnership in Western European oil refining with privately 
owned companies. The same can be said of ENI and Norsk Hydro. 
Obviously, this contrasts with the selection made by Repsol and Neste 
Oy which have largely confined their collaborative activities in this 
field of operation to state producers. On top of this, it is worthwhile 
to note that the latter two actors are the only public enterprises that 
have succeeded to obtain an equal or majority proprietary. Elf, ENI 
and Norsk Hydro, on the other hand, have reconciled themselves to 
a minority interest. 
Care should be taken, however, that joint venturing is not the single 
tool which national governments involved in the oil refining industry 
in Western Europe have employed in order to better their perform-
ance in this sector. Indeed, some of them have taken action on the 
front of acquisitions too. Before we turn to the acquisitions made by 
government-owned corporations, we need to consider the following. 
In the case of most state-controlled companies the achievement of the 
latter objective — that is, the improvement of their business perform-
ance — is not solely based on economic criteria, but also rests upon 
political and social aspects. Whereas the strategic decision making of 
their private cousins is predominantly guided by the desire to optimize 
in profitability terms, the behaviour of the national oil companies tends 
to rely partly upon non-commercial considerations. Given this differ-
ence in approach between state and private sector firms, it will come 
as no surprise, then, that the number of acquisitions made by the 
former has exceeded those of the latter since 1980. Table 6.30 
summarizes complete as well as partial (at least 50 percent of the shares) 
acquisitions which were undertaken by the state companies from other 
(national oil) companies in Western Europe in the period 1980-1995. 
The table reveals that the Scandinavian companies, Neste Oy and 
Statoil, were the most important buyers of refinery plants in Western 
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Europe. Expressed in quantitative terms, these two producers together 
accounted for more than half of all acquisitions which were imple-
mented by this group of players in the period under study. Conversely, 
Elf and Repsol, both high-ranking companies within this group as far 
as the volume of production is concerned, have not played a (real 
significant) role as acquirers in this area of operation. With respect to 
Elf, it needs to be said that until now this company has confined itself 
to the purchase of a minority interest in CEPSA, as discussed above, 
and the acquisition of a 70 percent share in the Milford Haven refinery 
in the United Kingdom from the American independent Amoco in 
1990. Regarding the takeover of the Whitegate refinery by the Irish 
state-owned enterprise INPC, it is valuable to remark that this 
investment decision is a good example of the strong preference of 
governments of most European countries to boast their own oil 
industry (Wilson 1994, 13). A salient feature of the transactions listed 
in table 6.30 is that in seven of eleven cases (a part of) the assets were 
bought from independent or private actors. Besides, well over half of 
all purchased production units can be characterized as small plants. 
Although the acquisition activities of the national oil companies 
have indisputably had the upper hand, a few members of this category 
have taken the opposite route by hiving ofF refineries to other firms. 
There are three examples which can be quoted in this context. Firsdy, 
Svenska Petroleum sold its 22 percent share in the Gothenburg 
refinery to OK Petroleum in 1986. Secondly, Norsk Hydro surren-
dered its minority interest (30 percent) in Statoil's refinery site in 
Mongstad (Norway) to Statoil in 1988. Thirdly, Saarberg decided to 
dispose of its 25 percent stake in Erdölraffinerie Neustadt in Germany 
to Ruhr 01 in 1989. 
Investments in conversion facilities 
Roughly speaking, the adjustments made by the national oil compa-
nies bear similarity to those which have been undertaken by other 
types of market participants. As in the case of most private sector firms, 
disinvestments in the form of closures of refineries and reductions of 
primary distillation capacity at surviving sites have frequently been 
accompanied by investments in upgrading facilities. Here, we shall see 
to what extent the state-supported enterprises have made a commit-
ment to conversion in order to meet the increased consumption of 
light oil products in Western Europe. Table 6.31 displays the devel-
opment of the catalytic cracking and hydrocracking capacity under 
control by the national oil companies between 1985 and 1995. 
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Table 6.31 Catalytic cracking and hydrocrackmg capacity of the national 
oil compames m 'Western Europe between 1985 and 1995 (Mtlyear) 
Caalytk cnckmf 
Elf 
ENI 
Repel 
Peinga) 
ÖMV 
NeirOy 
Stami 
Nonk Hydro 
Svciaka Petroleum 
HcDenic/DEP 
Seaibcig 
INPC 
Tool capacity 
HydfoencUng 
Elf 
ENI 
Repul 
Pctiogal 
ÖMV 
NeeeOy 
StUDll 
Nonk Hydro 
Svernka Petroleum 
Hcllciuc/DEP 
Saaibetg 
INPC 
Total capacity 
1985 
35 
45 
32 
05 
13 
19 
-
0J 
-
-
0J 
-
155 
-
-
0 5 
OS 
-
0 5 
-
-
-
-
-
-
15 
1995 
7 
85 
4 8 
16 
12 
22 
2 0 
0 3 
-
18 
-
-
294 
-
3 6 
07 
0 5 
-
0 8 
-
0 6 
-
14 
-
-
7 6 
Among the state-owned companies, ENI was not only positioned 
at the top in terms of primary distillation output. Its pre-eminence also 
holds good regarding upgrading capacity in Western Europe in the 
past ten years. More precisely, ENI owes this commanding position 
particularly to the equipment of its oil refineries in Milazzo and 
Sannazaro with catalytic cracking units. It is interesting to observe that 
the two latter refinery sites have recendy been endowed with hy-
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drocrackers. The fact that the Italian state company finds itself at the 
leading edge was underscored by a strategy manager of ENI in the 
interview. Apart from ENI, Elf has also enjoyed a quite spectacular 
expansion of catalytic cracking capacity. In the period 1985-1995 its 
volume of production became twice as great: from 3.5 million tonnes 
to 7 million tonnes. Actually, the extension of Elf s catalytic cracker 
in Donges contributed significandy to this upturn in output. More-
over, this absolute growth is especially attributable to the acquisition 
of an interest in refinery facilities which were already outfitted with 
catalytic cracking plants, notably the sites in Milford Haven (the UK) 
and Algeciras (Spain). Another remarkable example of a public actor 
that has played a fairly essential part in upgrading is Repsol. By 
contrast, up to now conversion has held no attraction for the Irish 
company INPC. Overall, however, it turns out that the group of the 
national oil companies at large has invested heavily in this field and 
has seen a bigjump in the volume of conversion capacity, as table 6.31 
shows. Whereas the scale of production of their catalytic crackers, 
taken together, almost doubled, the level of output of their hy-
drocracking plants even increased more than fivefold — albeit from a 
rather low starting point of 1.5 million tonnes in 1985 to 7.6 million 
tonnes in 1995. 
Access to natural resources 
In section 3.3 it was hypothesized that companies from OPEC 
countries have managed to infringe on the upstream activities of the 
major oil companies since the economic turbulence of the 1970s. We 
have already found that this hypothesis holds good as far as the majors 
as a group are concerned (see section 6.3). What was also suggested 
in section 3.3 is that this reshuffling process has probably enhanced the 
position of national oil companies from consumer countries upstream. 
Actually, this proposition was based on the fact that in the aftermath 
of the recessions of the seventies various arrangements for access to 
crude oil supplies between governments of producing and consuming 
countries sprouted. Let us explore now whether these government/ 
government deals on this issue have brought about a boost in the 
upstream strength of the national oil companies. In our investigation 
we will employ quantitative as well as qualitative data. Note, though, 
that it is not possible to examine in detail the alterations which have 
come about in the fortunes of each of the state-supported producers 
in this respect. This is primarily caused by the serious absence of figures 
on the changes in the volume of production of crude oil of the various 
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Table 6.32 World production of oil of some national oil companies be­
tween 1980 and 1990 (Mt/year) 
Company 
Elf 
ENI 
Rtpul 
NottOy 
Scacoil 
1980 
6 
16 
ПЛ. 
12 
n.a 
1981 
6 
12 
ПЛ. 
11 
na. 
1982 
6 
11 
ПЛ 
П Д . 
ал 
1983 
6 
13 
t u 
n.a 
η i 
1984 
6 
14 
6 
пл. 
5 
1985 
6 
14 
6 
10 
пл 
1986 
6 
14 
6 
10 
na 
1987 
6 
17 
6 
na. 
n.a 
1988 
8 
19 
7 
10 
пл 
1989 
8 
21 
8 
9 
na 
1990 
9 
24 
8 
na 
19 
Source: Grant (1993) 
enterprises belonging to this group between 1980 and 1990 (quanti­
tative information). As a matter of fact, data are entirely unavailable 
for seven of the twelve state-owned firms. Furthermore, it needs to 
be taken into consideration that in all but two (Elf and ENI) of the 
five remaining cases part of the information is incomplete. For that 
reason, it seems more sensible — and certainly more feasible — to draw 
a rough sketch of the pattern of development of the national oil 
companies at large. Within this framework attention will be devoted 
particularly to the two latter public corporations, namely Elf and ENI. 
Table 6.32 gives an indication of the trend in world production of 
some state-controlled producers in the period 1980-1990. 
The results tend to confirm the impression gained earlier the 
national oil companies in general were quite successful in strengthen­
ing their influence as producers of crude oil worldwide. Of course, 
we can only guess at the overall importance of the group in this field 
of operation. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the scarcity of empirical 
evidence, it does appear that all the state-owned corporations with the 
exception of Neste Oy witnessed an expansion in crude oil output in 
the 1980-1990 period. Especially the upstream activities of ENI and 
Statoil showed a sound and satisfactory performance, as table 6.32 
demonstrates. True, if we focus on the second half of the eighties, it 
turns out that ENI saw an increase in output by 50 percent. At the 
same time, Statoil's global total rose almost fourfold, though from a 
low base level of 5 million tonnes in 1984. Actually, a strategy manager 
of ENI in Rome was fully aware of the notable improvement which 
the Italian state producer has achieved in volume terms since 1980. 
However, in common with most strategy managers of private sector 
enterprises, those of ENI and of Elf Aquitaine stressed that access to 
crude supplies does not generate real apprehension for companies from 
consumer countries at present due to the ample availability of reserves. 
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Access to distribution channels and marketing outlets 
We have already established in section 6.3 that the major oil companies 
as a whole have suffered a relative decline in importance as marketen 
of oil products in Western Europe in favour of OPEC companies. 
This means that on the basis of this finding, we have been able to 
corroborate part of the hypothesis advanced in section 3.3. Yet, it still 
remains to be seen whether we can find evidence to support the 
remainder of the statement. Indeed, a glance back at section 3.3 makes 
clear that we have postulated that OPEC companies have not only 
gained in importance downstream at the expense of the majors but 
abo to the detriment of other types of established firms — for example, 
state-owned producers. Hence we need to find out here whether this 
hypothesis can be extended to the group of the national oil companies. 
Again, we will approach this topic from a quantitative as well as a 
qualitative perspective. From figure 6.4, which provides a synoptic 
analysis of the alterations that occurred in the shares of the various 
categories of market participants in the Western European network 
of marketing oudets in the period 1985-1991, the trend can be 
appraised quantitatively (see section 6.3). When we look at the data, 
it becomes obvious that the actual development of the government-
sponsored corporations at large appears to correspond to our expec-
tations. True, although the decrease in relative significance of the 
state-controlled enterprises was clearly less severe compared with the 
majors in this area of operation, it should be recognized that the former 
group of players also saw an impairment of their position. More 
precisely, its share went down from about 25 percent in 1985 to less 
than 22 percent in 1991. Therefore it seems justified to conclude that 
our hypothesis receives further support from the research results. It 
has to be underlined, however, that like in the case of the major oil 
companies, the recent shift towards greater involvement of firms from 
OPEC companies is not considered as negative by the state producers. 
The reason why their increased presence does not give rise to fear 
amongst European actors has to do, according to a strategy manager 
of Elf Aquitaine, with the fact that most OPEC companies have 
become less strong in financial respect due to a fall in crude prices. 
Besides, he raised the point that the downstream investments by firms 
from oil exporting countries is not a serious matter of concern to the 
established European players, because the former are quite often 
dependent on the technological and marketing expertise of the latter. 
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Ethylene crackers 
In dealing with the oil refining operations of the national oil compa-
nies, we have seen that contrary to most private sector enterprises 
involved in this line of business, various public corporations are still 
in a stage of expansion in life-cycle terms. On account of the fact that 
oil refining and ethylene manufacture are highly intertwined, it is quite 
conceivable that the pattern of development of both sectors has more 
or less paralleled. In other words, we have good reasons for supposing 
that, like in the case of oil refining, the Western European ethylene 
production activities of this group of market participants can generally 
be found in a growth phase at the moment. Let us see now whether 
or not this assumption is valid. Table 6.33 pictures the trend in 
ethylene manufacture of the national oil companies for the period 
1960-1993. 
What attracts attention is that by 1970 - the period immediately 
preceding the outbreak of both oil crises—ENI and Elf, the two largest 
state-owned companies, were producing about 81 percent of total 
ethylene output of this group of players in Western Europe. Although 
these two actors clearly managed to hold sway in volume terms within 
the subsequent twenty-three years, it has to be pointed out that their 
dominance waned to some extent. By 1993 their share had declined 
to slighdy less than 50 percent. This decrease in relative importance 
is partly attributable to the entry of some new national oil companies 
Table 6.33 Ethylene capacity of the national oil companies in Western Eu-
rope in the 1960-1993 period (1,000 tlyear) 
Company I960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 
Elf 
ENI 
Repto! 
Petrogal 
ÖMV 
Nette Oy 
Stam] 
Norsk Hydro 
Ht Be rue/DEP 
DSM 
Total ethylene capacity of the naoonal 
oil companies 
Tool ethylene capacity in Western 
Europe 
55 190 648 5 1.341 
37.5 620 1Λ60 
130 330 
70 105 
150 
10 40 135 400 
65 267 5 1.603.5 3.386 
695 2,675 
1.531 
1,230 
1,455 
-
265 
165 
147 
153 
-
800 
1.392 5 
1,702.5 
606 
300 
285 
200 
147 
153 
15 
800 
1,375 8 
1,635 
605 
300 
600 
412 
5462 
193 8 
15 
255 
1,567.8 
1,941 
780 
350 
650 
571.3 
618.5 
2065 
15 
333 
5.746 5,601 5,937 8 7,033.1 
7,725 13J10 17,060 15,586 14,740 18,245 
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on the Western European ethylene manufacturing scene in the first 
half of the eighties (Statoil, Norsk Hydro, Petrogal and Hellenic/DEP) 
and partly to the extension of production capacity by already estab-
lished firms. The Austrian state company ÖMV is an example of a 
producer that experienced a substantial capacity expansion, as is Neste 
Oy. It is worth mentioning that the two latter corporations accom-
plished this increase in output primarily through the acquisition of (a 
part interest in) ethylene crackers from private sector firms. We will 
revert to the acquisition activities of the state-controlled players at a 
later stage. 
Turning to ENI again, we find that this company surpassed Elf and 
Repsol at the beginning of the 1980s by which it became to dominate 
in terms of ethylene capacity not only the rank of the government-
owned firms, but also of all Western European players put together. 
This means that, as in the case of oil refining and conversion, ENI 
occupied the premier place in the hierarchy of the national oil 
companies. It is also noteworthy that not only ENI but also most other 
members of this group, save the Greek public enterprise Hellenic/ 
DEP, enjoyed an upward shift in their volume of production in the 
early nineties. In some cases, namely ENI, Elf, Repsol and DSM, this 
upturn in output figures was preceded by an absolute decline during 
the 1980s. Regarding DSM, it is useful to remark that the sharp fall at 
the end of the eighties can be ascribed to the sale of the majority of 
the shares of this company to private shareholders. In investigating the 
trend of the national oil companies taken as a group in the context of 
total Western European ethylene capacity between 1960 and 1993, it 
proves that this category of producers experienced a relative increase 
in importance. In the period 1960-1993 the national oil companies' 
share of the Western European total grew from 9 percent to less than 
39 percent. Notwithstanding a slight decrease in the position of the 
group at large in relative terms in the early nineties - a drop of more 
than 1 percent- the government-owned enterprises have clearly taken 
the lead in this field of operation and have been well ahead of the 
majors and the chemical producers since the turmoil of the 1970s. In 
view of the fact that in recent years investments have undoubtedly 
been more manifest than disinvestments as far as the European public 
firms are concerned, it seems appropriate to review the adjustments 
that the individual actors have made in general rather than to concen-
trate merely on their negative adaptations. 
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Adjustments in the 1980-1993 period 
When looking a bit closer at the investment behaviour of the national 
oil companies with respect to ethylene production in Western Europe 
between 1980 and 1993, it appears that downward adaptations have 
only predominated in the first half of the eighties. By contrast, in the 
period after the mid-1980s the volume of production remained stable 
initially and was even stepped up later on, as table 6.34 makes clear. 
A more detailed study of the strategies adopted by this group of 
market participants which have led to the changes in ethylene capacity, 
as presented in table 6.34, shows that rationalization of this sector has 
entirely been carried out through contraction of plants. Between 1980 
and 1985 Repsol and, to a somewhat lesser extent, ENI and Elf were 
responsible for this retrenchment, whereas between 1985 and 1990 
DSM played the most important part in this respect. Actually, up to 
now complete closures of production sites have not occurred at all. 
The absolute fäll of 0.4 million tonnes in the period 1980-1985 which 
is categorized as a closure concerns in fact the sale of Repsol's ethylene 
cracker in Tarragona (Spain). Therefore, as opposed to oil refining in 
which the shedding of capacity by this type of actors took mainly the 
form of shutting down entire production facilities, the national oil 
companies obviously showed reluctance to make a similar drastic 
decision in the case of ethylene manufacture. This behaviour suggests 
that many governments keep uncompetitive plants alive with capital 
injections by which they are able to continue to operate. This public 
sector subsidization may give this category of producers a competitive 
advantage over their private rivals. The resistance on the part of the 
Italian petrochemical industry to close down a whole complex was 
acknowledged by a strategy manager of Enichem in Milan in the 
interview. He said that social factors (e.g. employment aspects such as 
redundancies) reinforced by political considerations have acted as a 
deterrent to plant closure. 
Table 6.34 Changes in ethylene capacity of the national oil companies in 
Western Europe in the 1980 -1993 period; components of change (Mt/year) 
Λάφαηοη 1980-1985 1989-1990 1990-199] 
Cicaoou 0.Э 
Externum 0.6 0.8 1-2 
Contacaofi -0.8 -0Л 
Ckmire -0.4 
Tool -0J - 1.2 
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It has already been noted that the state-owned companies taken 
together saw a clear reversal in their pattern of development at the 
beginning of the nineties as their level of ethylene output rose by 1.2 
million tonnes. The growth in this period as well as in the preceding 
decade was achieved almost entirely by means of the scaling up of 
existing cracking units. While both in the early 1980s and the early 
1990s especially ENI accounted for the increase realized in this way, 
ÖMV contributed most to this upturn in production at the end of the 
1980s. Apart from extensions, two new steam crackers were created 
by the state-controlled enterprises: one plant was set up by Petrogal 
in Sines (Portugal) in 1984 and another facility was built by Enichem 
in Brindisi (Italy) in 1994. Both of them can be described as 'medi-
um-sized' and 'located on the coast'. 
Considering the impact of these adjustments for the composition 
of ethylene crackers managed by the national oil companies in terms 
of size and inland/coastal location, it appears that no significant 
changes have come about. Expressed more precisely, in common with 
the situation in 1980, in 1993 the vast majority of the cracking plants 
still belonged to the category of the medium-sized units (sixteen of 
the twenty-one sites) and were located on the coast (fourteen, or 
two-third of the total number). In fact, these figures altered only 
marginally in this period (see table 6.35). Differences are predomi-
nandy attributable to acquisitions. The same can be said of the number 
of production facilities at both ends of the spectrum of sizes of steam 
crackers. On the one hand, the small production facilities gained one 
Table 6.3 S Composition of the ethylene crackers of the national oil compa-
nies by size class and by inland/coastal location m Western Europe in the 
1980-1993 period 
number ofuniB according to sue 
class (1.000 t/y) 
mull (0 -100) 
medium (100 - 500) 
large (over 500) 
number of unió situated on the 
coast or at in inland location 
1980 
1 
14 
4 
1993 
2 
16 
3 
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Figure 6.9 Spatial pattern of ethylene crackers of the national oil companies 
in Western Europe in 1993 
unit; on the other hand, their large counterparts lost one plant. These 
changes are due to the size decrease of assets. The geographical spread 
of ethylene crackers of the national oil companies in Western Europe 
in 1993 is pictured in figure 6.9. 
Not surprisingly, the dispersion pattern of the ethylene manufac-
turing operations of the government-owned companies is highly 
.concordant with the geography of their oil refineries (see figure 6.8). 
Again, therefore, evidence is provided that both industries tend to be 
located in each other's neighbourhood: near a cracker we are apt to 
find an oil refinery (and vice versa). The spatial clustering of these 
industries implies that, like in the case of oil refining, Southern Europe 
has also attracted the major portion of total investments in ethylene 
production as far as the state producers are concerned. Indeed, just as 
this region contains the bulk of the national oil companies' oil refining 
assets, so it is the prime host for their ethylene manufacturing activities 
at the moment. Within Europe, however, the geographical balance 
varied considerably between both lines of business in the early 1990s. 
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In the case of oil refining, Italy accounted for 25 percent of all 
production sites owned by the government-controlled enterprises 
compared with 19 percent in ethylene. This difference in the relative 
significance of Italy is explainable by the fact that Elf Atochem, and 
therefore France (where 29 percent of all ethylene crackers was 
concentrated in 1993), is more heavily involved in ethylene produc-
tion in terms of the number of plants than ENI. 
In most cases, the manufacture of ethylene is the exclusive concern 
of one of the national oil companies at present. Nevertheless, five of 
the twenty-one existing crackers in 1993 were joindy owned, as can 
be seen from table 6.36. 
Table 6.36 reveals that the choice of joint venture partners made 
by the publicly owned firms spans almost the entire range of types of 
actors engaged in this sector. True, with the exception of OPEC 
companies — a category that is hardly involved in this field of operation 
- the state producers have entered into joint venture arrangements with 
all the groups of market participants which have been distinguished. 
This diversity of the partner choice of the national oil companies 
suggests that a variety of reasons, which are sometimes even non-eco-
nomic in nature, tend to have underlain the selection process. To 
illustrate this, let us take the example of Elf Atochem. A strategy 
manager of Elf Atochem in Paris emphasized that a combination of 
historical and fortuitous circumstances has undoubtedly played a key 
role in the establishment of the joint venture tie-ups with BP and ENI 
in Naphtachimie (Lavera) and Copenor (Dunkerque) respectively. In 
essence, the origins of both partnerships can be traced back to decisions 
which were taken by other companies. When Elf Atochem acquired 
Rhône-Poulenc's cracking plant in Lavera in 1980, the latter had 
already been working together with BP for many years. The implica-
tion of this takeover by Elf Atochem was the acceptance of BP as a 
partner. Almost the same story can be told with regard to Copenor. 
Before the merger between Elf Atochem and Orkem in 1990, the 
latter producer had sold part of its Dunkerque cracker to ENI. 
According to a strategy manager of Elf Atochem, it was rather logical 
that Elf Atochem would continue the operation of this cracker in 
conjunction with the Italian state company after merging with Orkem. 
A final remark regarding the joindy owned crackers displayed in table 
6.36 is that all of them are medium- or large-scale production facilities. 
Turning our attention to the transactions which have been under-
taken by the publicly owned corporations in this area of activity since 
1980, we find that this group of players has been more prominent as 
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acquirers of cracking facilities than as acquirees. More specifically, the 
Greek company Hellenic/DEP as well as Statoil bought steam crackers 
from Esso in Thessaloniki (Greece) in 1984 and in Stenungsund 
(Sweden) in 1986 respectively. In addition to these two producers, 
OMV took over an asset from the American independent Marathon 
in Burghausen (Germany) in 1987. Conversely, we can give only one 
example of a national oil company that sold a cracking unit: Repsol 
hived off an ethylene plant in Tarragona (Spain) in 1982. 
Conclusion 
On all fronts - oil refining, conversion, crude oil production and 
ethylene manufacture — except marketing, the national oil companies 
as a group have clearly won, relatively speaking, since the early 1980s. 
Particularly with regard to oil refining and ethylene production the 
European state-controlled enterprises have succeeded to gain ground 
at the expense of other groups of market participants, notably the 
majors and the chemical companies. This is not to say, however, that 
the state producers at large have not embarked upon rationalizations. 
Indeed, as we have seen, especially in the oil refining industry an effort 
has been made to get rid of surplus capacity. Obviously, in general 
their cutbacks in volume terms have been less drastic in comparison 
with their privately owned cousins. 
Not only between the various types of actors discerned but also 
within the category under study variations are noticeable in competi-
tiveness and thus in the strategies which have been pursued. Actually, 
in all fields of operation in which the national oil companies have 
witnessed an increase in relative importance, ENI, sometimes fol-
lowed by Elf (conversion and ethylene manufacture), has contributed 
most to the overall improvement of the whole group. Although ENI 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Elf have retained their dominance 
within this group, they have made the greatest commitment to 
disinvestments particularly in the refinery industry. As a consequence 
of this retrenchment, Elf was even overtaken by Repsol in terms of 
level of output in the latter sector. In addition to these three players, 
there are several state-supported firms active in the Western European 
oil refining and basic petrochemical sector which are, broadly speak-
ing, less important with respect to their volume of production as well 
as their role played in the restructuring process. 
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6.6 The state-owned companies from oil producing 
countries 
The preceding section has examined the (disinvestment decisions 
which have been taken by the national oil companies from consumer 
countries in the different areas of operation under study. Generally 
speaking, the business performance of this category of market partici-
pants proved remarkably sound and, with the exception of marketing 
of oil products in Western Europe, the group at large has succeeded 
to encroach upon the territory of other types of producers during the 
past decade. We now devote our attention to the different strategic 
paths which have been followed by state-owned firms from oil 
producing countries. It has already been found that OPEC companies 
have gained ground at the expense of the majors and the national oil 
companies from oil consuming countries regarding Western Europe's 
total service station network in the second half of the eighties. It is 
interesting to assess whether this positive development has been 
paralleled in the other lines of business treated in this chapter. Once 
again our examination will be structured in the same manner. There-
fore, we will begin with analyzing the recent commitment of overseas 
state producers from oil exporting countries to the Western European 
oil refining industry. 
Oil refining 
As has already been indicated in section 3.3, the Western European 
oil refining sector has witnessed the influx of producers from oil-rich 
countries since the early 1980s. Indeed, at the same time that many of 
the established firms were pulling out of oil refining in Europe as part 
Table 637 Number of oil refining units of the companies from oil produ-
cing countries in 'Western Europe in the period 1950-1995 
Company 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Oihnvst International - - - - - - - 2 4 4 
Kuwait Petroleum _ - - - . - _ 2 3 2 
Corporation (KPQ 
Petróleos de Venezuela _ _ - _ _ - _ 3
 D 7 
(PDVSA) 
Petróleos de Meneo - - - - - - 1 1 I 1 
(Pane*) 
Toa) compañía from od - - - - - 1 8 14 И 
producing countries 
Total Wenem Europe 72 96 105 127 160 163 161 129 104 102 
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of their restructuring efforts, several public enterprises from producing 
countries embarked on a strategy of forward integration by making 
downstream investments in the latter market area. Table 6.37 shows 
the number of refinery plants that were completely or partly controlled 
by the companies from oil producing countries in Western Europe in 
the period 1950-1995. 
It is apparent from table 6.37 that the entry of companies from oil 
exporting countries in Western Europe has started quite recendy. As 
a consequence of this late start the number of oil refineries managed 
by the group studied still rose during the past decade contrary to most 
other categories of market participants. This increase came to a 
standstill at the beginning of the nineties, when a period of stabilization 
set in for this type of players. Focusing on enterprise level, it turns out 
that all the actors presented in table 6.37, save Petróleos de Mexico 
(Pemex), can be characterized as OPEC companies. Especially Oilin-
vest International, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) and Petró-
leos de Venezuela (Petroven or PDVSA) have obviously been at-
tracted into the industry. Amongst these OPEC companies, Petroven 
took pride of place in terms of the number of production facilities in 
which it was involved from 1985 onwards. Nevertheless, employing 
the volume of primary distillation output as an indicator of the 
importance of the individual refiners belonging to the category 
reviewed, we find that the picture is somewhat different. Table 6.38 
summarizes the trend in primary distillation capacity of the companies 
from oil producing countries between 1950 and 1995. 
On the basis of the output figures of this category of producers it 
can be deduced that the Libyan government-controlled corporation 
Oilinvest International was positioned at the leading edge on the 
Table 6.38 Oil refining capacity (primary distillation) of the companies 
from oil producing countries in Western Europe, 1950-1995 (Mt/year) 
Company 1950 1955 I960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
OihnvtK International - - - - - - - 10.1 12.7 14.7 
Kuwait Petroleum - - - - - - - 6.3 Ц.4 6.S 
Corporation (KPQ 
Petróleos de Venezuela - - - - - - - 7.4 9.7 10.1 
(PDVSA) 
Petróleos de Meneo - - - - - - 4.2 4.0 3.7 0.6 
(Pemex) 
Toni capacity of the - - - - - - 4.2 27.8 37.5 31.9 
companies from oil 
producing countries 
Tool capacity Western 41 118 192 386 705 965 1.1X14 751 635 643 
Europe 
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Western European market in the last ten years, ahead of Petroven. 
Note that by 1990 the latter was outpaced by Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation (KPC) through which it dropped to third place in the 
hierarchy of the companies from producer countries. KPC managed 
to achieve the status of runner-up by acquiring a small refinery from 
Mobil in Naples (Italy) in 1990. However, this improvement of the 
position of Kuwait's national oil company was rather short-lived, 
because this company shuttered the Naples site for environmental 
reasons in 1993. Besides, table 6.38 mirrors once again that the 
Mexican public firm Pemex has invested less heavily in this sector 
relative to its counterparts from OPEC countries. What is more, 
between 1990 and 1995 Pemex experienced a further substantial 
decline in production from 3.7 million tonnes to 0.6 million tonnes. 
This capacity reduction was the result of the fact that Pemex sold 
almost all its shares in its single asset in Bilbao (Spain) to the Spanish 
state-supported enterprise Repsol in 1990. Particularly due to the 
retrenchment carried out by the two latter actors the group as a whole 
has seen a modest deterioration in relative significance in recent years. 
Let us shed now some additional light on the downward as well as 
the upward adaptations which were made by the individual members 
of this group in Western European oil refining after 1980. 
Adjustments in the 1980-1995 period 
When we look at the absolute importance of the various components 
of change of all state-owned companies from oil exporting countries 
together since 1980 (table 6.39), it seems that, unlike the other 
categories of players, this group has clearly favoured capacity expan-
sion above reduction in output as far as the European refining scene 
is concerned. 
Table 6.39 adds support to the aforementioned observation that the 
total upturn in production of the state-supported refiners of oil 
producing countries has predominandy been the work of Oilinvest. 
More explicidy, during the period 1980 to 1995 almost half of the 
overall increase can be ascribed to this Libyan producer. We should 
be aware that the investments of the latter firm as well as those of the 
other two OPEC companies - Petroven and KPC - took entirely the 
form of acquisitions of (a part interest in) refinery sites of already 
established enterprises. The takeovers made by these three OPEC 
companies will be broached at a later stage in this section. Mark, 
though, that the positive trend of the group at large resulting from 
their takeover activities was slighdy offset by a few rationalizations. As 
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Table 6.39 Changes in refining capacity (primary distilhtion) of the compa-
nies from oil producing countries m Western Europe in the 1980-1995 peri-
od; components of change (Mt/year) 
Company 
Oihnvcst 
International 
Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation (KPC) 
Petróleos de 
Venezuela (PDVSA) 
Petróleos de Mexico 
(Pemex) 
Tool 
1980-1995 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
cmrjon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
con trac non 
closure 
total 
creauon 
extension 
contracnon 
closure 
total 
crraoon 
extension 
contracnon 
closure 
tool 
_ 
15 
-
_ 15 
_ 
12 
-5 
7 
_ 
10 
-
_ 10 
_ 
-
-4 
-
-4 
_ 
37 
-4 
-5 
28 
has already been indicated above, especially Pemex and KPC brought 
about the negative adaptations within this group. Another point we 
referred to earlier is that the former accomplished divestiture by selling 
practically all its shares in the Bilbao refinery in Spain which is 
categorized as a contraction here, whereas the latter carried out 
restructuring through complete closure of its production facility in 
Naples (Italy). These facts are also reproduced in table 6.39. Although 
Pemex and KPC were responsible for almost all of the total trimming 
of primary distillation capacity of the national oil companies from 
producer countries together in Western Europe in the period of 
analysis, it should be recognized that Oilinvest also took measures to 
decrease the volume of production of some of its refinery plants, 
namely its assets in Antwerp (Belgium) and in Cremona (Italy). 
However, it is noteworthy that the retrenchment of the latter producer 
was nullified by the purchase of (a part interest in) refineries in 
Hamburg (Germany) in 1988 and in Collombey (Switzerland) in 
1990. Petroven, on the other hand, has failed to implement major 
disinvestments in this field of operation until now. 
Taking a closer look at the influence exerted by these positive and 
negative adjustments upon the composition of oil refineries of the 
state-supported players from oil producing countries in terms of both 
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Table 6.40 Composition of the oil refining units of the companies from oil 
producing countries by size class and by Mandi coastal location m Western 
Europe m the 1985-1995 period 
1980 1993 
number of urna according to sue 
cb»(M/y) 
small (0 - 5 Mt/y) 6 13 
medium (5 - 10 Mt/y) 2 1 
large (over 10 Mt/y) 
number of units named on the 
соав or at an inland locanon 
coast 4 9 
inland 4 5 
tocal number β 14 
size and inland/coastal location, it appears that real significant altera­
tions have solely come about in the group of the small plants which 
were situated on the coast between 1985 and 1995 (table 6.40). 
Indeed, table 6.40 reveals that not only the number of refinery 
acuities belonging to the small size class but abo those at coastal 
locations more than doubled in the period considered. By contrast, 
the other figures presented in this table stayed almost equal between 
1985 and 1995. Whereas the inland refineries gained one unit, the 
medium-sized faculties lost one plant. Apart from the latter decrease 
which was due to the contraction of the Cremona refinery by 
Oilinvest, the changed composition is fully attributable to the (partial) 
purchase of oil refinery assets from incumbent firms on the Western 
European market. This might be expected in the light of the remark 
made earlier that this category of actors has merely employed this 
external method of growth in this line of business. Figure 6.10 displays 
the map of the Western European oil refining operations of the 
newcomers from producer countries in 1995. 
It is evident from figure 6.10 that the northwestern part of Europe 
— Germany in particular — contained the vast majority of the invest­
ments upon which the category under study had embarked in this 
industry by the mid-nineties. Quantitatively the North-West ac­
counted for twelve of the fourteen plants controlled by the publicly 
owned corporations from oil producing countries in 1995. It is 
noteworthy that all the acquisitions which were undertaken by this 
group of players from 1985 to date occurred in the latter area. At this 
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Figure 6.10 Spatial pattern of oil refineries of the companies from oil produ-
cing countries in Western Europe in 1995 
point it is worth recalling the following briefly. Reference back to the 
geographical dispersion of the primary distillation capacity of the 
majors and the chemical companies makes clear that there is a high 
degree of correspondence with the spatial configuration pictured in 
figure 6.10. True, as in the case of the majors and the chemical 
companies, the distribution of the refining activities of the state-owned 
enterprises from oil exporting countries is gready skewed in the sense 
that only a few sites which are in the hands of this type of producers 
can be found in Southern Europe. The prime cause for the tact that 
the latter subregion has barely held attraction for the national oil 
companies from producer countries should be sought in the domi-
nance of the state in this sector which still exists in countries such as 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Italy (see 
section 6.3). Although the grip of national governments on public 
enterprises - for example, Repsol, Petrogal and ENI - has undoubt-
edly loosened in the southern part of Europe in the last few years, state 
involvement in the industry in this area has remained substantial and 
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has obviously acted as a kind of entry barrier for many firms belonging 
to one of the other categories. However, amongst the new entrants 
from producer countries two firms, notably Pemex and Oilinvest, 
managed to overcome this hindrance by taking over (part of) a single 
refinery facility in Southern Europe. More precisely, Oilinvest bought 
the Cremona refinery from the American independent Amoco in 
1983 and Pemex currendy holds a minority interest of 5 percent in 
Petronor in Bilbao (Spain). At the moment the remaining 95 percent 
in the latter refinery site is in the hands of the Spanish state producer 
Repsol. Cooperation with a partner in Western European oil refining 
has not been restricted solely to Pemex as far as this group of players 
is concerned. In addition to the Mexican government-owned corpo-
ration, Oilinvest and Petroven have also used joint venturing as a 
means of gaining access to the Western European market. The 
implication of the frequent use of joint venture arrangements among 
the state-controlled firms from oil exporting countries as a mode of 
entry into this sector overseas is that most refineries of this category 
of actors (nine of the fourteen plants in which this type of producers 
was involved in 1995) were run in conjunction with another company 
in Western Europe by the mid-nineties. These joindy owned assets 
are listed in table 6.41. 
Table 6.41 demonstrates that by 1995 all the members of this group 
except Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) had forged one or 
several partnership (s) in the European refinery industry. Although it 
seems justified to state on the basis of these results that linking up with 
a partner has evidendy been a popular way to achieve downstream 
integration of most national oil companies from producer countries, 
it is necessary to take into consideration that a difference in attitude 
towards joint ventures can be perceived. It is apparent from table 6.41 
that especially Petroven has been prepared to collaborate with incum-
bent firms in this area of activity in Western Europe. More specifically, 
the Venezuelan public player accounted for seven of the nine alliances 
which were set up by this category of producers around the mid-
1990s. Conversely, in the case of Oilinvest, which can be characterized 
as a multiplant company like Petroven, we can cite only one example 
of a joint venture tie-up into which it has entered. Indeed, up to now 
Oilinvest has only concerted its efforts in oil refining with the 
American independent Coastal Corporation in the Holborn Europa 
refinery in Hamburg (Germany), with Oilinvest owning the majority 
of the shares at 67 percent. From the interview with a strategy manager 
of Oilinvest in Milan it can be inferred that Oilinvest, indeed, seeks 
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to adhere to a solitary stance as much as possible. He commented that 
despite Oilinvest's clear preference for doing things itself, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that it is not sensible to reject collaboration as an 
organizational form completely. In accordance with various strategy 
managers of other companies which participated in the present re-
search (i.e. strategy managers of Shell in The Hague, of BASF and of 
Elf Aquitaine), he admitted that in order to enlarge the geographical 
scope of operation, it may be valuable or even imperative to join hands 
with a partner. According to him, the main rationale behind most 
overseas alliances built up by Oilinvest was the fact that the risks 
involved, which tend to be especially high when a company has to 
start from scratch in a new market area, could thus be shared. 
Turning to the choice of joint venture partners made by the 
national oil companies from producer countries, we see that all the 
four types of incumbent firms discerned in this study have been willing 
to ally themselves with players belonging to the category studied in 
this area of activity. Notwithstanding the representation of all the 
categories of established market participants on the list of joint venture 
partners given in table 6.41, it is worthwhile to observe that the 
selection process of the government-controlled companies from oil 
exporting countries in general and of Petroven in particular has shown 
a slight bias in favour of state-owned enterprises from consumer 
countries. A final remark on the partnerships formed by the newcom-
ers from producer countries concerns the ownership structure of the 
joindy owned sites of this group of actors. In common with the majors 
and the independents, the public firms from oil producing countries 
have managed to obtain an equal or controlling interest in the majority 
of cases (five of the nine plants). 
Having dealt with the joint ventures of the new entrants under 
review in the European refinery industry, we will now devote our 
attention to the outright acquisitions of production facilities that were 
undertaken by this group of producers in this sector between 1980 
and 1995. Table 6.42 reproduces these complete takeovers. 
So far only the OPEC companies, Oilinvest and Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation (KPC), have seen the opportunity to become single 
owners of refinery assets through acquisitions, as table 6.42 indicates. 
Regarding KPC, it needs to be said that buying existing refineries in 
their entirety has been the sole means by which this company has 
pursued the intention to increase the involvement in downstream 
activities, at least in Western Europe. Furthermore, it is remarkable 
that while KPC bought all its oil refining plants from the major oil 
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companies, namely from Gulf and Mobil1, Oilinvest purchased its 
assets from several independent producers, such as Amoco, Mabanaft 
and Gatoil. Finally, one other notable characteristic of the purchased 
refineries is that all of them belonged to the category of the small units 
in 1993. 
Mark that until now none of the members of this group has 
followed the opposite course, that is to say the sale of (a part interest 
in) a refinery site. 
Investments in conversion facilities 
It is clear from the previous discussion that the investments in primary 
distillation capacity made by the state-owned companies from pro-
ducer countries have obviously exceeded the negative adaptations of 
this group of players. Though the rationalizations upon which some 
of the newcomers have embarked in this field of operation have still 
remained limited, they have brought about a minor impairment of the 
market position of the group at large. It seems that, like in the case of 
most established firms, the European refinery business has, to some 
extent, lost its appeal to actors from oil exporting countries in favour 
of market areas such as the Middle East and South East Asia, as 
suggested by a strategy manager of ICI (see section 6.4). A glance back 
at the preceding sections reveals that the shedding of primary distilla-
tion output has often been just one part of the transformation package 
of producers active on the Western European market. Indeed, no less 
of an issue proved to be the upgrading of existing refinery sites geared 
to satisfying the need for middle and light fractions. Faced with a 
stimulus for action ensuing from a changed demand-mix, it is quite 
likely that the national oil companies from oil producing countries 
have also tailored the composition of their production to the require-
ments of the customers. Therefore, it is relevant to find out now 
whether investments in conversion have received much attention 
from the overseas newcomers studied. Table 6.43 provides insight into 
the evolution of the catalytic cracking and hydrocracking capacity of 
the government-sponsored corporations from oil producing countries 
in the period 1985-1995. 
It can be seen that overall the magnitude of the investments which 
have been undertaken by the national oil companies from producer 
1 The transaction between Mobil and KPC, which took place in 1990, is not 
displayed in table 6.42, because the latter company has shut down the acquired 
refinery in Naples (Italy) in 1993. 
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Table 6.43 Catalytic cracking and hydrocracking capacity of the companies 
from oil producing countries in Western Europe in the 1985-1995 period 
(Mt/year) 
Catalytic cracking 
Oihnveu International 
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 
(KPQ 
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) 
Petróleos de Mexico (Peme*) 
Total capacity 
Hydro* racking 
Oilinvest International 
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 
(KPQ 
Petroled de Venezuela (PDVSA) 
Petróleos de Meneo (Реглеж) 
Total capacity 
1985 
-
-
0.7 
-
0.7 
-
-
0 7 
-
0.7 
1995 
0 6 
-
1 4 
0.1 
2.1 
0 6 
-
07 
-
1.3 
countries in upgrading plants in Western Europe have been fairly 
insignificant. Nonetheless, it would be an overstatement to say that 
the group at large has not made a commitment at all in this respect 
during the past decade. O n the contrary, the state-controlled compa­
nies from oil exporting countries taken together have even enjoyed a 
moderate increase in the level of conversion capacity. While the 
volume of production of their hydrocrackers virtually doubled, the 
scale of output of their catalytic cracking units even trebled - however 
both from a low starting point of 0.7 million tonnes in 1985. 
Analysis at the level of the individual firm shows that the upturn in 
upgrading capacity has almost entirely been the work of two firms, 
namely Petroven and Oilinvest. Within the group studied, Petroven 
has always occupied a commanding position, followed by Oilinvest 
from the early nineties onwards. Petroven's leadership concerns cata­
lytic cracking as well as hydrocracking. When we look a litde bit closer 
at the four Western European conversion facilities owned by the 
Venezuelan state producer in the period of analysis, it turns out that 
Germany currendy hosts all of them. Especially the equipment of the 
Gelsenkirchen complex with both a catalytic cracker and a hy­
drocracking plant has edged Petroven ahead of the other public 
enterprises from oil producing countries. As to Oilinvest, it is worth 
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observing that this company has also restricted its investments in 
catalytic cracking to Germany and, more specifically, to the Holbom 
Europa refinery in Hamburg. This contrasts with the creation of 
hydrocracking capacity by the Libyan public firm which has been 
equally divided between its refinery sites in Cremona (Italy) and 
Collombey (Switzerland). The fact that Oilinvest has recendy outfit-
ted the two latter assets with hydrocrackers was brought to the fore 
by a strategy manager of Oilinvest in the interview. What is also clear 
from the empirical evidence given in table 6.43 is that until now 
upgrading has barely appealed to Pemex. Moreover, it should be noted 
that KPC has even never been involved in conversion in Europe at 
all. 
Access to natural resources 
When we return to section 3.3, we see that it was postulated there 
that the national oil companies from consumer as well as producer 
countries gained ground in the upstream area of the oil industry at the 
expense of the major oil companies in the aftermath of the oil price 
hikes of the seventies. The investigations of the changes in competi-
tiveness of the publicly owned enterprises from consumer countries 
and the majors in the field of crude oil production has enabled us to 
confirm part of this hypothesis. Indeed, the results of our examination 
have lent support to the statement that the former category has 
witnessed an increase in relative importance, whereas in the case of 
the latter group the opposite has happened (see sections 6.3 and 6.5). 
We will now seek to back up the remainder of the proposition — that 
is an improvement in the market position of the national oil companies 
from producer countries upstream — with quantitative information on 
the alterations that came about in the level of crude oil output of some 
OPEC companies in the period 1980-1990. Again, however, account 
needs to be taken of the fact that a thorough analysis is constrained by 
a deficiency of statistics available for the three firms from OPEC 
countries studied, namely Oilinvest, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation 
and Petroven. As opposed to the preceding sections, the approach 
adopted here will be merely quantitative in nature owing to a lack of 
qualitative information. 
When analyzing the trend in the level of global oil output of the 
OPEC companies between 1980 and 1990, we find that, generally 
speaking, the facts negate a boost in the upstream strength of this 
category of market participants, as hypothesized above. Of the three 
OPEC companies mentioned above, only in the case of Kuwait 
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Petroleum Corporation production showed a tendency to grow. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for supposing that the favourable 
performance of the latter in volume terms was reversed at the 
beginning of the nineties as a result of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 
and the subsequent firing of Kuwait's oil wells. Looking at the 
production figures of Oilinvest, it appears that this company under-
went an extremely impressive downturn in output in the early 1980s. 
In the period 1980-1984 its volume of crude oil output more than 
halved: from 104 million tonnes to 49 million tonnes. But, in the 
second half of the eighties growth resumed, although Oilinvest's 
production has not returned to former levels yet. Its global total 
amounted to 69 million tonnes in 1990. Switching our attention to 
Petroven, it proves that Venezuela's state-owned oil company practi-
cally succeeded to maintain stability in output terms. The production 
figure for 1980 and 1990 was about 107 million tonnes. When the 
entire period is considered, however, we see that by the end of the 
last decade the latter actor witnessed a slight production increase 
preceded by an absolute decline during a few years. The consequence 
of this modest upward trend is that Petroven outpaced Esso again by 
1990. 
Access to distribution channels and marketing outlets 
The preceding sections have already paid considerable attention to the 
changes that took place in the relative significance of the groups of 
companies distinguished in this study in the Western European retail 
network between 1985 and 1991. On account of the fact that the issue 
of the alterations in the access to distribution channels and marketing 
oudets has been explored exhaustively in earlier parts of this chapter, 
it seems appropriate to confine ourselves to a succinct discussion here. 
Our needs are satisfied if we give a brief summary of the outcome of 
the reshuffling process in the field of marketing. Besides, it is worth-
while to treat the recent downstream investments made by the 
state-controlled producers from oil exporting countries in this respect 
and the principal driving forces behind their strategic behaviour. Let 
us review once again the shifts which occurred in the market shares 
of the various categories of players in Western Europe's total network 
of service stations in the period 1985-1991 initially. It is clear from 
figure 6.4 (see section 6.3) that the OPEC companies and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, the group of local producers and independent 
oil companies and the actors which constitute the category Others' 
were the winners, whilst the majors and the government-sponsored 
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enterprises from consumer countries can be described as losers. Read-
ers are reminded that the OPEC companies, taken collectively, indeed 
experienced the greatest increase in relative importance in this area of 
operation. Expressed in quantitative terms, their share of the Western 
European total grew by 4 percentage points - albeit from a low level 
of about 3 percent in 1985 to almost 7 percent in 1991. This growth 
implies that the recent purchases of oil refining facilities by the latter 
category of market participants in Europe have often been accompa-
nied by acquisitions of retail outlets. In this context, it is useful to point 
out that particularly Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) and 
Oilinvest have succeeded to enter the Western European distribution 
and marketing sector. Actually, the two last-mentioned producers 
even possess their own service station network in Western Europe. 
More precisely, KPC has unified its European marketing operations 
under the 'Q8 ' brand, whereas Oilinvest has sold oil products through 
its retail chain named Tamoil during the past decade. As far as these 
two corporations are concerned, it should be observed that they owe 
their success in strengthening their influence as marketers of refined 
products in the latter area more to takeovers of already existing petrol 
stations than to the creation of an entirely new network. We can quote 
several examples of distribution assets which have recendy been 
bought by KPC and Oilinvest. As we have seen, KPC purchased 
retailing facilities from BP in Denmark in 1988 and from Petrofina in 
Italy in 1992. Moreover, Kuwait's national oil company acquired 
marketing assets from Gulf in Italy in 1986 and in the Netherlands in 
1989 respectively, and from Ultramar in the United Kingdom in 1987. 
Turning to Oilinvest, we find that this company became a retailer in 
former Czechoslovakia by taking over 90 percent of the market shares 
in Tempo Spol in 1992. According to a strategy manager of Oilinvest, 
the latter investment should be regarded as part of Oilinvest's strategic 
objective to build up a marketing presence in Eastern Europe. Apart 
from internationalizing its downstream activities more extensively, the 
Libyan public actor has sought to enhance its market position in 
countries where it was already operative. Oilinvest's acquisition of 
petrol filling stations from the Italian independent Cameli in the early 
1990s is a case in point. 
Ethylene crackers 
Examining the production of ethylene, it appears that the involvement 
of the government-owned companies from oil producing countries 
in this area of activity in Western Europe has been rather insignificant 
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so far. In fact, only the Venezuelan state producer Petroven has made 
a commitment to Western European ethylene manufacture by joining 
forces with the German chemical company Veba in 1983. At the 
moment Petroven is engaged in two ethylene crackers, namely in 
Gelsenkirchen and Münchmünster, in which it owns a 50 percent 
share. Both cracking plants are situated at inland locations in Germany. 
While the Gelsenkirchen cracker can be characterized as large, the 
production site in Münchmünster currendy belongs to the category 
of the medium-sized facilities. It is reasonable to suggest that Petroven 
shows a positive attitude towards its partnership with Veba, because it 
has also been willing to team up with the latter in oil refining (table 
6.41). 
Finally, it needs to be emphasized that Petroven and, hence, the 
state-controlled players from producer countries underwent a mar-
ginal upward shift in production at the beginning of the nineties due 
to the commissioning of a new cracking unit in Gelsenkirchen. This 
steam cracker was built in concert with Veba in 1994 (see section 6.4). 
As a result of this investment, Petroven has witnessed a slight increase 
in relative importance as a manufacturer of ethylene in Western 
Europe since 1985. Expressed in a more precise way, its share in total 
Western European ethylene capacity rose from about 2 percent in 
1985 to 3 percent in 1994. 
Conclusion 
Without doubt, one of the most eye-catching developments in the 
Western European oil refining and basic petrochemical industry 
during the last few decades has been the emergence of some newcom-
ers from oil exporting countries. Generally speaking, however, the 
magnitude of their downstream investments, which have taken pri-
marily the form of acquisitions, has remained quite small until now. 
Besides, it should be observed that the competitiveness of the govern-
ment-owned companies from oil producing countries at large in the 
various sectors analyzed stayed virtually unchanged from the early 
1980s onwards. Whereas in the case of conversion (i.e. catalytic 
cracking), marketing and ethylene manufacture the category as a 
whole has enjoyed a slight boost in relative strength, the converse has 
happened as far as oil refining and crude oil production are concerned. 
Analysis on enterprise level has revealed that Petroven has occupied 
a leading position in volume terms in two lines of business, namely in 
conversion and crude oil production. In the two latter areas of activity 
Oilinvest has ranked second in the hierarchy of the public enterprises 
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from oil-rich countries since the beginning of the eighties. Yet, it was 
this Libyan actor who was in the vanguard in oil refining in the past 
ten years. Looking at ethylene production, it is important to underline 
that Petroven stands out from the other members of this category in 
the sense that it was the sole producer who invested in this field of 
operation. Contrary to Petroven and Oilinvest, the commitment of 
Pemex and, to a somewhat lesser extent, of Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation — the remaining two government-controlled firms from 
producer countries that went downstream in Western Europe — to the 
refinery industry in particular was fairly modest by the mid-1990s. 
6.7 The independent private oil companies 
As we have seen already, the economic problems of the 1970s have 
prompted several companies to withdraw from the Western European 
market. Especially amongst the group of independent private produc-
ers many actors seem to have folded their tents and slipped away by 
closing down or selling their plants. This happened particularly in the 
oil refining sector which saw a decrease in the size of this group from 
more than thirty firms in the late 1970s to twenty in 1995. Inde-
pendents of Italian parentage in particular took the decision to exit 
from the European refining scene during the past decade, although 
Italy still contains most members of this category of market partici-
pants. Actually, this category consists of two sub-groups: the Western 
European companies and those independents whose roots are chiefly 
in the United States. Within the former sub-group a further distinction 
can be drawn between large corporations with a strongly international 
orientation such as Petrofina on the one hand and a large bunch of 
smaller firms which have confined their operations primarily to their 
own home countries on the other hand. With regard to ethylene 
manufacture in Western Europe, it is worth noting that only a few of 
this type of players, namely Petrofina and the German company 
Rheinisch Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerke (RWE/DEA) are current-
ly still engaged in this area of activity. 
Generally speaking, it can be said that the role of the independent 
producers in the oil refining and basic petrochemical sector is rather 
small and has probably even declined since the oil price hikes of the 
seventies. It appears that this contrasts with their position in oil 
production and marketing, as has been asserted by Ellis Jones (1988). 
In his view independent companies complement the role of the majors 
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and that of the state-controlled enterprises in these lines of business 
and can be regarded as lubricating the system. Put differendy, markets 
and exploration plays overlooked by other categories of firms may 
present opportunities for the independents. In this section we will see 
whether the independents have, indeed, seized the chance to enhance 
their competitiveness in these fields, and which developments have 
come about in the Western European refinery and ethylene manufac-
turing industry as far as this group of actors is concerned. The overall 
structure remains the same as that of the previous sections of this 
chapter. This means that again we will start off by investigating the 
strategies which have been pursued in the oil refining sector. 
Oil refining 
Making a comparison between the evolution of the refinery activities 
of the independent oil companies and that of the Western European 
oil refining industry as a whole, we find that both trends are virtually 
analogous. Table 6.44 reproduces the number of oil refining assets 
which were wholly or partly in the hands of the independents in 
Western Europe between 1950 and 1995. 
Table 6.44 Number of oil refining units of the independent oil companies 
in Western Europe m the period 1950-1995 
Company 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
PetroEna 3 6 7 6 7 6 6 4 3 3 
Universal - _ - _ . . _ - l l 
Reârung 
(Daewoo) 
Buta . . . . . ι . . . -
R.WE/DEA 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Tuscuhun and - - - - - - - - - 1 
Loua Dievfiis 
Group 
Hanennmn i i - - _ _ _ _ - _ 
Jubos Schindler 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 - -
Bochumer _ . - - - - 1 - . -
Erdol 
Coosa) . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 
Corporation 
Marathon . . . . 1 1 1 1 - . 
Pbdfat» - - - 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Minto . . . - - - - - 1 1 
Amoco I 1 1 I 2 2 1 
Conoco - - - 1 2 2 2 - - -
BmyWiegira 2 2 2 2 2 1 
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Table 6.44 (continued) 
Company 
BunnahOil 
BngpOd 
Tarmac 
Mabanafi 
OK Petroleum 
Axel Johnson 
Srrudand 
Ho)Undet 
Gitoli 
CEPSA 
Rio Tinto 
John L Ratm 
Vardrnoyanius 
Edoardo 
Garrone 
Moraba 
Bragchira 
Perera 
Cimeli 
Praod 
Fmtcrauca 
Profilino and 
JaconxB 
Ratbele 
DeDepiane 
Boatti 
Volpato 
Ge try 
Taghabuc 
Conte Volpi di 
Misurare 
Mono 
Maegiahm 
tXovclh 
Secondo 
Mamirer 
Pontoü 
1950 
2 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
-
-
-
1 
-
-
1 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
1 
-
-
-
-
_ 
1955 
2 
1 
-
-
-
2 
-
-
1 
-
-
-
3 
-
1 
2 
1 
1 
-
1 
2 
1 
-
1 
1 
-
-
-
. 
1960 
2 
1 
-
-
-
3 
-
-
1 
-
-
-
3 
-
1 
2 
1 
-
-
-
1 
1965 
2 
1 
-
-
-
3 
1 
1 
1 
-
-
-
3 
-
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-
-
-
1 
1970 
2 
1 
1 
-
-
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
-
-
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-
1 
-
1 
1975 
1 
1 
1 
-
-
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
-
5 
1 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
-
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1980 1995 
1 
-
2 2 
1 
-
1 
1 
1 
1 
1990 
-
-
2 
-
2 
-
1 
-
3 
-
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
1995 
-
-
1 
-
2 
-
1 
-
3 
-
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
Tool 13 
independent od 
companies' 
26 30 33 
Total Western 72 96 105 127 160 163 161 129 104 102 
Europe 
'In some cases, severa] independent oil companies are involved in one paracubr refinery 
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Like in the case of the Western European refinery plants taken 
together, the number of primary distillation units owned by the 
independents rose steadily until the mid-1970s followed by a substan-
tial decrease from the early 1980s onwards. What attracts attention 
when looking at table 6.44 is that, as opposed to other categories of 
market participants, the group of independent oil companies covers 
an extremely wide range of players. Turning to the micro level of the 
individual firm, it is easy to see that within this multiplicity of actors 
a distinction can be made between multiplant and single plant refiners. 
Whereas only six of the twenty producers involved in this sector were 
owning more than one refinery site in Europe by 1995, the remaining 
majority had restricted their investments to a single asset. Besides, it is 
worth mentioning that all these multi-site owners except the German 
company RWE/DEA and the Swedish firm OK Petroleum were 
continuously represented on the Western European market during the 
entire period studied. Conversely, their single plant counterparts were 
only operative during part of this span of time. Some independents 
even failed to survive beyond a few years (Haltermann, Getty and 
Conte Volpi di Misurate). Many of them ceased to exist in the aftermath 
of the oil crises of the seventies, because they stopped their production 
or were absorbed by larger companies. Examples of single plant 
producers who closed down their refinery facilities are Julius Schind-
ler, Bochumer Erdöl, Berry Wiggins, Burmah, Raffaele Dellepiane, 
Volpato, Tagliabue, Maggialitti, Rovelli and Secondo Mamiter. 
Marathon, Amoco, Briggs Oil, Mabanaft, Gatoil, Rio Tinto and 
Pontoil, on the other hand, can be cited as examples of independents 
that managed to find a buyer for their plants. 
In contrast to these firms which disappeared from the European 
refining scene, the entry of newcomers into the industry has also been 
noticeable in recent years. True, the Korean conglomerate Daewoo 
(Universal Refining), Tusculum and Louis Dreyfus Group, Vardinoy-
annis and the American companies Coastal Corporation and Murco 
(Murphy Oil) have recendy made a commitment to this sector. What 
the impact of these developments has been in terms of changes in the 
volume of production is presented in table 6.45, which reveals the 
evolution of the primary distillation capacity in the period 1950-1995. 
This table reflects once again that many independents, especially 
single plant firms, have responded in a rather drastic fashion to the 
onset of maturity by closing down or selling refineries to other types 
of producers. Whereas a few decades ago the oil refining industry 
clearly acted by virtue of its spectacular growth as a magnet to several 
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Table 6 AS Oil refining capacity (primary dutillation) of the independent 
oil companies in Western Europe, 1950-1995 (Mt/year) 
Company 
Pctroom 
Unrwoal 
Refining 
(Daewoo) 
Bufi 
R W E / D E A 
Tusnihunand 
Louis Dreyfus 
Group 
r u h a u u i o i 
Juhut Schindler 
Bochumer 
Erdöl 
Contal 
Corporation 
Manchon 
РЫЬрш 
Мшто 
Amoco 
Conoco 
Berry Wiggnrn 
BurmahOil 
B n g g i O ü 
Tarmac 
Materna 
OIC Petroleum 
Ani Johnson 
Simdind 
Hollander 
Gamil 
CEPSA 
Rio Timo 
John L. Rass 
ілЬюуашт 
Edoardo 
M o n o 
BUQLIBIU 
Candi 
Ρηοΐ 
пшсшвся 
Ріиишю and 
Jxoran 
1950 
0.3 
-
-
-
-
0.1 
0.1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.2 
0 4 
0.1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
, 0.9 
-
-
-
0.1 
-
-
at 
0.1 
-
-
1955 
3.1 
-
-
1.1 
-
0.1 
OJ 
-
-
-
-
-
0.1 
-
0.3 
0.4 
0.1 
-
-
-
0.7 
-
-
1.5 
-
-
-
О 
-
I J 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
-
I960 
4.7 
-
-
2.3 
-
-
0J 
-
-
-
-
-
0 5 
-
0.4 
0.4 
0.1 
-
-
-
1.4 
-
-
3.0 
-
-
-
1.7 
-
го 
ai 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
19*5 
10.4 
-
-
3.1 
-
-
0.3 
-
-
-
0.5 
-
1.1 
0.5 
0.5 
0.6 
at 
-
-
-
го 
02 
2-2 
5.4 
-
-
-
7.8 
-
Z5 
as 
0.9 
0.5 
0.7 
1970 
16 
-
-
5.9 
-
-
0.4 
-
-
3.0 
Z9 
-
4.9 
6.1 
0.5 
0.5 
0.1 
0.2 
-
-
3.2 
0.4 
2.4 
12 6 
3.9 
-
-
8.5 
15.1 
32 
0.6 
0.9 
0.6 
I J 
1975 
19.5 
-
0.2 
7.3 
-
-
0.4 
-
-
32 
3.0 
-
8.8 
6.1 
0.3 
I J 
0.4 
OJ 
-
-
3.2 
0.4 
3.6 
14.6 
4.1 
5.4 
-
16 7 
15.1 
42 
3.2 
1.8 
1.1 
1.7 
1980 
20 
-
-
7.6 
-
-
0.4 
24 
3.9 
3.0 
3.0 
-
9.7 
8.0 
-
I J 
-
0.6 
4 5 
3.6 
2.5 
0J 
3.6 
163 
3 9 
5.4 
6.9 
17.5 
15.1 
3.9 
3.2 
1 9 
1.1 
1.7 
1985 
16.5 
-
-
7 6 
-
-
0.5 
-
3.2 
3.6 
2.7 
-
5J 
-
-
-
-
06 
-
36 
10 
0.4 
3.6 
16.3 
3.9 
4.9 
49 
15.3 
151 
3.7 
5.7 
1.1 
1.1 
1.7 
1990 
22 
3.2 
-
11.2 
-
-
-
-
12 
-
2.4 
1.6 
-
-
-
-
-
0 5 
-
8.8 
-
0.5 
-
11.7 
-
5 3 
4.9 
8.8 
1Z0 
3.9 
5.7 
0.» 
1.1 
1.6 
1995 
19.9 
0.6 
-
13.4 
8 9 
-
-
-
1.3 
-
2.4 
1.6 
-
-
-
-
-
0.5 
-
12.9 
-
0.5 
-
9 
-
5J 
4.9 
9.1 
t2.0 
3.8 
5.6 
0.9 
1.1 
2 J 
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Table 6.45 (continued) 
Company 
Rabele 
DcUcpiane 
Boara 
Volpato 
Getry 
Tagliabile 
Come Volpi ώ 
Misurate 
Monti 
Maggubm 
Rovelh 
Secondo 
Mamiter 
Pontoü 
TonücapacKy 
of the 
independent oil 
companies' 
Total capacity 
Weitem Europe 
1950 
-
-
-
-
0.2 
0.3 
-
-
-
-
-
2.9 
41 
1955 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
-
OJ 
0.6 
-
-
-
-
11.8 
118 
I960 
0.1 
\2 
0.1 
1.0 
0J 
\2 
-
-
-
0.5 
21.7 
192 
1965 
0.1 
1.5 
0-2 
10 
08 
8.1 
-
-
-
\2 
52.7 
386 
1970 
0.1 
21 
0.7 
10 
12 
8.1 
-
49 
-
3.0 
114.5 
705 
1975 
0.1 
14 
0.8 
-
\2 
189 
0 3 
55 
0 3 
3.0 
157.4 
965 
1980 
0.1 
1J 
0.8 
-
\2 
-
0 3 
5.5 
0.3 
2.7 
163.5 
1004 
1985 
0.1 
1J 
0.8 
-
1.2 
-
-
-
-
-
126.7 
751 
1990 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
I07J 
635 
1995 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
116 
643 
independent companies, it has lost its appeal entirely to most of them 
since the early 1980s. Mark that the picture for those producers who 
remained in business is also mainly one of stabilization (Petrofina, 
Tarmac, Smid and Hollander, Ratsis, Pereto and Fintermica) or 
contraction (Coastal Corporation, Phillips, CEPSA, Vardnoyannis, 
Garrone, Moratti and Praoil) in output terms. Actually, there were 
only three enterprises which experienced a significant expansion in 
primary distillation capacity through acquisitions, notably RWE/ 
DEA, Tusculum and Louis Dreyfus Group, and OK Petroleum. Their 
investments have resulted in a slight improvement in the market 
position of the independent producers as a whole in this sector in 
Western Europe. When everything is considered, however, it turns 
out that the vast majority of this group has recendy assigned higher 
priority to retrenchment than to enlargement of production. There-
fore, let us take a more penetrating look at the rationalizations 
implemented by the independents in the past fifteen years. 
Negative adaptations between 1980 and 1995 
In spite of the fact that the primary distillation output of the inde-
pendent oil companies taken together dropped at a somewhat lower 
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Table 6.46 Changes m refining capacity (primary distillation) of the inde­
pendent oil companies in Western Europe in the 1980-1995 period; compo­
nents of change (Mt/year) 
Company 
Ресгобга 
Universal Refining 
(Daewoo) 
RWE/DEA 
Tuscuhim and Louis 
Dreyfus Group 
Julius Schindler 
Dochumer Entöl 
Coastal Corporation 
Marathon 
PtuSrps 
Murco 
Amoco 
Conoco 
Bu rauh Od 
1980-1995 
creation 
extension 
contracDon 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contneuon 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
création 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creaaon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contracDon 
closure 
total 
creanon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
tool 
creation 
extension 
contneuon 
closure 
total 
стеаооп 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creanon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
. 
5 
-1 
-4 
0 
. 
1 
-• 
1 
_ 
6 
-
-6 
_ 
9 
-
_ 9 
_ 
-
. 
-1 
-1 
. 
-
-
-2 
-2 
-
-3 
-
-3 
_ 
-
-4 
-
-4 
_ 
-
- 0 3 
- 0 J 
- 0 6 
. 
2 
-
-2 
-
-
-
-10 
-10 
-
-
-
-8 
-8 
_ 
-
-
-1 
-1 
Company 
Tarmac 
Mabanart 
O K Petroleum 
Axel Johnson 
Smid and Hollander 
Gatoil 
CEPSA 
Può Tìnto 
Ráeos 
Vardinoyanrus 
Edoardo Garrone 
Mora tu 
Pereto 
1980-1995 
creanon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
toral 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contracDon 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contneuon 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creanon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creanon 
extension 
conmenon 
closure 
total 
creanon 
extension 
conmenon 
closure 
total 
creanon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creanon 
extension 
contracDon 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
conmenon 
closure 
total 
creanon 
extension 
conmenon 
closure 
total 
_ 
0 2 
-
- 0 J 
- 0 1 
-
-
-
-5 
-5 
_ 
9 
-
_ 9 
. 
-
-2 
-2 
_ 
0 2 
_ 
. 0.2 
. 
-
-
-4 
-4 
_ 
-7 
_ 
-7 
_ 
-
-
-4 
-4 
. 
-
- 0 1 
. 
- 0 1 
_ 
-
-2 
-
-2 
_ 
0 3 
- 0 1 
-7 
- 6 8 
_ 
-
-3 
. 
-3 
_ 
-
- 0 1 
_ 
- 0 1 
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Table 6.46 (continued) 
Company 
Cameli 
Praoil 
Prolïimo 
Rarbelle 
Boaro 
Volpato 
andjacorossi 
DellcpiaiM 
1980-1995 
creation 
extension 
con trac Don 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
connection 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contracDon 
closure 
total 
-
3 
-
- 0 2 
2.B 
-
-
- 0 1 
- 0 9 
-1 
] 
-
. 1 
. 
-
-
- 0 1 
-0.1 
_ 
-
-
-1 
-1 
-
-
-1 
-
1 
Company 
Tagliabue 
Maggi aun 
Rovelli 
Secondo Mamiter 
Pontoil 
Total 
1980-1995 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
crraöon 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
creation 
extension 
contraction 
closure 
total 
-
-
-
-1 
-1 
. 
-
-
-0.3 
- 0 3 
-
-
-6 
-6 
_ 
-
-
-0.3 
-0.3 
-
-
-
-3 
-3 
_ 
38 
-21 
-62 
-45 
rate in comparison with the entire Western European refining sector 
and even grew modestly in the early nineties, well over half of all the 
players belonging to this group (twenty-eight out of thirty-seven 
producers) obviously gave preference to disinvestments in the period 
1980-1995, as table 6.46 shows. Table 6.46 provides insight into the 
contribution of the components of change to the restructuring process 
upon which the independents embarked during this period. 
It is evident from table 6.46 that within the category of the 
independent oil companies just five producers have been almost 
completely responsible for the total capacity reduction of this group 
in Western Europe since 1980: Amoco, Conoco, CEPSA, Garrone 
and Rovelli. Together, these actors accounted for about 83 percent 
of the group's total decrease in production. With the exception of 
CEPSA, these firms, like the independents in general, have imple-
mented rationalization predominandy by means of the sale of (a part 
interest in) a refinery — which is encompassed in the closure figure — 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, via closures rather than contractions. 
Turning to the other members of this group, the following attracts 
our attention. Within this group, Petrofina has always taken the lead 
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(table 6.45). It is noteworthy that Petrofina succeeded to maintain 
stability in volume terms from 1980 onwards. More precisely, the 
absolute decline in Petrofina's output resulting from the shutdown of 
the plants in Mühlheim and Duisburg (both in Germany), and the 
Volpiano refinery in Italy as well as the scaling down of its production 
facilities in South Killingholme (the United Kingdom) and Rome 
(Italy) was exacdy counterbalanced by the expansion in Antwerp. In 
the interview the general director corporate planning of Petrofina in 
Brussels remarked that the latter enlargement which can be ascribed 
to Petrofina's acquisition of BP's 50 percent share in the SIBP refinery 
in 1988 signifies the intention of the former company to concentrate 
its investments in this line of business in the Antwerp area. In doing 
so, Petrofina hopes to upgrade this asset to the status of one of the top 
performers in Europe in terms of profitability. The observation made 
earlier that RWE/DEA, Tusculum and Louis Dreyfus Group, and 
OK Petroleum were the only three companies which enjoyed a quite 
substantial upturn in output in the period under study is confirmed 
once again by table 6.46. It has to be pointed out that the extension 
of capacity of these three producers is totally attributable to takeovers 
of (a part interest in) refineries from other market participants. We will 
treat the acquisitions which the independent oil companies have 
recendy made in this area of operation in more detail below. 
As has already been mentioned above, the independents taken as a 
whole have accomplished divestiture mainly by selling assets. Alto-
gether, the rationalizations carried out by this group of players resulted 
in a fall in the number of refinery sites which were completely or partly 
in their hands by 43 percent in the period 1980-1995. Actually, this 
means that the relative decline witnessed by the group of the inde-
pendents was almost as sharp as that of the major oil companies (see 
section 6.3). When we review the alterations which took place in the 
composition of the refinery facilities controlled by the independent 
oil companies as far as size as well as inland versus coastal location are 
concerned between 1980 and 1995 (table 6.47), it appears that, like 
the major oil companies, the independents primarily got rid of their 
small-sized plants. 
Although their retrenchment efforts apparendy showed a bias in 
favour of small refineries, it is important to emphasize that by 1995 
the bulk of their assets still belonged to this size class. As table 6.47 
indicates, this group of market participants also gave up some units 
which were in the middle of the size spectrum. The category of the 
large production facilities, on the other hand, gained one plant. Putting 
Structural Changes in Western Europe 199 
Table 6.47 Composition of the oil refining units of the independent oil com-
panies by size class and inhnd/coastal location in Western Europe m the 
1980-199S period 
1980 1995 
number of units according to size 
class (M/y) 
small (0 - 5 Ml /y ) 35 17 
medium (5 - 10 Mt/y) 10 7 
large (over 10 Mt/y) 1 2 
number ofunirs situated on the 
coast or at an inland location 
coast 31 20 
inland 15 6 
total number 46 26 
the developments across the range of sizes in a relative perspective, we 
find that the medium- and large-sized refinery plants encroached 
slighdy on their small counterparts. Contrary to the other types of 
market participants, the independent oil companies have chiefly 
disposed of their coastal refineries. In spite of the tact that the pattern 
of disinvestment was slighdy skewed in favour of refinery sites located 
on the coast, it needs to be stressed that in absolute terms the 
involvement of the independents in the latter type of production 
facilities was still more than three times as great as in inland refineries 
by the mid-nineties. Figure 6.11 gives a picture of the geographical 
spread of the surviving refinery facilities of the independent oil 
companies in Western Europe in 1995. 
This figure portrays that the refinery plants of the independents are 
fairly evenly distributed across the Western European area. Expressed 
in a quantitative manner, within Western Europe the northwestern 
and southern part contained fourteen and twelve refineries respec-
tively which were wholly or partly managed by this group of actors 
in 1995. It is useful to observe that during the past decades the share 
of both subregions remained virtually static. More precisely, these two 
subregions were responsible for exactly half of the total number of 
production facilities, or twenty-three of the forty-six sites, in 1980. 
At first blush, it might be concluded on the basis of these figures 
that the disinvestment behaviour of the independent refiners active in 
Southern Europe has borne similarity to that of its cousins in the 
North-West. However, upon closer scrutiny, it turns out that some 
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Figure 6.11 Spatial pattern of oil refineries of the independent oil compa-
nies in Western Europe in 1995 
interesting differences can be revealed in terms of the extent as well 
as the nature of their rationalization experiences. Compared with the 
independents in Southern Europe, their northwestern counterparts 
pulled out of more assets in this field of operation in the period 
1980-1995. Whereas retrenchment in the former subregion took 
predominandy the form of closures, in the latter area divestiture was 
-achieved mainly through transactions. As to the bias in the degree of 
disinvestment in favour of independent oil companies in North-West 
Europe, it has to be pointed out, however, that acquisitions under-
taken by already established members of this group as well as a few 
newcomers have constituted a certain counterbalance to these nega-
tive adaptations. Indeed, owing to the takeover activities of companies 
such as RWE/DEA, Coastal Corporation, OK Petroleum, Universal 
Refining (Daewoo), Tusculum and Dreyfus, and Murco, the relative 
significance of the North-West has stayed virtually stable since 1980 
as far as the independents are concerned. All these producers except 
Tusculum and Dreyfus - the present owners of the Beta refinery in 
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Wilhelmshaven (Germany) — have forged partnerships in this sector. 
It seems that this can also be said of many other independent actors 
who were still operative in Western European oil refining in 1995. 
The result is that most of the refinery assets of this group of players 
(fifteen of the twenty-six sites that remained in business) can currently 
be described as 'joindy owned'. Table 6.48 shows the oil refineries in 
which the independents shared ownership with other (independent 
oil) companies in Western Europe by the mid-nineties. 
In common with the majors and the chemical companies, the vast 
majority of the independents (fourteen of the twenty existing produc-
ers belonging to this group that were engaged in the European refinery 
business in 1995) collaborated with (a) partner(s). It is noteworthy that 
those enterprises which were not involved in joint venture tie-ups can 
mainly be characterized as small refiners. Besides, it has to be pointed 
out that all of them were single plant producers. The latter finding 
lends further support to the statement made in section 6.5 that single 
plant actors tend to be less willing to enter into alliances than their 
multiplant counterparts. True, in the case of the independent oil 
companies, all multiplant companies (Petrofina, RWE/DEA, OK 
Petroleum, CEPSA, Garrone and Cameli) had established one or 
several joint ventures by 1995. Focusing on Petrofina, it has to be 
noted that in general this company shows a fairly positive attitude 
towards the formation of partnerships, as commented by the general 
director corporate planning of this company. In his opinion, joint 
venturing may be conceived as an attractive and sensible method of 
reducing production costs, risk-sharing and removing uncompetitive 
capacity. In this context, however, it is important to bring to the fore 
that the vice-president strategic planning of Dow Europe argued that 
unfortunately many joint venture arrangements do not rest on these 
objectives in practice. 
Taking the choice of firms with which Petrofina has tied up into 
account, it appears that this Belgian-based independent has hardly 
joined forces with the two biggest oil companies, Shell and Esso, at 
least in this area of operation. The general director corporate planning 
of Petrofina ascribes this bias against these large corporations to the 
fact that these front runners prefer to link up with private sector 
enterprises which also figure prominendy worldwide in terms of sales 
revenue and assets. As we have seen in section 6.3, this preference was, 
indeed, voiced by a strategy manager of Shell in The Hague. The 
consequence of their orientation (i.e. Shell, Esso etc.) towards their 
closest rivals as far as the selection ofjoint venture partners is concerned 
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has been that Petrofina has reconciled itself to collaboration with firms 
that occupy a medium position in the world league table. Another 
significant feature is that Petrofina, along with most of the other 
independent oil companies (except Phillips and Tarmac), obviously 
showed no reluctance to forge an alliance with public firms. Apart 
from this, two additional aspects are interesting to observe. One relates 
to the ownership structure of the joindy owned assets of this group of 
players. It is apparent that in most cases (eight of the fifteen sites) — in 
accordance with the major oil companies and the state-owned com-
panies from producer countries — the independent actors involved 
have seen an opportunity to buy at least 50 percent of the equity. A 
final point to emphasize is about the size of the production facilities 
listed in table 6.48. The major part of them can be characterized as 
medium- or even large-sized. 
Again, however, we should be aware that, like in the case of the 
other categories of market participants, the restructuring attempts of 
the independents as a group have not remained limited solely to the 
establishment of joint ventures. True, the unhealthy situation faced by 
the Western European oil refining industry has incited several inde-
pendent players to sell (part of) their refinery facilities to other 
(independent oil) companies. The transfer of ownership of refineries 
from the independents to other (independent oil) companies in 
Western Europe in the period 1980-1995 is displayed in table 6.49. 
Table 6.49 makes clear that especially the American independents, 
notably Coastal Corporation, Marathon, Phillips, Amoco and Conoco 
acted as sellers of refinery facilities. More precisely, these five firms 
were responsible for exactly half of the total number of transactions 
that were undertaken by this category of market participants during 
the period considered. When looking at the transactions of all the 
independent oil companies together, it can be seen that in nine of the 
fourteen cases (a part of) the plants were sold to state-controlled 
enterprises. Moreover, it is worthwhile to mention that all the assets 
save three which were disposed of can be described as small (less than 
5 million t/y). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the group under study has played a 
far more significant role as sellers than as buyers of refineries in Western 
Europe, it should be recognized that some independent producers 
have also taken steps in the converse direction. Eight members of this 
group - Petrofina, RWE/DEA, Tusculum and Dreyfus, Coastal 
Corporation, OK Petroleum, Universal Refining (Daewoo), Murco, 
and Cameli — made the decision to enlarge their primary distillation 
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capacity through acquisitions. Whereas the former five companies 
took over (part of the) oil refining plants from the major oil companies, 
namely from Texaco, Mobil, Esso and BP, in the latter cases the assets 
were purchased from other independent actors, such as Coastal 
Corporation, Amoco and Pontoil. 
Investments in conversion facilities 
What we have learned from the preceding sections of this chapter is 
that many Western European refiners have invested in upgrading 
capacity. Given the recent boost in the use of light oil products, this 
type of investments is generally deemed to be of vital importance in 
the decision making about whether or not a particular refinery site is 
kept open. We will now investigate to what degree the equipment of 
oil refineries with conversion facilities has held attraction for the 
independent oil companies. The trend in catalytic cracking as well as 
hydrocracking capacity for the period 1985 and 1995 is quantified in 
table 6.50. Our analysis is confined to those companies which were 
operative in Western European oil refining within this span of time. 
It is apparent from table 6.50 that Petrofina has not only been the 
leader regarding primary distillation output, but also with respect to 
upgrading capacity as far as the independents are concerned during 
the last decade. On closer examination we find that the dominance of 
the Belgian-based independent producer in terms of the total volume 
of conversion capacity can be attributed to the extension of Petrofina's 
catalytic cracker in Antwerp. Actually, the increase in the scale of 
production of the latter facility provides another example of the fact 
that Petrofina aims to optimize the performance of the Antwerp site. 
The general director corporate planning of Petrofina was convinced 
that the enhancement of the sophistication of the Antwerp refinery 
ensures its success in competing with high-ranking assets elsewhere in 
the world. He argued that in an open economy such as the Western 
European market upgrading can be regarded as imperative in order to 
be able to cater for the current pattern of demand. Hence, this kind 
of adjustment is almost a prerequisite for staying in business. Simulta-
neously, however, he underscored that some parts of Southern Europe 
are still protected well enough to guarantee that oil refineries yield a 
satisfactory return on investment without being endowed with crack-
ing plants. For this reason, Petrofina has refrained from outfitting the 
Rome refinery, in which it accounts for a majority share of 55 percent, 
with conversion capacity. Despite the pre-eminence of Petrofina from 
the mid-1980s to date, it has to be pointed out that the German 
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Table 6.50 Catalytic cracking and hydrocrackmg capacity of the inde-
pendent oil companies in Western Europe between 1985 and 1995 (Mtfyear) 
1985 1»5 
Caoljrac cnckmf 
Petrofiiu 
RWE/DEA 
Untvcml Refining (Daewoo) 
Tusculum and Dreyfus 
Juhus Schmäler 
Coastal Corporation 
Marathon 
Phillms 
Murco 
Amoco 
Tarmac 
OK Petroleum 
Axel Johnson 
Snud and Holhnder 
Gatod 
CEPSA 
Rio Tìnto 
John L. Ratst 
Varduioyamut 
Edoardo Garrone 
Moratti 
Bragchitii Pereto 
СатеЬ 
Praod 
Rraermica 
Profilmo andjacorosa 
Delsqnanc 
Boam 
Volpato 
Tagbabue 
Total capacity 
2.8 
1.4 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1.6 
-
0.4 
-
-
-
\2 
-
-
1.1 
0.1 
2.6 
-
0.1 
-
0.1 
-
-
-
-
-
11 4 
5.0 
19 
-
-
-
0.3 
-
-
0.5 
-
-
0.6 
-
-
-
13 
-
-
1.5 
02 
Э.1 
-
0.1 
-
0.1 
-
-
-
-
-
14.6 
independent company RWE/DEA followed close on the former's 
heels in terms of upgrading capacity in 1995. Whereas Petrofina 
managed to maintain its premier place through a quite significant 
expansion of catalytic cracking capacity, RWE/DEA owes its status 
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Table 6.50 (continued) 
1985 1995 
H^dfocncklng 
Pctrofina 
RWE/DEA 0 9 2.0 
Unrvenal ReBrung (Daewoo) 
Tincuhim and Dreyfin 
Juhus Schindler 
Coasal Corporanon 
Marathon 
Р Ы Ц Я 0 2 
Murco 
Amoco 
Tarmac 
OK Petroleum 21 
Amljohmon 
Saud and Hollander 
Gitoli 
CEKA 
Rio Tinto 
John L. RaBB 
Vaiduioyanmi 
Edoardo Garrone - 19 
Moratti 
Bragchitn Perno 
Cameh - 0 6 
Pnoil 
Rniemuca 
Profumo andjacorosa 
DeDepane 
Boam 
Volpato 
Tagbabuc 
Total capacity 0 9 6 8 
of runner-up especially to the size increase of its hydrocracker in 
Wesseling (Germany). In addition to these two front runners, Moratti, 
Garrone and OK Petroleum should also be identified as important 
investors in this context. More specifically, Moratti was responsible 
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for a considerable proportion of total catalytic cracking capacity of the 
entire category by the mid-nineties. Garrone and OK Petroleum, on 
the other hand, made a remarkable contribution to the impressive 
upturn in hydrocracking output. Especially due to the investments of 
the two latter companies the independents at large witnessed a more 
than sevenfold increase in the volume of production of their hy­
drocracking units in the period considered. Note though that, as in 
the case of the state-supported producers, this growth occurred from 
a low base level (from 0.9 million tonnes to 6.8 million tonnes between 
1985 and 1995). 
On balance it seems that the greater part of the independent actors 
(seventeen of the thirty companies which were present in the гебпегу 
business in Western Europe in the period under study) did not show 
interest in upgrading at all. Of these producers, only a small majority 
(nine of the seventeen firms) failed to survive. The fact that exactly 
half of the survivors are currendy operative in Southern Europe seems 
to add support to the statement made by the interviewee of Petrofina 
above that subsidization tends to influence the viability and profitabil­
ity of assets in this region. 
Access to natural resources 
Having discussed the oil refining operations of the independent oil 
companies in Western Europe and, especially, the adaptations made 
by them regarding retrenchment and conversion, we will now transfer 
our attention briefly to the control and access to crude supplies and 
oil production of this group of players and the recent changes in that. 
This topic will be treated in the same way as in the previous sections. 
This means that we will complement, again, the figures on the volume 
of world oil production of a few members of this group for the period 
1980-1990 with qualitative information obtained from the interview 
with the general director corporate planning of Petrofina. Unfortu­
nately, a detailed analysis of the changes which occurred in the position 
of all the independent actors engaged in the upstream area of the oil 
industry during this period is hindered by a substantial lack of statistics. 
Indeed, quantitative data are only available for four independent 
producers, namely Petrofina, Phillips, Amoco and Coastal Corpora­
tion. Besides, the observation has to be made that in the case of the 
latter firm the availability of production figures is limited to the second 
half of the eighties. Table 6.51 demonstrates the evolution of world 
crude oil production of these four independent players between 1980 
and 1990. 
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Table 6.51 World production of oil of some independent oil companies be­
tween 1980 and 1990 (Mtfyear) 
Company 
PetTofira 
Costal 
Coipomion 
PtaOipi 
Amoco 
1980 
9 
n j . 
22 
41 
1981 
6 
n.a. 
20 
39 
1982 
6 
ПЛ. 
19 
38 
1983 
6 
ΏΛ. 
21 
39 
1984 
6 
ILL 
23 
42 
1985 
6 
0.7 
14 
42 
1986 
6 
0.6 
12 
40 
1987 
6 
0.5 
11 
40 
1988 
6 
0.5 
12 
40 
1989 
6 
0 5 
11 
40 
1990 
6 
0 5 
11 
39 
Source: Grant (1993) 
Comparing the trend for the various companies, we find that the 
general pattern of development is rather similar. In the majority of 
cases the level of global oil output remained more-or-less constant 
during the 1980s. The sole exception was Phillips, whose volume of 
production halved from 22 million tonnes in 1980 to 11 million tonnes 
in 1990. Nevertheless, in this context the point needs to be made that 
in the early nineties Phillips announced a switch in emphasis away 
from refining and marketing to exploration and chemicals due to 
uncertainty about the company's ability to maintain its high margins 
in the former lines of business (Grant 1993,289). For this reason, there 
is every likelihood that in the immediate future this American inde­
pendent will witness an expansion in output again. When casting more 
light on the performance of the upstream operations of the other three 
producers, as summarized in table 6.51, the following attracts our 
attention. Amongst the independent actors listed in table 6.51, Amoco 
has clearly taken the lead since 1980. More surprisingly, the latter even 
succeeded to surpass several of the majors such as Texaco, Mobil and 
CFP-Total in volume terms at the beginning of the 1990s. Without 
doubt, Amoco's strength upstream is partly attributable to its huge 
exploration expenditure throughout the period considered. As op­
posed to Amoco, the commitment of Coastal Corporation and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, of Petrofina to exploration and production 
has been fairly modest so far. Indeed, while the core of Coastal 
Corporation's business has always been the distribution of natural gas, 
Petrofina has traditionally been strongly downstream oriented. As to 
Petrofina, it is worth mentioning however that in recent years the 
company's investments have focused primarily on upstream activities. 
According to the general director corporate planning of Petrofina, the 
strategic priority which this company has recently given to the 
upstream end of the processing chain has certainly exercised a positive 
influence on its competitiveness in this part of the oil industry. 
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Access to distribution channels and marketing outlets 
It has already become clear from the previous surveys of the changes 
which have taken place in the situation downstream that the owner-
ship structure of retail oudets in Western Europe has remained by no 
means static. Despite the continued dominance of the major oil 
companies downstream on the Western European market, the lead-
ership of this group of market participants has obviously come under 
challenge. Reference back to section 6.3 makes plain that this chal-
lenge was not only posed by OPEC companies and players lumped 
together under the category 'others', but also by the group of local 
producers and independent oil companies. True, analysis of the main 
shifts in the market shares of the various categories of producers in 
Western Europe's total service station network in the 1985-1991 
period (figure 6.4) shows that the independents taken together saw, 
relatively speaking, a slight improvement in their position. Expressed 
quantitatively, by 1991 the independents were owning more than 16 
percent of the total number of Western European petrol stations as 
compared with less than 14 percent in 1985. From the interview with 
the general director corporate planning of Petrofina in Brussels it can 
be inferred that, in accordance with the positive trend of the group as 
a whole in this area of operation, Petrofina's downstream strategy has 
indeed been expansionary with substantial investment in enlarging, 
automating and modernizing its marketing assets. Within Europe the 
Belgian-based independent seeks to boost its market share in its core 
region consisting of the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the United 
Kingdom and Germany as well as to expand its geographical coverage 
by acquiring assets in Spain and former East Germany, for example. 
Although overall Petrofina has enjoyed an increase in relative signifi-
cance as a retailer of oil products in Western Europe, it should be 
recognized that it has also embarked on downward adjustments in this 
field of operation. More explicidy, the latter company sacrificed its 
marketing operations to BP in Greece and Switzerland in 1981 and 
1985 respectively. 
Besides, it sold distribution facilities to Agip in France and to 
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) in Italy in 1992. The latter 
transaction mirrors Petrofina's willingness to do business with com-
panies from oil producing countries in general. 
Ethylene crackers 
Whereas a large number of independent producers has been engaged 
in the Western European refining industry during the last decades, 
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only a few of them have felt attracted to ethylene manufacture. 
Notwithstanding the modest role played by the independents as a 
group on the Western European ethylene manufacturing scene, the 
(dis)investment decisions which have been taken by them deserve to 
be studied somewhat closer. Table 6.52 gives an idea of the pattern of 
development of the ethylene capacity of the independent oil compa­
nies between 1960 and 1993. 
In common with most other groups of market participants, the 
independents in their entirety saw a recovery in their production 
volume in the early nineties. A more detailed examination at enterprise 
level shows that this upward shift in ethylene output was the work of 
a mere two firms, namely Petrofina and RWE/DEA. As was men­
tioned in chapter 5, Petrofina was one of the five companies which 
dared to commission a new steam cracker in Western Europe at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Obviously, the favourable prospects for 
ethylene demand prevailing around the mid-1980s enticed Petrofina 
to build an additional cracking unit in Antwerp in conjunction with 
the Finnish state-owned producer Neste Oy. The consequence of the 
creation of this plant is that it edged Petrofina ahead of RWE/DEA 
by which the former is currendy in the vanguard within this group. 
As far as RWE/DEA is concerned, it has to be pointed out that this 
company achieved a slight capacity expansion through the acquisition 
of a small cracking plant from Texaco in Heide (Germany) in 1988. 
By contrast, Marathon, Rovelli and Maersk took the decision to exit 
from this sector altogether in the course of the eighties. In the case of 
the two latter firms (Rovelli and Maersk), withdrawing from the 
Western European market entailed the shutdown of their production 
Table 6.52 Ethylene capacity of the independent oil companies in Western 
Europe m the 1960-1993 period (1,000 tlyear) 
Company I960 
Petrofina 
RWE/DEA 
Muuhon 
КтЛ 
Маевк Group 
Total ethylene 
capacity of the 
independent oil 
companies 
Total ethylene 695 
capacity in 
wesem Europe 
1965 
250 
eo 
-
50 
-
MO 
2,675 
1970 
500 
№ 
150 
55 
40 
825 
7,725 
1975 
520 
480 
150 
65 
40 
1,255 
13310 
1980 
520 
520 
225 
75 
40 
1,380 
16,685 
1985 
520 
440 
280 
-
-
1,240 
14346 
1990 
338 
520 
-
-
-
858 
14,530 
1993 
633 8 
520 
-
-
-
1,153 8 
18,245 
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facilities. Marathon, on the other hand, managed to hand over its asset 
in Burghausen (Germany) in 1987. The Austrian state-supported 
company OMV was prepared to take over this ethylene cracker, along 
with Marathon's oil refining operations at the same location (table 
6.49). 
Viewing the development of the production of ethylene of the 
independent oil companies as a whole against the background of the 
Western European total, it turns out that this category of producers 
suffered a decrease in relative strength. While in 1965 the inde­
pendents taken as a group accounted for 14 percent of total Western 
European ethylene capacity, their share went down to less than 11 
percent in 1993. Having outlined the changes that have come about 
in the fortunes of the entire category as well as of the various members 
of this group separately with respect to ethylene production, we will 
now go into some details of the restructuring efforts made by the 
individual enterprises. 
Negative adjustments in the 1980-1993 period 
Drawing a comparison between the (disinvestment behaviour of the 
independent oil companies and that of the other established firms — 
the majors, the chemical companies and the government-controlled 
enterprises from consumer countries - a slight difference in the timing 
of rationalization should be noticed. As opposed to the other categories 
of established market participants, the independents as a group gave a 
somewhat delayed response to the onset of market maturity. Indeed, 
whilst in the case of the majors, the chemical companies and the 
state-owned producers the shedding of ethylene capacity mainly 
occurred in the first half of the eighties, the independents still resisted 
retrenchment in this period by which they virtually retained a stable 
position in volume terms. As table 6.53 shows, the disinvestments 
Table 6.53 Changes in ethylene capacity of the independent oil companies 
in Western Europe in the 1980-1993 period; components of change 
(Mt/year) 
Λάρααοη 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1993 
Cteition -
Extension 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Contraction -01 -0.2 
Closure -0.1 -0J 
Tool -0.1 -0.4 0.3 
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undertaken by the latter group were almost negligible at the beginning 
of the 1980s and were practically matched by capacity expansion. 
However, by the end of the last decade the independent oil companies 
also gave in, although on a small scale. 
When looking more closely at the absolute contribution of the 
components of change to the overall impairment of the competitive-
ness of the category as a whole in this sector, as illustrated in table 6.53, 
it appears that contraction and closure were equally popular in the 
1980-1985 period. More precisely, Rovelli and Maersk accomplished 
divestiture by complete closure of their ethylene crackers. R W E / 
DEA, on the other hand, implemented restructuring through contrac-
tion of its asset in Wesseling (Germany). In the period 1985-1990 
retrenchment was for the most part due to the sale of Marathon's 
cracking plant in Burghausen (Germany), which is classified here as a 
closure, and for another part to the scaling down of Petrofina's asset 
in Antwerp. 
As has already been indicated above, in the early nineties, the 
decrease in ethylene production of the independent oil companies at 
large which was perceivable for the previous decade was reversed. 
Between 1990 and 1993 their volume of ethylene output grew by 0.3 
million tonnes. This jump in ethylene capacity is completely attribut-
able to the creation of a new cracking facility by Petrofina with the 
help of Neste Oy in Antwerp. The establishment of this cracker lends 
further support to the fact that Petrofina attaches very great importance 
to the Antwerp complex. 
We now switch our attention to the alterations which have taken 
place in the composition of the ethylene crackers owned by the 
independents in terms of size as well as inland versus coastal location. 
The composition for 1980 and 1995 is summarized in table 6.54. 
We see that only a few minor changes occurred in this respect from 
1980 to date. Actually, the figures shown in table 6.54 stayed almost 
equal between 1980 and 1993. The moderate shifts in the number of 
production facilities categorized according to size class and inland/ 
coastal location will cause little surprise, because the independent oil 
companies have hardly been involved in ethylene manufacture in 
Western Europe. Quantitatively a loss of one plant is observable at 
both ends of the spectrum of ethylene cracker sizes during the period 
considered. In the case of the small cracking units this insignificant 
decline was the result of closures, whilst contraction was responsible 
for this change in the case of their large counterparts. The two steam 
crackers which were closed down by the independents, namely the 
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Table 6.54 Composition of the ethylene crackers of the independent oil 
companies by size class and by inhndlcoastal location in Western Europe in 
the 1980-1993 period 
number of unit* according to m e 
class (1,000 t/y) 
mull ( 0 - 1 0 0 ) 
medium (100 - 500) 
large (over 500) 
number of units situated on the 
coast or at an inland location 
coast 
inland 
total number 
1980 
2 
1 
2 
Э 
2 
5 
1993 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
assets of Rovelli and Maersk in Cagliari (Italy) and Copenhagen 
(Denmark) respectively, were both located on the coast. As a conse­
quence of the shutdown of these plants, most of the crackers that were 
still in the hands of this group of players in 1993 were situated inland. 
The converse was true in 1980, as can be deduced from table 6.54. 
Geographically, North-West Europe currendy hosts all the opera­
tions of the category under study in this line of business. A glance back 
at the spatial configuration of the refinery sites of the independent oil 
companies (figure 6.10) makes clear that the location pattern of their 
ethylene manufacturing activities is strikingly different. Indeed, as we 
have seen already, their oil refineries are virtually evenly spread across 
the Western European market. Almost half of the independents' oil 
refining assets can be found in Southern Europe at the moment. Of 
the latter production facilities, Italy contained the greater part (seven 
of the twelve refineries) in 1995. In short, the refinery industry had 
and still has much attraction for independent actors of Southern 
European origin. This is in marked contrast to ethylene manufacture. 
Since the early 1980s, when the Italian private producer Rovelli 
decided to shut down its single cracker in Cagliari, the production of 
ethylene of this group of actors has been the exclusive concern of 
Petrofina and RWE/DEA and, therefore, of the North-West. 
Turning now to the joint venture arrangements set up by the 
independent oil companies within this sector, it seems that only 
Petrofina had teamed up with a partner by 1993. From 1988 onwards, 
Petrofina worked in concert with Neste Oy in the Antwerp complex, 
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in which the former holds a majority stake of 65 percent. As pointed 
out above, this partnership also applies to the new steam cracker which 
has recendy come into operation in Antwerp. The choice of Neste 
Oy as a joint venture partner confirms once again the aforementioned 
observation: Petrofina generally tends to ally itself with corporations 
which find themselves somewhere in the middle of the global hierar-
chy of oil companies. Furthermore, it provides evidence in support of 
the fact that the latter is undoubtedly prepared to join forces with 
government-controlled producers. 
When we consider the issue of asset trading upon which the 
independents have embarked in this line of business during the past 
decades, we see that this type of action has scarcely appealed to this 
category of market participants. In fact, the American independent 
Marathon was the sole producer that sold an ethylene cracker after 
1980. As has been said, in 1987 ÖMV acquired this production facility 
which is situated in Burghausen (Germany) from Marathon. But also 
with regard to the opposite, that is the purchase of cracking plants, we 
can quote only one example. RWE/DEA bought a small steam 
cracker from Texaco in Heide (Germany) in 1988 (see above). 
Conclusion 
The patterns of development of the various areas of activity covered 
in this section have not been exacdy identical. Nor have they been so 
for all members belonging to the group of the independent private 
producers. Broadly speaking, only marginal alterations have been 
occurring in the past fifteen years. At the level of the category as a 
whole, the following changes in competitiveness have been noticed. 
In oil refining as well as marketing the independents taken together 
have witnessed an improvement in market position. As to conversion 
and crude oil production, their relative significance has stayed virtually 
stable. However, with respect to ethylene manufacture in Western 
Europe, this type of players has slighdy lost ground in favour of other 
categories of market participants since the mid-sixties. 
At firm level, we have seen that Petrofina has been the front runner 
in terms of output in several fields of operation, notably in oil refining, 
conversion and ethylene production. In the case of the three latter 
activities, it is noteworthy that the German independent company 
RWE/DEA was the runner-up around the mid-nineties. Apart from 
these two top performers, it has to be pointed out that by 1995 OK 
petroleum, Moratti and Garrone were quite well-placed in oil refining 
and conversion as far as their volume of production is concerned. By 
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contrast, most of the other independent actors have never played a 
major role in the Western European refinery industry, not to mention 
in the basic petrochemical sector. Regarding the former line of 
business, it is useful to remark that many independents disappeared 
altogether in the aftermath of the oil crises of the seventies. Whereas 
some of them were forced to shut down their refinery facilities, others 
— predominantly American independent producers such as Coastal 
Corporation, Marathon, Phillips, Amoco and Conoco - succeeded to 
find a buyer for their plants. 
6.8 Comparison between the various categories of 
companies discerned; summary and conclusions 
A main purpose of this chapter has been to explore how far the actual 
pattern of market (de)concentration in Western European oil refining 
and ethylene manufacture conforms to the sectoral evolution postu-
lated by de Jong in his dynamic market theory (1985; 1989a). The 
degree of this correspondence has been examined in section 6.2. It has 
been seen there that in Western Europe both oil refining and ethylene 
production have generally gone through an introduction and a growth 
stage, and have lately moved into maturity. With respect to the 
patterns of structural changes of these two sectors, it has been deter-
mined that in the introduction and expansion stage, the overall level 
of market concentration has been consistent with the findings based 
on de Jong's model. True, we have found that the high initial 
concentration dropped substantially during the expansion stages of 
both industries. By contrast, the pattern for the saturation phases of 
the two fields of operation in question did not accord with theoretical 
expectations (that is, a rise in the degree of market concentration in 
the stage of maturity). This observation was also made by Molle (1993, 
54 and 60). More precisely, concentration ratios in ethylene manu-
facture in Western Europe only showed a modest increase from 1980 
onwards, whereas those in oil refining (primary distillation) even 
declined in the last fifteen years. On account of the fact that the recent 
aggregated developments in Western European refining and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, ethylene production have been at odds with 
the trend in restructuring predicted by de Jong, we have sought to 
accomplish another purpose in this chapter. 
Due to the non-compliance with de Jong's dynamic market model 
as far as the overall outcome of the transformation of the competitive 
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structure of our sectors in the era of maturity is concerned the major 
part of this chapter (sections 6.3 to 6.7) has been aimed at providing 
an explanation for the deviation observed. In order to reach the latter 
goal, it has been necessary to adopt a less aggregative approach and -
more specifically - to concentrate on the differences in strategic 
behaviour between the individual firms operative in these lines of 
business primarily since the economic whirlwind of the seventies. In 
our empirical investigation, we have started from the premise that 
intrinsic (i.e. economies of scale, vertical intregrarion, access to natural 
resources and distribution channels and investments in conversion 
facilities) as well as extrinsic mobility barriers (i.e. government inter-
vention) have the tendency to modify the interaction between market 
development and market structure. This means that we have assumed 
that these impediments may have hindered the process of restructuring 
and, hence, of repositioning of certain companies within our sectors. 
Put differendy, we supposed that the influence of these obstacles on 
the relationship between our key variables, market structure and 
market development, may account for the fact that the recent per-
formance of the European refinery and basic petrochemical industry 
was out of step with the pattern theoretically expected (see chapter 3). 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to put the results of our 
aggregate analysis into perspective by examining the probable deter-
rent effect of these barriers on the strategic decisions taken by the 
companies involved in these activities, which have resulted in a 
reshuffling process lately. Particular emphasis in our study at enterprise 
level has been placed upon describing and explaining potential vari-
ations in the strategies that have been followed by the actors engaged 
in the sectors under consideration. In spite of the fact that the focus 
has been on the variations in strategic choices among individual 
producers, we have abo paid attention to the differences in investment 
behaviour between categories of companies. Reference back to sec-
tion 3.3 shows that the hypotheses which we have formulated concern 
clusters of companies rather than the individual firm. Indeed, virtually 
all the propositions relate to particular groups of market participants, 
such as the majors and the state-owned companies from both con-
sumer and producer countries. In addition to the latter three groups, 
we have distinguished two other categories, notably the independents 
and the chemical companies. 
Let us recapitulate here the most salient findings regarding the 
changes that have been occurring in the competitive position of the 
various categories of actors in their entirety during the past few 
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decades. The following summary is divided into a consideration of 
each of the five areas of activity treated in this chapter: (1) oil refining, 
(2) conversion, (3) access to crude oil supplies, (4) access to distribution 
channels and marketing outlets and (5) ethylene manufacture. A 
comparison will be drawn between the categories of producers with 
regard to their strategic decision making and the ensuing alterations 
in their relative competitiveness in the above-mentioned fields of 
operation. Besides, we will test the validity of the hypotheses advanced 
in chapter 3 against our research results. 
6.8.1 Oil refining 
Table 6.55 is devoted to the primary distillation output both in 
absolute (million tonnes/year) and relative terms for the five categories 
of market participants discerned in Western Europe in the period 
1950-1995. 
Comparing the trend for the various categories of players, it is 
apparent that the major oil companies at large made the greatest 
commitment to disinvestments in the Western European refinery 
industry in the period under review. Between 1975 and 1995 their 
volume of production almost halved from about 546 million tonnes 
to 285 million tonnes. Although the majors managed to retain their 
leadership in this line of business, it should be underlined that their 
dominance has clearly come under challenge. The most significant 
challenge was posed by the national oil companies from consumer 
countries. In the 1980-1995 period the majors' share in the Western 
European total declined from 54 percent to 44 percent, while the share 
of the government-controlled enterprises from oil consuming coun-
tries rose from 24 percent to 29 percent. The increase in relative 
importance of the latter group can be ascribed to the fact that the 
divestiture upon which it embarked was obviously less severe in 
comparison with the entire European oil refining sector. In essence, 
this pattern of development lends support to the hypothesis that the 
involvement of public actors in the refinery business in Europe, whose 
decision making process frequendy includes non-commercial consid-
erations as well, has paralysed action in the form of plant closures and 
contractions and has retarded restructuring among state-supported 
refinery owners (see section 3.3). Apparendy, state refiners have been 
able to resist retrenchment more stubbornly than the other categories 
of producers. This disparity is not difficult to understand because 
state-owned companies are generally less vulnerable to the normal 
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economie consequences of commercial losses, as they are often 
feather-bedded in one way or the other by national governments. 
Table 6.55 makes clear that apart from the national oil companies 
from oil consuming countries, the independents taken together have 
abo witnessed a minor improvement in market position in oil refining. 
Despite the large number of independent oil companies that are still 
engaged in this area of activity, only a few of them (Petrofina, 
RWE/DEA, OK Petroleum and Moratti) are currendy responsible 
for the bulk of total primary distillation capacity of this group in 
Western Europe. This observation implies that many of the inde-
pendent producers who were operative in the Western European oil 
refining industry by 1995 can be characterized as small entities. A 
glance back at table 6.44 reveals that practically all these small players 
were single plant producers around the mid-1990s. The presence of 
these small, single plant firms supports the hypothesis that this type of 
market occupants tends to show reluctance to disinvest on account of 
the fact that this entails complete withdrawal from a particular sector. 
When considering the adjustments made by the chemical compa-
nies as a whole from 1980 onwards, it turns out that this group 
underwent a pronounced decline in its level of production which 
resulted in an impairment of its competitiveness. Analysis at the level 
of the individual firm makes plain that amongst the chemical actors 
Montedison, Veba and, to a somewhat lesser extent, BASF bore the 
main burden of retrenchment. 
Turning to the state-owned enterprises from producer countries, 
it is noteworthy that this group of market participants also imple-
mented rationalization in this field of operation in the early nineties, 
albeit on a small scale. As a consequence of this downturn in output, 
which was the work of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and Pemex, 
the overseas newcomers taken collectively saw a modest deterioration 
in relative strength in recent years. 
6.8.2 Investments in conversion facilities 
Table 6.56 displays the development of the Western European cata-
lytic cracking and hydrocracking capacity in absolute (million ton-
nes/year) as well as relative terms for the five categories of market 
participants discerned between 1985 and 1995. 
What attracts attention when looking at the total production 
capacity of the catalytic cracking and hydrocracking facilities owned 
by the various categories of producers shown in table 6.56 is that all 
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Table 6.56 Catalytic cracking and hydrocracking capacity by category of 
market participants m Western Europe in the 1985-1995 period 
C*tah-tic гжЫв« 
the major od c o n f u í a 
the chamal companies 
the nabonal oil compaiuet б о т 
consumer comunes 
the Mate-owned companies from 
producer comune» 
the independent od companies 
Toed Western Europe 
Hydracfecunsj 
the major od companies 
the chenues] companies 
the national od companies from 
consumer countries 
the Hate-owned companies from 
producer countries 
the independent od companies 
Total Western Europe 
million 
43.2 
3.0 
IS S 
0.7 
11.4 
73.8 
4.3 
1.6 
15 
0.7 
0.9 
9 
1985 
tonnes % share 
59 
4 
21 
1 
15 
100 
48 
18 
16 
8 
10 
100 
million 
49 2 
63 
29.4 
2.1 
14 6 
101.6 
9.3 
2.8 
7 6 
13 
6 8 
27.8 
1995 
tonnes % share 
49 
6 
29 
2 
14 
100 
33 
10 
27 
5 
25 
100 
the groups distinguished have evidently attached importance to up­
grading which is mirrored in an absolute rise in their level of output. 
However, wide variations can be perceived between the different 
subsets of actors not only in the changes which have come about, 
relatively speaking, in the fortunes of the five categories but also in 
their absolute significance. As table 6.56 demonstrates, the majors as 
a group clearly took pride of place in both years of analysis as far as 
their overall involvement in conversion is concerned. It is undeniable 
that throughout the past decade the major oil companies in general -
and Shell and Esso in particular - succeeded to be by far the most 
dominant forces in absolute terms. Nevertheless, the majors' growth 
rates lagged behind those of the other groups of players through which 
the former category clearly lost relative strength in the period 1985-
1995. Especially the national oil companies from consumer countries 
encroached upon the territory of the traditional oil giants regarding 
upgrading in Western Europe. Amongst the government-owned 
enterprises from oil consuming countries, ENI has invested most 
heavily in this field. Actually, in 1995 ENI ranked third in terms of 
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production in the Western European league table after Shell and Esso. 
The fact that these three big oil companies are currently in the 
vanguard in the hierarchy of producers active in the refinery industry 
in Western Europe corroborates the hypothesis that particularly large-
sized firms have had the ability to make adaptations in this respect due 
to the high financial resources required to upgrade plants. 
In addition to the majors and the public corporations from con-
sumer countries, the independent oil companies as a whole should abo 
be identified as quite significant investors in this context. Mark that 
their investments took primarily the form of equipping oil refineries 
with hydrocrackers. The result of this kind of modernization is that 
the share of all independents together of total Western European 
hydrocracking capacity rose from 10 percent in 1985 to 25 percent in 
1995. Looking at the state-controlled companies from producer 
countries and the chemical actors, we see that the volume of conver-
sion capacity of these two groups of market participants has been rather 
limited so far. Moreover, it needs to be said that the market position 
of the two latter groups changed only marginally in this area of activity 
during the period studied. More specifically, the competitiveness of 
both categories stayed almost stable with respect to catalytic cracking, 
while they experienced a slight decrease in relative significance in 
hydrocracking. 
6.8.3 Access to crude oil supplies 
In section 3.3 it was posited that companies from OPEC countries 
have managed to infringe on the upstream activities of the majors since 
the oil price hikes of the seventies. Besides, it was postulated there that 
the reshuffling process which has ensued from this has enhanced the 
competitiveness of the category of the national oil companies from 
consumer countries upstream. The latter hypothesis was grounded on 
the fact that in the aftermath of the recessions of the 1970s various 
arrangements for access to crude oil supplies between governments of 
producing and consuming countries sprouted. In this chapter we have 
attempted to back up these postulations with research findings. We 
have employed both quantitative and qualitative data in our empirical 
investigation. Unfortunately, a thorough analysis of the changes which 
took place in the market position after 1980 of all the actors engaged 
in the upstream area of the oil industry and, therefore, of the various 
groups to which these producers belong was hampered by a substantial 
lack of figures on world oil production. True, quantitative data were 
224 Structural Changes m Western Europe 
only available for all the major oil companies except Gulf and for a 
few members of the other categories of market participants (excluding 
the chemical companies, because they are hardly involved in crude oil 
production activities). Furthermore, the point needs to be made that 
in many cases the availability of production figures was restricted to 
part of the period considered (1980-1990). The scarcity of information 
precluded us from calculating the exact shifts in the market shares of 
the various categories of producers in total world production of crude 
oil. This does not mean, however, that we are unable to say something 
about the alterations that came about in the comparative competitive 
strength of the different groups discerned. On the basis of the statistics 
obtained it is justified to state that the major oil companies have lost 
ground probably in favour of government-sponsored firms from oil 
consuming countries in this field of operation since the early 1980s. 
Indeed, we have seen that the majors' share in the world total dropped 
from 23 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 1990. This trend bears 
witness to the hypothesis put forward above regarding the weakening 
of the position of the major oil companies. By contrast, with the 
exception of Neste Oy all the public producers from consumer 
countries, whose performance in this respect is summarized in table 
6.32, experienced an absolute rise in crude oil output between 1980 
and 1990. This development seems to point to an encroachment on 
the traditional stronghold of the established oil majors, but it should 
be underlined once again that we do not have sufficient information 
for the entire group to determine whether this is true. 
Regarding the state-controlled corporations from oil producing 
countries, it is useful to observe that the evolutionary pattern generally 
deviated from our expectations. Broadly speaking, production stayed 
stable or even declined rather than increased. Switching our attention 
to the trend of the category of the independents, it proves that the 
level of global oil output remained more-or-less constant during the 
eighties. 
6.8.4 Access to distribution channels and marketing 
outlets 
Table 6.57 provides insight into the changes that occurred in the 
relative importance of categories of producers2 in the Western Euro-
2 The classification of companies which were active as retailers of oil products 
in Western Europe during this period is slightly different from those used in 
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Table 6.57 The share of categories of market participants in the total Wes­
tern European network of service stations, 1985 and 1991 (percentages) 
1985 199) 
the major oil companies 37.6 31.8 
«hen 20 β 23.3 
the national oil companies from 24.7 21.6 
coraumer countries 
OPEC countna 3.2 6.9 
ІосаЬ and independents 13.7 16.4 
Tool Western Europe 100 100 
Source: Own calculations based on BIBP, 
CDdP, Enerfinance, Euromonitor, Roland 
Berger and Partner 
pean network of marketing outlets between 1985 and 1991. 
Again, as table 6.57 depicts, it appears that the major oil companies 
as a whole have suffered the greatest decrease in relative significance 
in recent years. Indeed, in spite of the fact that the majors were still 
in the lead in terms of the total number of Western European service 
stations owned in 1991, it has to be pointed out that this group was, 
relatively speaking, the most important loser. Expressed in a quanti­
tative manner, its share went down from around 38 percent in 1985 
to a little under 32 percent in 1991. Conversely, the category of the 
OPEC companies witnessed the most satisfactory growth during the 
period under study. Between 1985 and 1991 the OPEC companies' 
share of the Western European total increased by 4 percentage points 
- albeit from a low starting point of about 3 percent to almost 7 
percent. The negative development of the majors and the positive 
trend of the OPEC companies support the proposition that producers 
from oil exporting countries have gained ground downstream (oil 
refining and marketing) to the detriment of the former group. Recall 
that we have hypothesized in section 3.3 that apart from the major oil 
the analysis of the other four areas of activity studied. Contrary to the other 
fields of operation, we distinguish here the categories Others' and 'locals and 
independents' in which 'the chemical companies' and 'the independent oil 
companies' are subsumed respectively. Besides, the category 'OPEC compa­
nies' instead of the brouder group 'state producers from oil exporting coun­
tries' is applied. This means that the Mexican public firm Pemex is excluded. 
These differences in classification are attributable to the categorization em­
ployed in the statistics on which our calculations are based. 
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companies, other types of established firms have also probably under-
gone an erosion of their relative competitiveness in marketing in 
Western Europe in favour of OPEC companies. From table 6.57 it 
can be deduced that this hypothesis can only be extended to the 
category of the state-controlled players from consumer countries. 
True, like the majors, the government-owned enterprises from oil 
consuming countries saw an impairment of their market position, 
although the relative fall in importance was small. More precisely, in 
the period 1985-1991 its share dropped from 25 percent to less than 
22 percent. When we consider the performance of the marketing 
activities of the remaining two groups (i.e. the group of local producers 
and independent oil companies, and the category labelled Others' 
which includes among others the chemical companies), it proves that 
both of them were quite successful in strengthening their influence as 
marketers of oil products in Western Europe. Whereas the share of 
'the locals and independents' of the world total grew from less than 
14 percent in 1985 to 16 percent in 1991, the proportion in the hands 
of the category Others' increased from about 21 percent to 23 percent. 
6.8.5 Ethylene manufacture 
Table 6.58 reproduces the trend in ethylene manufacture both in 
absolute (thousand tonnes) and relative terms for the five categories of 
market participants discerned in Western Europe between 1960 and 
1993. 
It is evident from table 6.58 that the group of the chemical 
producers has come out on top regarding rationalization since the 
beginning of the eighties. Relatively speaking, the production of 
ethylene of the chemical companies at large has decreased at a much 
higher rate compared with the Western European ethylene manufac-
turing sector as a whole. This implies that their market position has 
impaired considerably in this line of business. While by 1960 the 
chemical companies taken together were producing about 47 percent 
of the Western European total, by 1993 their share had fallen to 23 
percent. Although the category of the majors has not gone farthest in 
reducing output as far as ethylene manufacture is concerned, it should 
be recognized that this group has followed close on the heels of the 
chemical players in terms of divestiture. Between 1980 and 1993 the 
majors' volume of ethylene capacity dropped from 4,870 to 4,420 
thousand tonnes. The consequence of this retrenchment is that their 
share of total Western European ethylene production shrunk from 28 
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percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 1993. Conversely, the remaining 
three categories of actors - the state-supported corporations trom oil 
producing as well as oil consuming countries and the independents -
enjoyed an increase in importance in this field of operation from the 
early 1980s onwards. Like in the case of most other areas of activity, 
the biggest boost in relative strength was witnessed by the national oil 
companies from consumer countries. We find that this group outpaced 
the chemical producers around 1980 through which it became to head 
the Western European league table. In 1993 it accounted for 39 
percent of the Western European total. Note that the capacity 
expansion of the government-sponsored enterprises from oil consum-
ing countries was primarily carried out by ENI. Viewed in volume 
terms, the Italian state company occupied the premier place in the 
hierarchy of all manufacturers of ethylene in Western Europe at the 
beginning of the nineties, ahead of Shell and BP. The fact that 
especially the public enterprises from consumer countries stepped up 
production significantly even in the maturity stage indicates once again 
that the behaviour of this type of market participants tends to embrace 
non-economic criteria too. 
But the independents and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the state-
owned companies from oil producing countries have also recendy 
experienced a growth in ethylene output which has been greater than 
for the entire industry by which the competitive position of both 
groups has improved slightly. With respect to the government-owned 
firms from oil-rich countries, it is worth mentioning that until now 
this industry has held attraction for only one member of this category, 
namely Petroven. 
7 
Evaluation and Final Considerations 
7.1 Introduction 
At the end of this long journey, it is time to look back and take stock 
of where it has taken us. The central theme of this book has been the 
reshuffling process among the companies engaged in oil refining and 
ethylene manufacture on the Western European market primarily after 
the price shocks of the seventies. This reshuffling process has been the 
result of differences in investment behaviour of (subsets of) firms active 
in these lines of business in response to recent shifts in the volume and 
composition of demand. The present study has set out to explain why 
the producéis involved in these sectors have behaved in a dissimilar 
fashion, although they have been faced with similar unfavourable 
market circumstances since the early 1980s. In order to provide an 
explanation for the potential variations in the strategic decisions made 
by individual oil and chemical corporations and thus for the reposi-
tioning of all the market participants separately, we have employed 
the concept of mobility barriers. The notion of mobility barriers refers 
to obstacles that discourage entry into as well as departure from a field 
of operation and the forces that deter repositioning of established firms. 
In addition to the latter notion, we have used the concepts of market 
structure and market development which have both been regarded as 
key variables in our investigation. Market structure is about the ways 
markets are organized. It points to the extent of interrelatedness of 
market participants in a particular industry and to the degree of market 
concentration. The market development can be defined as a process 
which is the result of the succession of different market situations. The 
market situation concerns the state of a particular product or industry 
at a certain moment or a short period of time brought about by both 
demand and supply factors. Regarding the development of our sectors, 
it has been assumed that they have gone through (part of) a life cycle, 
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which consists of the following phases: an introduction stage, an 
expansion stage, a maturity stage and a decline stage. Furthermore, we 
have supposed that a dynamic reciprocal relationship exists between 
the various stages of the life cycle of the industries studied on the one 
hand and the market structure on the other. The idea that the concepts 
market structure and market development are mutually related lies at 
the heart of the dynamic market approach of de Jong (1985; 1989a). 
De Jong's model, which gauges a sector's passage through its life cycle 
in terms of output, has been applied as the main framework for 
analyzing the general patterns of structural changes of the oil refining 
and basic petrochemical industry in Western Europe. De Jong argues 
that in a market economy growing sectors generally show a declining 
degree of market concentration. By contrast, stagnating and contrac-
ting sectors display growing concentration. 
The principal objective of this study has been to examine whether 
the actual pattern of market (de)concentration in Western European 
oil refining and ethylene manufacture has been in accordance with the 
sectoral evolution theoretically expected. In our analysis, we have 
focused explicitly on possible deviations of the development of the 
sectors considered from theoretical expectations - that is, from the line 
of reasoning adopted by de Jong. More precisely, in the case of 
non-compliance with the dynamic market theory of de Jong we have 
sought to explain why the structural adjustments in the industries 
under review have been at odds with the behaviour hypothesized by 
the latter writer. This has been done with the help of the above-men-
tioned concept of mobility barriers. 
Having outlined the prime aim of this book, the central research 
question is: 
Which changes have taken place in the degree of market concen-
tration in the Western European oil refining and ethylene manufac-
turing sector as a whole? Which shifts have been occurring in the 
competitive position of (categories of) companies within both sectors 
particularly since the oil crises of the seventies, which have led to the 
structural changes observed in the two industries? What are the main 
explanations for these changes and especially those theoretically unex-
pected? This broad research question has been split into four more 
specific research questions. These are: 
1. What is the outcome of the investment behaviour of producers 
operative in the oil refining and basic petrochemical industry on a 
worldwide scale? What is the relative position of Western Europe 
in total world oil and petrochemical production? What are the 
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sources underlying the recent global shirts in the oil refining and 
basic petrochemical sector? 
2. Which interrelationship can be found between the various stages 
of sectoral development and the market structure of a sector in 
general and of the Western European oil refining and basic petro-
chemical industry in particular? 
3. What are the effects of the ownership structure of the Western 
European oil refining and basic petrochemical facilities, and recent 
changes in that, on the level of market concentration in our sectors? 
4. What are the consequences of the various strategies pursued by 
(groups of) individual firms active in these industries for their 
relative competitiveness? What are the implications of the invest-
ment/disinvestment decisions of actors engaged in these lines of 
business for the trend in production capacity in Western Europe? 
7.2 Summary 
7.2.1 De Jong's dynamic market theory: a life-cycle 
perspective on changes in market structure 
In order to meet the research objective, it is necessary to adopt a 
process view with regard to business strategies and the organization of 
a market resulting from them. The dynamic market theory of de Jong 
is only one of the few approaches which treats market concentration 
as a process. Expressed in a more precise manner, de Jong's dynamic 
market model, along with the profit cycle model of Markusen (1985), 
stands out from other theories of market concentration in the sense 
that it incorporates an evolutionary dimension wherein it is postulated 
that in the historical development of a particular industry concentra-
tion ratios vary across the cycle. Put differently, unlike other appro-
aches to the organizational structure of industries, the latter two 
theories do not look at competitive behaviour and the ensuing ways 
markets are organized as static but in passage. Both de Jong's dynamic 
market theory and Markusen's profit cycle theory are in fact extensions 
of the product life-cycle concept which seek to explain systematic 
changes of sectors in terms of market concentration. Despite this 
resemblance, the following important difference needs to be taken 
into account. While de Jong makes use of output as the main indicator 
in analyzing structural changes, Markusen employs profitability to 
assess the evolution of an industry. Since we focus in this study on the 
oscillations in commercial structure of sectors, output seems to be a 
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more convenient measure. By applying output as the central criterion, 
we are able to investigate the alterations in market position of market 
participants that have occurred with the passage of time. Hence for 
the purpose of the present research the model of de Jong appears to 
be more applicable. Although de Jong regards strategic decision 
making of individual firms within a sector as the most significant 
determinant of market concentration, he recognizes the impact which 
sectoral and locational characteristics have on the performance of an 
industry. It has to be pointed out, however, that these more specific 
characteristics have not been embraced in his model as a variable. As 
has already been noted above, the essence of the dynamic market 
approach of de Jong is the existence of a systematic interrelation 
between the market structure of a particular sector and the stages of 
the evolutionary path of the product involved. De Jong asserts that as 
a sector passes through the various stages of the life cycle, the market 
structure in terms of (de)concentration alters in a predictable fashion. 
Starting with high levels of market concentration in the initial deve-
lopment phase, concentration ratios tend to be eroded by the influx 
of new entrants which jump on the bandwagon during the growth 
stage. Nevertheless, when a sector reaches maturity and, eventually, 
its demise comes about, concentration ratios are likely to go up again 
resulting from firm failures and predatory practices of leading produ-
cen. There is no doubt that de Jong's dynamic market model provides 
a useful framework for analyzing the general development of a 
particular sector and, therefore, abo of the oil and petrochemical 
industry in Western Europe. Mark, though, that the applicability of 
this theory to an interpretation of the differences in strategic choices 
of individual enterprises at a certain point in a sector's evolution is 
limited. This limitation can be ascribed to the fact that this model rests 
on the product life-cycle concept as a scheme for explaining and 
predicting alterations in market structure. This being so, he hypothe-
sizes a relationship between the strategic decision making of individual 
producers within a sector and market conditions, while leaving other, 
more specific circumstances aside, as mentioned earlier. The conse-
quence of such an abstract treatment of the evolution of a sector, in 
which investment behaviour of companies is considered as a determi-
nistic response to economic forces, is that we need to draw upon the 
work of other theorists to explain the potential dissimilarities in 
strategic decisions of firms involved in the Western European oil 
refining and basic petrochemical industry. In order to comprehend 
and interpret the possible diversity of strategic reactions of the actors 
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engaged in the sectors under study especially to the current mature 
industry environment, the concept of mobility barriers introduced by 
Porter (1980) forms an appropriate starting point. Although the 
fundamental idea of de Jong's theory - that is, the existence of a 
systematic interaction between market development and market struc-
ture - has been retained in the present research, we have assumed that 
mobility barriers may have exerted an influence on the relationship 
between the two key variables and may yield an outcome which 
deviates from the evolutionary pattern of market (de)concentration 
suggested by de Jong. According to us, these impediments may 
account for the differences in (dis)investment behaviour between the 
producers engaged and thus for the recent shifts in their relative 
competitiveness. In other words, we have supposed that these obstacles 
may have hampered the process of restructuring and, hence, of 
repositioning of certain companies within our sectors. Like Willems 
(1991,86), we have drawn a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
mobility barriers. Intrinsic mobility barriers are created by sector-spe-
cific structural features. In the context of our sectors, this meant that 
we considered the probable impact of aspects, such as economies of 
scale, vertical integration, access to natural resources as well as to 
distribution channels and investments in conversion facilities. Extrinsic 
mobility barriers are the result of external, location-specific conditions. 
This implied that we looked at possible changes in market position 
caused by government intervention. By incorporating these sector-
and location-specific aspects as potential intervening variables into the 
dynamic market model of de Jong, we have started from the premise 
that the strategic decision-making process cannot be couched and 
explained solely in terms of market conditions. As opposed to de Jong, 
it has therefore been contended that this process is only partly moulded 
by these conditions. Implicit in allowing for the impact of these more 
specific elements on the organizational structure of the sectors under 
review is therefore the introduction of other factors than those which 
are purely economic to the dynamic market theory of de Jong. 
7.2.2 Research design: choices and strategies 
As has already been indicated above, in this book emphasis has been 
placed upon describing and explaining potential variations in the 
strategic behaviour between (groups of) individual producers opera-
tive in the Western European oil refining and/or basic petrochemical 
industry and the ensuing alterations in their comparative competitive 
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strength. In order to answer the research questions posed, we have 
addressed the changes in competitiveness of the actors engaged in these 
lines of business on three different levels of analysis. 
First, research has been carried out at the level of the different 
economic regions in the world. It is impossible to understand the 
reorganization of oil refining and ethylene production in Western 
Europe fully, without some knowledge of the recent aggregate 
dynamics of these activities on a global scale. For that reason, the 
changes in the geography of our sectors in terms of production capacity 
have been investigated by making a comparison between the indivi-
dual world regions. 
Second, analysis has been conducted at the level of groups of 
companies active in the sectors under consideration on the Western 
European market. A glance back at the central research question 
reveals that we have not only been interested in the differences in 
strategic choices between individual producers, but also between 
categories of market participants. For the purpose of this study, we 
have made an a priori classification of enterprises which show some 
identical strategic characteristics, are likely to pursue similar strategies 
or tend to compete under similar conditions. On the basis of these 
criteria, we have divided all the market participants involved into five 
categories, notably the majors, the chemical companies, the state-ow-
ned companies from both consumer and producer countries, and the 
independents. Apart from the fact that such an approach of strategic 
grouping has enabled us to draw a comparison between the various 
subsets of players distinguished, it has also allowed us to compare the 
strategic decision making of actors belonging to a particular category. 
Third, data have been collected and analyzed at the level of the 
individual firm. Given the central theme of the present study - the 
reshuffling process among producers engaged in the sectors under 
review resulting from variations in investment behaviour — it should 
not come as a surprise that the main part of our empirical material has 
been gathered at enterprise level. To gain insight into this reshuffling 
process, we have examined the shifts in market position of all the actors 
separately through time. The market position of the different business 
organizations involved within our sectors has been established by using 
market share as an indicator. We have employed two sources of 
quantitative information to measure the market share of individual 
companies at several moments in time, namely data concerning the 
ownership structure, and figures regarding primary distillation output 
and ethylene production of all the Western European facilities. The 
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statistics thus obtained have formed the basis for the subsequent 
selection of some producers whose strategic behaviour has been 
investigated more closely. We have chosen those 6rms which have 
already embarked on major rationalizations of their oil refining and/or 
ethylene manufacturing operations in Western Europe or, contrary to 
this, have clearly lagged behind in terms of retrenchment. By conduc-
ting an in-depth study of these companies, we have sought to 
complement the secondary analysis of quantitative data with qualita-
tive information on (dis)investment decisions collected via personal 
interviews with top managers from the department of strategy inte-
gration and (corporate) planning of the Western European headquar-
ters of several oil and chemical companies. These face-to-face inter-
views can be characterized as semi-structured and formal in the sense 
that the questions asked have had a standardized sequence and have 
been worked out beforehand and the wording has been tailored to 
each individual firm. We have done the interviews by means of a 
questionnaire which consisted primarily of open questions. Only part 
of the questionnaire-based findings has been used to buttress and 
interpret the secondary research material. The following ten compa-
nies have been prepared to participate in our research: Shell, BP, 
Petrofina, ICI, Dow, BASF, Oilinvest, Elf Atochem, ENI/Enichem 
and Total. In order to make an optimal comparison between indivi-
dual firms belonging to a particular group as far as their strategic 
behaviour is concerned, each of the five categories of producers 
discerned above should have been represented by at least two enter-
prises. For practical reasons, we had to confine ourselves to only one 
company in the case of the independents (i.e. Petrofina) and the 
state-controlled corporations from producer countries (i.e. Oilinvest). 
7.2.3 Global shifts in oil and petrochemical production 
This chapter has treated research question number one, concerning 
the recent shifts which have come about in the competitive position 
of Western Europe relative to other world regions with respect to oil 
refining (i.e. primary distillation) and basic petrochemical production 
(i.e. ethylene manufacture). It was found that North America in 
general and the United States in particular succeeded to remain the 
leader in both sectors in terms of volume of production on a worldwi-
de scale. Although North America was able to continue to dominate 
as a manufacturer of oil products as well as ethylene, its leadership was 
much reduced. The weakening of the dominance of the latter region 
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is primarily attributable to the challenge posed by South East Asia. 
Actually, both South East Asia and Western Europe ranked second 
regarding their share of total global primary distillation output by 1993 
- that is to say they were running neck and neck. As to ethylene 
manufacture, it proved that the former market area followed close on 
Western Europe's heels at the beginning of the nineties and it is likely 
to surpass the latter before the turn of the century. 
We have attempted to explain the variations in regional competitive-
ness which have governed the investment behaviour of the producers 
involved by making use of the concept of market size. The size of the 
potential market is shaped by the wealth and structure of a region or 
country as well as its absolute size. Therefore, measurement of market 
size has been obtained through multiplying the per capita GNP by the 
country's population in a particular year. Subsequendy, we have 
plotted market size against both primary distillation output and ethy-
lene production of some countries spread all over the world for 1990. 
Generally speaking, it can be said that a positive correlation exists 
between the two variables. Nevertheless, we have also seen that the 
position of some countries departs from the market size versus pro-
duction capacity trend line. This imperfect linear relationship not only 
applies to oil refining but also to ethylene manufacture. These imper-
fections bear witness to the statement made in section 7.2.1 that the 
development of the sectors studied, which is sculptured by the 
investment decisions taken by the individual producers involved, is 
not completely explainable in terms of market forces. It seems reaso-
nable to suggest that in a few cases non-commercial factors, such as 
political considerations have exerted a deviational influence on the 
interaction between demand conditions and the significance of the 
industries in volume terms. When taking a closer look at the reper-
cussions of the reorganization process on the various countries within 
Western Europe, it appears that especially France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom and Belgium have suffered the greatest 
decline in primary distillation capacity during the past decade. With 
respect to ethylene manufacture, we see that only Spain has undergone 
a significant downturn in its volume of production. Besides, it is 
noteworthy that Denmark exited from this field of operation altoge-
ther at the end of the seventies. 
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7.2.4 Structural changes in the Western European oil 
refining and basic petrochemical industry 
This chapter has dealt with research questions number two, three and 
four. Research question number two concerns the interrelationship 
which can be observed between the different stages of sectoral 
development and the market structure of a sector in general and of 
the Western European oil refining and basic petrochemical industry 
in particular. It has been established that in Western Europe the oil 
refining as well as the ethylene manufacturing sector at large have 
passed through an introduction and a growth stage, and have recendy 
reached the maturity phase. Regarding the patterns of structural 
changes of these two sectors, we have found that in the introduction 
and expansion stage, the overall level of market concentration has 
corresponded to the outcome predicted by de Jong. Indeed, it turned 
out that the high initial concentration decreased considerably during 
the expansion phases of both sectors. As opposed to this, the pattern 
for the saturation stages of the two lines ofbusiness under consideration 
was in conflict with the behaviour theoretically expected (that is, an 
increase in the degree of market concentration in the period of 
maturity). More explicidy, concentration ratios in ethylene manufac-
ture only rose modesdy from 1980 onwards, while those in oil refining 
(primary distillation) even dropped in the last fifteen years. Because of 
the non-compliance with de Jong's dynamic market model as far as 
the overall outcome of the transformation of the competitive structure 
of our sectors in the maturity stage is concerned we have sought to 
provide an explanation for the deviation noticed. The above-named 
concept of mobility barriers has been used to shed light on the 
variations in strategic choices between (groups of) companies active 
in these fields of operation since the oil crises of the 1970s, which tend 
to have led to the anomalies found. In other words, an attempt has 
been made to place the results of our aggregate analysis into perspective 
by exploring the probable deterrent effect of the various types of 
mobility barriers discerned above on the (dis)investment decisions 
made by the producers engaged in these activities. In our empirical 
investigation, we have assumed that the magnitude of the impact of 
these hindrances may have differed across the wide range of (categories 
of) players and, as a consequence, may have led to changes in their 
market position and thus to a reshuffling process recendy. 
The third research question is about the effects of the ownership 
structure of the Western European oil refining and basic petrochemical 
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facilities and recent changes in that on the level of market concentra-
tion in our sectors. To come to grips with the ownership structure of 
the oil refineries and ethylene crackers in Western Europe, we have 
mapped out all the market participants involved into five groups. As 
we have seen already, the classification of companies made has been 
as follows: the majors, the chemical companies, the government-ow-
ned companies from both consumer and producer countries and the 
independents. Analysis of the differences in investment behaviour 
between these five categories of actors and between the individual 
firms belonging to one of these groups has not remained restricted to 
oil refining and ethylene production. We have also devoted attention 
to this issue with regard to three related areas of activity, notably 
conversion (in particular the cracking process in which heavy oil 
products are broken down into lighter fractions), crude oil production 
and marketing of oil products. What attracts attention when compa-
ring the strategic decision making and the ensuing alterations in 
relative strength in the aforementioned fields of operation, is that the 
former market power of the major oil companies taken collectively 
upstream (crude oil production) as well as downstream (oil refining, 
conversion, marketing and ethylene manufacture) has been curtailed 
by public enterprises in general and those from oil consuming coun-
tries in particular. Looking a bit closer at the investment behaviour of 
the majors, it appears that in the case of the Western European refinery 
industry it has been this group which has made the greatest commit-
ment to rationalizations especially since the early eighties. Within this 
group, the restructuring crisis has taken the heaviest toll of BP. In the 
period 1980-1995 BP accounted for about 25 percent of the capacity 
reduction in Western European output of the major oil companies 
totally. In addition to BP, Mobil, Chevron, Gulf and CFP-Total have 
contributed significantly to the waning of the dominance of the group 
as a whole in this field. With regard to ethylene manufacture, the 
category of the established oil majors has almost gone as far as the 
chemical players in terms of divestiture. Particularly the American 
majors (i.e. Texaco, Chevron and Gulf) have been responsible for the 
overall decreasing share of the major oil companies. Amongst the 
chemical producers, ICI has clearly been in the lead in this respect. As 
to the remaining three lines of business (i.e. conversion, crude oil 
production and marketing), it is useful to remark that the growth rates 
of the majors at large have lagged behind those of the other groups of 
players. Relatively speaking, the traditional oil giants have experienced 
a deterioration in importance on all the five fronts reviewed. This is 
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not to say, however, that the major oil companies have lost their 
pre-eminence. Actually, with the exception of ethylene manufacture, 
it is worthwhile to note that the latter category has succeeded to 
maintain a commanding position. 
Notwithstanding this supremacy, it needs to be stressed once again 
that the majors have lost ground especially in favour of the group of 
the national oil companies from consumer countries. Backed up by 
the government in one way or another, state producers have obviously 
been able to resist retrenchment more stubbornly than other categories 
of players. On account of the fact that the strategic decision making 
of the government-sponsored corporations in general has often also 
included non-commercial considerations, restructuring has been less 
common in its occurrence among this type of actors in comparison 
with other groups of producers so far. This being so, the state-con-
trolled enterprises and primarily those from oil consuming countries 
have enjoyed an improvement in their competitiveness in oil refining 
and ethylene manufacture, amongst others. Regarding ethylene pro-
duction, it should be underscored that the national oil companies from 
consumer countries managed to surpass the chemical actors around 
1980 through which they became to head the Western European 
league table. It is noteworthy that the Italian state producer ENI 
currendy dominates in terms of ethylene capacity not only the rank 
of the government-supported firms from consumer countries, but also 
of all Western European players put together. Besides, it is important 
to mention that ENI has always been the leader in terms of primary 
distillation output as far as the state-owned companies from oil 
consuming countries are concerned. In the early nineties ENI even 
overtook BP by which it soared to the third place in the Western 
European hierarchy after Esso and Shell. 
Having said something about the variations in (dis)investment 
decisions taken by the majors and the public actors, and the shifts in 
market position which have ensued from this, we have already partially 
answered research question number four. We have found that, roug-
hly speaking, the major oil companies have been the most significant 
losers, whereas the national oil companies from consumer countries 
can be identified as the main winners. When we consider the per-
formance of the remaining three categories (i.e. the chemical compa-
nies, the state-supported corporations from oil producing countries 
and the independents), we should observe the following develop-
ments. The chemical producers in their entirety have experienced a 
considerable impairment of their relative competitiveness in Western 
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European oil refining (primary distillation) and ethylene manufacture 
since the beginning of the 1980s. Mark that the capacity reduction in 
oil refining of the chemical players was primarily carried out by 
Montedison and Veba, whereas the downturn in ethylene output has 
predominandy been the work of ICI, as we have said already. As far 
as the public players from oil-rich countries are concerned, it is worth 
emphasizing that the scale of their downstream investments has 
remained rather small until now. So far only three OPEC companies 
- Oilinvest, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) and Petróleos de 
Venezuela (Petroven) - and the Mexican public enterprise Pemex 
have invested in oil refining in Western Europe. With respect to 
Western European ethylene production, Petroven has been the sole 
producer who has been attracted into this field of operation. Given 
the fact that these sectors have barely appealed to the public enterprises 
from oil-rich countries, it seems justified to state that the fears of 
already established firms on the Western European market which 
prevailed in the early eighties for the entry of the overseas newcomers 
have proved to be groundless. Moreover, it has to be pointed out that 
the relative importance of the latter group in the various areas of 
activity analyzed stayed practically stable from about 1980 onwards. 
Switching our attention to the independent oil companies, we see that 
this category of market participants has been quite successful in 
strengthening its influence as refiners, marketers of oil products and 
manufacturers of ethylene in Western Europe by which its market 
position has improved slightly. Within this group, Petrofina, followed 
by RWE/DEA, are the front runners in oil refining as well as ethylene 
manufacture at the moment. 
Especially due to the high degree of state involvement in the lines 
of business under study the restructuring of the European oil and 
petrochemical industry and, hence, the shedding of production capa-
city has been delayed. As a result of this inertia, the oil refining and 
ethylene manufacturing sector in Western Europe find themselves 
grappling with a situation of substantial supply overhang at present. 
Although both sectors have already gone through painful adjustment 
processes, they indeed still have to cope with an adverse competitive 
environment resulting from excess capacity. This finding raises inte-
resting questions about how demand and supply can be brought into 
a more balanced relationship again and, therefore, about how the 
profitability of our industries can be restored. Let us turn finally to 
these and other key challenges which need to be overcome in the 
immediate future. 
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7.3 Issues for the future 
The outlook for enhanced profitability hinges in part on whether a 
correct anticipation of future developments will evoke the right 
economic responses. It should be recognized, however, that an 
accurate assessment of trends, on which strategic decision making is 
built, may be rather difficult to make because of the fact that many 
variables may exert an influence on these developments. 
In the final section of this book our concern is with those issues 
which are bound to have a considerable impact on the performance 
of the Western European oil refining and basic petrochemical industry 
and of (categories of) producers engaged in these lines of business in 
particular. 
The first issue worthwhile to take into account is about the world 
economic conditions. A glance back at chapter 5 which has dealt with 
the global shifts in oil and petrochemical production makes plain that 
we have found that not only North America, but also Western Europe 
have lost ground in favour of other parts of the world, such as South 
East Asia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Middle East. More 
precisely, South East Asia succeeded to overtake Western Europe in 
oil refining around the mid-1990s, whereas in the case of ethylene 
manufacture the former is likely to surpass the latter before the turn 
of the century. We have sought to explain the recent changes in the 
fortunes of individual world regions with regard to oil refining as well 
as ethylene production by employing the concept of market size. It 
has been determined that the grown involvement of the above-men-
tioned market areas (i.e. the Asian Pacific region and the Middle East) 
which finds expression in the enlargement of their productivity in both 
sectors has, to a high degree, been market-led. This means that in these 
developing economies the volume of output has largely been stepped 
up to meet rapidly growing demand. As has been pointed out in 
chapter 5, in addition to local companies which are predominandy 
state-supported or -owned, several producers operative in Western 
Europe have also been attracted into the oil refining and basic 
petrochemical industry in the emerging markets. The commitment 
made by Western European actors to the sectors under consideration 
in the latter parts of the world is likely to yield a satisfactory return on 
investment and may therefore result in an overall improvement in 
their competitiveness. Although care should be taken not to overes-
timate the opportunities or underestimate the challenges of the new 
growth markets, there is evidence that companies involved in these 
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fields of operation which have expanded their presence outside 
Western Europe generally perform better than those which have 
restricted their activities to the last-named region. Indeed, it is easy to 
appreciate that enterprises that have broadened their geographical 
scope of operation are able to counterbalance the poor performance 
of the sectors in question in a particular region where adverse market 
circumstances prevail by a more favourable performance elsewhere in 
the world. As has been brought to the fore many times in this book, 
especially refiners and ethylene manufacturers in Western Europe have 
had to cope with an unpleasant state of affairs which still needs 
remedying. 
However, this is not to say that the European consumption of oil 
products and basic chemicals has failed to show a growing trend in 
recent years. What is more, there are good reasons for supposing that 
demand will increase even further in the remaining years of this 
century, though the growth rate will be lower than in most other 
world regions. The belief that demand will continue to rise in the near 
future rests upon the forecasts of crude oil prices and economic 
growth, which can be regarded as the two main determinants behind 
the consumption of oil products and basic chemicals. When we focus 
on the former determining factor - that is, the price of crude oil - it 
appears that, roughly speaking, a period of low international oil prices 
has set in since the mid-1980s. It is not difficult to understand that 
these low oil prices, which may remain fairly moderate for a number 
of years ahead, tend to bring about an upturn in the demand for 
petroleum products and basic chemicals. Nevertheless, it is unlikely 
that demand will be allowed to run away, because national govern-
ments tend to respond to low crude oil prices in international markets 
by means of compensatory increases in taxation on petroleum products 
sold domestically. Such a behaviour is partly attributable to the fear of 
renewed dependence on oil imports of the Middle East, which still 
exists in many European countries. Switching our attention to the 
latter determinant of demand - economic growth — it turns out that 
various new developments have recendy come about which tend to 
exercise a positive influence on the consumption of the products 
studied. One of the most eye-catching changes which should be 
thought of in this context has been the breaking down of European 
trade barriers and the evolving single market. Without doubt, the 
integration process in which Europe seeks to become more outward 
looking in its approach to trade and foreign investment may enhance 
the competitive strength of European firms active in the industries 
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under review. The opening up of Europe will not only involve the 
dismantlement of hindrances to oil and chemical companies from the 
rest of the world which wish to export to and/or invest in the latter 
region. The converse will also hold good in the sense that it will create 
a better investment climate for European investors in new growth 
markets, such as Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Far 
East. True, by liberalizing Western European countries that were 
previously protected, it may be expected that these emerging markets 
will also become more open to foreign investment flows. The process 
of liberalization has not remained confined to Western Europe. This 
event is currendy taking place in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union too. It is quite conceivable that this development may encou-
rage East-West trade and result in stronger economic relationships 
between Western Europe and the countries of the former Communist 
bloc, with a favourable impact on economic growth and hence on 
demand for the products in question. Apart from liberalization and 
attempts to remove trade barriers, the anti-inflationary policies follo-
wed by the governments of many Western European countries during 
the eighties may lead to a period of sustained economic growth, along 
with an increase in the consumption of oil products and basic 
chemicals. 
Notwithstanding the fact that demand for these products is likely 
to receive a boost in the immediate future, it has to be underscored 
that the total level of production, particularly as far as Western 
European ethylene manufacture is concerned, tends to rise at a 
somewhat higher rate than the overall consumption. The consequence 
is that the present market situation in which supply exceeds demand 
may well be observed for many years to come. This implies that further 
restructuring of the oil refining and ethylene manufacturing industry 
is necessary. Indisputably, negative adaptations in the form of factory 
closures and contractions have been rife among most producers 
engaged in these sectors in the past few decades. However, it should 
be remembered that the issue of restructuring has displayed a specta-
cular diversity of involvement across the entire spectrum of market 
participants until now. Actually, a continuum of actors can be found 
which ranges from those that have behaved in a rather capitalist fashion 
to those that are state-supported or -owned. Whereas producers which 
are cast in the capitalist mould have already taken far-reaching disin-
vestment decisions based on economic criteria, their public counter-
parts have, burdened with political objectives, generally made hardly 
any moves towards the trimming of capacity. Indeed, as we have said 
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already, the resistance to retrenchment has particularly been an endu-
ring hallmark of the national oil companies. More specifically, contrary 
to other categories of players, the state producers in general have hardly 
embarked on impressive rationalizations (i.e. in the case of Western 
European oil refining) or have even increased production considerably 
sometimes in spite of losses through public sector subsidization (i.e. in 
the case of ethylene manufacture in Western Europe). For this reason, 
it seems justified to suggest that the level and speed of disinvestments 
have, to some extent, been dictated by the ownership structure of both 
sectors in Europe. 
This remark leads on to the final issue which needs to be given 
consideration here and may help to rid our industries of the problem 
of overcapacity — that is, the trend towards privatization. In essence, 
the seeds of privatization were already sown in the early 1990s. As a 
matter of fact, the privatizations, which are gripping Western Europe 
at present, are part and parcel of the process of European unification 
discussed above. Elf, Repsol and DSM can be cited as examples of 
national oil companies that have been partly privatized. In addition to 
these three enterprises, it is noteworthy that Petrogal and Helle-
nic/DEP intend to sell the majority of their shares to private share-
holders before the end of the century. It is obvious that these 
privatizations play an important role in combating the surplus capacity 
problem, because it facilitates the competitive process to reach its 
normal outcome: the exit of losers and the restoration of the profita-
bility of survivors within a reasonable period of time. It may be 
expected that a situation will be created in which strategic decisions 
will rest primarily on economic considerations rather than on political 
and social aspects, like in the case of some government-sponsored 
corporations. This being so, it is quite likely that in the foreseeable 
future the sectors reviewed will witness further capacity reductions, 
which are a prerequisite for the enhancement of the competitive 
strength of the Western European oil refining and basic petrochemical 
industry. 
In summary, then, to solve the problem of supply overhang and to 
improve the economic performance of the industries considered, 
strategy managers need to be aware that macro-economic variables 
such as demand conditions and politics (e.g. the processes of liberali-
zation and privatization), which have an impact on the competitive-
ness of our sectors, are outside the control of the individual business 
organizations involved. For example, this means that in making 
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investment decisions, they have to take into consideration the devel-
opments of the world economy - say, the size of the potential market 
for oil and petrochemical products which cannot be influenced by the 
industry at large. From a profitability point of view, it may be 
inevitable to shift the geographical focus from Western Europe to 
other parts of the world. However, apart from these macro-economic 
forces, it should be emphasized that management itself plays an 
important part in shaping and bolstering the future competitive 
position of Western Europe relative to other world regions with 
respect to oil refining and ethylene manufacture. Faced with a mature 
industry environment, which is more complex, more competitive and 
more foreign than in the past, collaboration with other Western 
European market participants will become an increasingly essential 
tool for attaining the latter objective. Further cooperation is not only 
required to scrap excess capacity and to shutter obsolete and cost-in-
efficient plants. This organizational form will also be imperative with 
a view to building infrastructure networks such as major new pipelines 
and achieving technological innovations at a faster pace. 
Despite the many challenges that still have to be coped with, we 
are convinced that there is no lack of ingenuity, talent and willingness 
among management to tackle all of them. Especially by joining forces, 
the sectors studied will soon emerge fitter and stronger from the 
present period of restructuring. We completely subscribe to the 
opinion of Jennings (1994, 6), group managing director of Shell, that 
the Western European oil refining and basic petrochemical sector are 
'sunshine' industries which are in full swing — and will remain so for 
a long time yet. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Inleiding en probleemstelling 
De verschuivingen die zich hebben voorgedaan in de concurrentie-
positie van maatschappijen die actief zijn in de West-Europese olieraf-
finage en ethyleenproductie na de oliecrisissen in de jaren zeventig 
vormen het centrale thema. De positieveranderingen zijn toe te 
schrijven aan verschillen in investeringsbeslissingen van deze bedrijven 
als reactie op de recente wijzigingen in de omvang en aard van de 
vraag naar olieproducten en chemicaliën. De voor u liggende studie 
tracht een verklaring te vinden voor het feit dat de producenten 
verschillende strategieën hebben gevolgd, hoewel ze geconfronteerd 
zijn met dezelfde ongunstige marktcondities sinds het begin van de 
jaren tachtig. Om deze verschillen in strategische acties van de 
individuele olie- en chemieconcerns te verklaren is gebruik gemaakt 
van het begrip 'mobiliteitsbarrières'. Onder mobiliteitsbarrières wor-
den de belemmeringen verstaan die de toetreding tot en de terugtrek-
king uit een bepaalde bedrijfstak bemoeilijken. Bovendien heeft dit 
begrip betrekking op drempels die tussen strategische groepen bestaan. 
Het omvat dus ook factoren die veranderingen in de concurrentiepo-
sities van bestaande ondernemingen verhinderen. Naast het concept 
'mobiliteitsbarrières' zijn de begrippen 'marktstructuur' en 'marktont-
wikkeling' gebruikt. Met marktstructuur wordt bedoeld de wijze 
waarop de markt van een bepaald product is georganiseerd. Dit begrip 
duidt op de mate van onderlinge verwevenheid van marktparticipan-
ten in een bepaalde bedrijñtak en daarmee op de mate waarin de 
fabricage van een product in handen is van een klein aantal grote 
bedrijven, de marktconcentratiegraad. In het algemeen geldt, hoe 
groter de marktconcentratie, des te geringer het aantal producenten 
op de markt en des te schever de verdeling van marktaandelen. 
Marktontwikkeling kan worden gedefinieerd als de opeenvolging van 
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verschillende marktsituaties. De marktsituatie verwijst naar het samen-
hangend geheel van vraag- en aanbodfactoren dat op een gegeven 
moment of gedurende een korte periode de toestand van de markt 
van een bepaald product uitmaakt. 
In deze studie wordt verondersteld dat de beide sectoren die 
bestudeerd zijn (de olieraffinage en de ethyleenproductie in West-
Europa) een (deel van een) levenscyclus hebben doorlopen, die uit de 
volgende fasen bestaat: een introductiefase, een expansiefase, een 
rijpheidsfase en een fase van stagnatie en zelfs teruggang. Verder is 
ervan uitgegaan dat een dynamische, wederzijdse interactie bestaat 
tussen enerzijds de levenscyclus van een product en dus de ontwik-
kelingsgang van een bedrijfstak die dit product vervaardigt en an-
derzijds de marktstructuur. Het uitgangspunt dat er een wederzijdse 
beïnvloeding is tussen de variabelen 'marktstructuur' en 'markt-
ontwikkeling' vormt de kem van de dynamische marktbenadering van 
de Jong (1985; 1989a). In het dynamische marktmodel van de Jong 
worden de wijzigingen in de marktconcentratiegraad gemeten op basis 
van productiecapaciteitsgegevens. Dit model is toegepast als ana-
lysekader om de structuurveranderingen in kaart te brengen die zich 
hebben voorgedaan in de West-Europese olieraffinage en de petro-
chemische basisindustrie. De Jong neemt het volgende patroon waar 
in termen van markt(de)concentratie: in een markteconomie onder-
vindt een groeiende bedrijfstak een vermindering in de mate van 
marktconcentratie, terwijl een stagnerende bedrijfstak een toename in 
zijn concentratiegraad vertoont. 
Doelstelling van deze studie is om te onderzoeken in hoeverre de 
systematiek welke de Jong heeft gevonden in het patroon van con-
centratie en deconcentratie in een bedrijfstak, gekoppeld aan de 
verschillende fasen van de producdevenscyclus, eveneens kan worden 
aangetroffen in de olieraffinage en de ethyleenproductie in West-
Europa. In het bijzonder is aandacht besteed aan mogelijke afwijkin-
gen van het theoretisch patroon, welke de Jong heeft geschetst in zijn 
dynamische marktmodel. Getracht is een verklaring te geven voor de 
waargenomen deviaties. Voor de verklaring van deze deviaties is het 
noodzakelijk dat niet alleen wordt gekeken naar de structuurveran-
deringen van markten op bedrijfstakniveau, zoals de Jong doet. 
Analyse dient eveneens te worden uitgevoerd op het niveau van 
individuele bedrijven. Daarbij is gebruik gemaakt van het boven-
genoemde concept 'mobiliteitsbarrières'. Dit betekent dat ofschoon 
de kerngedachte van de dynamische markttheorie van de Jong — dat 
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wil zeggen het bestaan van een wederzijdse interactie tussen de 
variabelen marktontwikkeling en marktstructuur — als belangrijkste 
uitgangspunt heeft gediend in dit onderzoek, is verondersteld dat 
mobiliteitsbarrières mogelijkerwijs invloed hebben uitgeoefend op de 
relatie tussen beide variabelen. De invloed van deze barrières kan ertoe 
hebben geleid dat het verloop van de marktstructuur in de West-
Europese olieraffinage en ethyleenproductie niet in overeenstemming 
is met de bedrijfstak-structuurveranderingen die door de Jong worden 
onderkend. 
In navolging van Porter (1980) is ervan uitgegaan dat mobiliteits-
drempels de oorzaak kunnen zijn van verschillen in (des)invester-
ingsgedrag tussen producenten en dus van recente verschuivingen in 
concurrentiekracht. Met andere woorden, aangenomen is dat deze 
barrières het herstructureringsproces hebben kunnen belemmeren en 
daarom ook wijzigingen in de positionering van bepaalde maatschap-
pijen binnen onze sectoren hebben kunnen tegenhouden. Aansluitend 
bij Willems (1991, 86) is een onderscheid gemaakt tussen intrinsieke 
en extrinsieke mobiliteitsbarrières. Intrinsieke mobiliteitsbarrières ont-
staan als gevolg van sector-specifieke structurele factoren. In de 
context van de door ons bestudeerde sectoren impliceert dit dat de 
mogelijke invloed van aspecten zoals schaalvoordelen, verticale inte-
gratie, toegang tot oliebronnen en afzetmarkten, en investeringen in 
conversie (in de olierafBnage) in beschouwing is genomen. Extrinsieke 
mobiliteitsbarrières worden gecreëerd door externe, locatie-specifieke 
condities. Hierbij gaat het om eventuele veranderingen in de marktpo-
sitie van bedrijven veroorzaakt door het optreden van de overheid. 
Door deze sector- en locatie-specifieke aspecten als mogelijke inter-
veniërende variabelen op te nemen in het dynamische marktmodel 
van de Jong, is van de veronderstelling uitgegaan dat het strategisch 
besluitvormingsproces niet louter kan worden verklaard in termen van 
marktcondities. In tegenstelling tot de Jong, is betoogd dat dit proces 
slechts gedeeltelijk wordt beïnvloed door deze condities. 
De doelstelling is vertaald in de navolgende probleemstelling: 
Welke veranderingen hebben zich voorgedaan in de mate van markt-
concentratie in de West-Europese olieratEnage en ethyleenproductie 
in hun totaliteit? 
Welke verschuivingen hebben plaatsgevonden in de concurrentiepo-
sitie van (categorieën) maatschappijen in de beide sectoren met name 
sinds de oliecrisissen van de jaren zeventig die geleid hebben tot de 
waargenomen structuurveranderingen op bedrijfstakniveau? Hoe kun-
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nen deze veranderingen worden verklaard en voornamelijk die welke 
in strijd zijn met het theoretisch patroon zoals door de Jong wordt 
weergegeven? 
Deze brede probleemstelling is uitgewerkt in een viertal onder-
zoeksvragen: 
1. Welke verschuivingen hebben zich recentelijk voorgedaan in de 
olieraffinage en de petrochemische basisindustrie op wereld-
schaal? Wat is de concurrentiepositie van West-Europa ten op-
zichte van andere wereldregio's in de olieraffinage (primaire 
destillatie) en ethyleenproductie? Wat is de oorzaak van de 
mondiale verschuivingen in deze sectoren? 
2. Welke relatie bestaat er tussen de verschillende fasen van een 
groeiproces van een bedrijfstak (de industrie-levenscyclus) en de 
marktstructuur van een sector in het algemeen, en de West-Eu-
ropese olieraffinage en petrochemische basisindustrie in het bij-
zonder? 
3. Wat zijn de consequenties van de eigendomsstructuur van de 
West-Europese olieraffinage- en ethyleenproductie-eenheden, 
en recente veranderingen daarin, voor de marktconcentratdegraad 
van onze sectoren? 
4. Welke gevolgen hebben de gekozen strategieën van de (groepen) 
individuele ondernemingen in deze sectoren voor hun concur-
rentiekracht? Wat zijn de implicaties van de (des)investeringsbe-
slissingen van de betreffende actoren voor de trend in de olieraf-
finage- en ethyleenproductiecapaciteit in West-Europa? 
Onderzoeksontwerp 
Om deze onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden is informatie verzameld 
en geanalyseerd op drie verschillende niveaus. In de eerste plaats heeft 
onderzoek plaatsgevonden op het niveau van de diverse wereldregio's. 
Het is onmogelijk om de reorganisatie in de West-Europese olieraf-
finage en ethyleenproductie volledig te begrijpen zonder kennis te 
verwerven van de recente verschuivingen op wereldschaal. Daarom 
is een vergelijking gemaakt tussen de wereldregio's op basis van hun 
trends in de productiecapaciteit in beide sectoren. 
In de tweede plaats is analyse uitgevoerd op het niveau van groepen 
maatschappijen die actief zijn in de bestudeerde sectoren op de 
West-Europese markt. Uit de probleemstelling kan worden opge-
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maakt dat we niet alleen geïnteresseerd zijn in de verschillen in 
strategisch gedrag tussen individuele producenten, maar ook tussen 
categorieën marktparticipanten. In deze studie zijn bedrijven die 
identieke strategische kenmerken vertonen, de neiging hebben dezelf-
de strategieën te volgen en onder dezelfde condities te concurreren 
vooraf geclassificeerd. Zo zijn er vijf categorieën marktparticipanten 
onderscheiden, namelijk de grote oliemaatschappijen (the major oil 
companies), de chemische maatschappijen, de staatsmaatschappijen 
van zowel olieconsumerende als olieproducerende landen en onafhan-
kelijke particuliere maatschappijen (the independents). Het indelen 
van bedrijven in strategische groepen vergemakkelijkt het vergelijken 
van de strategische besluitvorming van actoren die tot dezelfde cate-
gorie behoren. Dit brengt ons op het derde niveau waarop onderzoek 
is uitgevoerd, namelijk het niveau van individuele bedrijven. Gezien 
het centrale onderzoeksthema — de verschuivingen in de concurren-
tiepositie van maatschappijen in de West-Europese olieraffinage en 
ethyleenproductie ten gevolge van verschillen in investeringsgedrag — 
zal het geen verwondering wekken dat het merendeel van het empi-
risch materiaal is verzameld op ondernemingsniveau. Om inzicht te 
verkrijgen in de herpositionering van deze concerns zijn de wijzigin-
gen in de marktpositie welke zich hebben voorgedaan in de loop der 
jaren voor alle actoren afzonderlijk onderzocht. De marktpositie van 
de verschillende bedrijven in de beide sectoren is gemeten op basis 
van hun marktaandeel. Het marktaandeel van de individuele bedrijven 
op diverse momenten is vastgesteld door gebruik te maken van twee 
soorten kwantitatieve informatiebronnen: gegevens over de eigen-
domsstructuur en productiecapaciteitsgegevens van alle olieraffinade-
rijen (primaire destillatie) en naftakrakers in West-Europa. Op grond 
van de verzamelde informatie is vervolgens een selectie gemaakt van 
een aantal producenten waarvan het strategisch gedrag nader is bestu-
deerd. Bedrijven die uitgekozen zijn voor nader onderzoek hebben 
reeds grootscheepse rationalisaties doorgevoerd in de West-Europese 
olieraffinage en ethyleenproductie. Daarnaast zijn ondernemingen 
geselecteerd die voor wat betreft capaciteitsreductie duidelijk zijn 
achtergebleven. Met topmanagers van de afdeling Strategisch Manage-
ment werkzaam op de West-Europese hoofdkantoren van 10 maat-
schappijen zijn zogenaamde diepte-interviews afgenomen. Een deel 
van de kwalitatieve informatie die op deze wijze is verzameld is 
gebruikt om het secundair onderzoeksmateriaal aan te vullen en te 
verklaren. 
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Bevindingen 
(1) Er zijn belangrijke verschuivingen gevonden in de concurrentie-
positie van wereldregio's wat betreft de olieraffinage (d.w.z. 
primaire destillatie) en de ethyleenproductie. 
(2) Noord-Amerika en West-Europa hebben in de afgelopen jaren 
duidelijk terrein prijsgegeven aan Zuidoost-Azië. Hierbij is ge-
keken naar het marktaandeel van de regio's in de totale mondiale 
productiecapaciteit van beide sectoren. 
(3) Momenteel neemt Zuidoost-Azië de tweede plaats in qua pri-
maire destillatiecapaciteit, voor West-Europa. In de ethyleenpro-
ductie is Zuidoost-Azië 's werelds derde producent na West-Eu-
ropa, maar ze staat op het punt de laatstgenoemde regio voorbij 
te streven. 
(4) Noord-Amerika heeft haar leidende positie in de wereld in beide 
setoren gehandhaafd, hoewel haar dominantie sterk is verzwakt. 
(5) Er kan een positieve correlatie worden waargenomen tussen de 
concurrentiekracht van landen in de beide sectoren gemeten op 
basis van hun productievolume en de marktomvang. De markt-
omvang van een land is vastgesteld door het bruto nationaal 
product per hoofd van de bevolking te vermenigvuldigen met 
het inwonertal van een land in een bepaald jaar. 
(6) Het positieve verband onder (5) geldt echter niet voor alle 
onderzochte landen. Dit impliceert dat in een aantal gevallen 
niet-commerciële aspecten, zoals bijvoorbeeld politieke factoren, 
de interactie tussen enerzijds marktcondities van landen en an-
derzijds de betekenis van de beide bedrijfstakken in termen van 
productieomvang hebben verstoord. 
(7) Binnen West-Europa hebben met name Frankrijk, Italië, Neder-
land, België en Groot-Brittannië een grote afname in primaire 
destillatiecapaciteit ondervonden in het afgelopen decennium, 
terwijl in de ethyleenproductie alleen voor Spanje een belangrijke 
capaciteitsreductie valt waar te nemen. 
(8) Met het levenscyclusconcept als uitgangspunt van analyse kan 
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worden vastgesteld dat in West-Europa zowel de olieraffinage als 
de ethyleenproductie een introductiefase en een expansiefase 
hebben doorlopen, en dat ze zich momenteel in de rijpheidsfase 
bevinden. 
Wat betreft het in het dynamische marktmodel geschetste, theoreti-
sche patroon ten aanzien van markt(de)concentratie die vergeleken 
wordt met de structuurveranderingen van de West-Europese olieraf-
finage en ethyleenproductie is het volgende gebleken: 
(9) In de introductie- en de expansiefase stemt de marktconcentra-
tiegraad van de beide sectoren overeen met het patroon zoals de 
Jong heeft gevonden; de concentratiegraad die aanvankelijk hoog 
was, nam in de expansiefase flink af. In de rijpheidsfase daarente-
gen wijkt de mate van marktconcentratie af van de theoretisch 
verwachte ontwikkeling. Verondersteld wordt dat deze duidelijk 
vermindert in dit stadium. De concentratiegraad in de ethyleen-
productie in West-Europa is echter nauwelijks toegenomen sinds 
1980, terwijl deze in de olieraffinage (primaire destillatie) zelfs is 
gedaald. 
Om de waargenomen deviatie te verklaren is gekeken naar de invloed 
van de eigendomsstructuur van de West-Europese olieraffinage- en 
ethyleenproductie-eenheden, en recente veranderingen daarin, op de 
marktconcentratiegraad van onze sectoren. Daartoe zijn vijf catego-
rieën marktparticipanten onderscheiden: de grote oliemaatschappijen 
(the majors), de chemische maatschappijen, de staatsmaatschappijen 
van zowel olieconsumerende als olieproducerende landen en onafhan-
kelijke particuliere maatschappijen (the independents). Het volgende 
kan worden geconcludeerd: 
(10) De grote oliemaatschappijen (the major oil companies) hebben 
niet alleen in de olieraffinage en de ethyleenproductie, maar ook 
in de productie van ruwe olie, conversie en de marketing en 
distributie van olieproducten — activiteiten die eveneens zijn 
bestudeerd in dit onderzoek - marktaandeel ingeleverd aan de 
staatsmaatschappijen van met name olieconsumerende landen. 
(11) De grote oliemaatschappijen hebben in vergelijking tot de ove-
rige vier groepen producenten de primaire destillatiecapaciteit in 
West-Europa het sterkst verminderd sinds het begin van dejaren 
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tachtig. BP en in iets mindere mate Mobil, Chevron, Gulf en 
CFP-Total nemen de meeste desinvesteringen voor hun reke-
ning. 
(12) De chemische maatschappijen, en met name ICI, hebben de 
meeste rationalisaties doorgevoerd in de West-Europese ethy-
leenproductie. De chemische maatschappijen worden echter qua 
capaciteitsvermindering op dit terrein op korte afstand gevolgd 
door de grote oliemaatschappijen (Texaco, Chevron en Gulf in 
het bijzonder). 
(13) De staatsmaatschappijen, en met name die van olieconsumerende 
landen, zijn het minst overgegaan tot rationalisaties in de olieraf-
finage (primaire destillatie) en ethyleenproducüe in West-Europa 
tot nu toe. Gevolg hiervan is dat de marktpositie van deze groep 
producenten is verbeterd. 
(14) In de ethyleenproducüe zijn de staatsmaatschappijen van oliecon-
sumerende landen erin geslaagd de chemische maatschappijen van 
de eerste plaats te verdringen wat betreft het productievolume. 
Wordt gekeken naar de omvang van de primaire destillatiecapa-
citeit, dan kan worden vastgesteld dat de eerstgenoemde categorie 
bedrijven de tweede positie inneemt in West-Europa, na de grote 
oliemaatschappijen. Binnen de staatsmaatschappijen van oliecon-
sumerende landen bezit het Italiaanse concern ENI momenteel 
een dominante positie in beide sectoren. 
(15) Tot op heden is de omvang van de investeringen van de staats-
maatschappijen van olieproducerende landen in de olieraffinage, 
marketing en distributie van olieproducten, en de ethyleenpro-
ducüe in West-Europa beperkt gebleven. 
(16) De onafhankelijke oliemaatschappijen (the independents) hebben 
hun marktpositie in de olieraffinage, marketing en distributie van 
olieproducten, en ethyleenproducüe in West-Europa in geringe 
mate weten te versterken. Gemeten naar primaire destillatie- en 
ethyleencapaciteit is Petrofina, gevolgd door RWE/DEA, de 
belangrijkste producent. 
(17) Vooral doordat het marktaandeel van staatsmaatschappijen in het 
algemeen de laatste jaren sterk is toegenomen en dus de rol van 
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de overheid in de West-Europese olieraffinage en ethyleenpro-
ductie groter is geworden, is de overcapaciteit in de beide 
sectoren onvoldoende bestreden. Dit komt omdat het investe-
ringsgedrag van deze groep bedrijven vaak niet alleen gebaseerd 
is op economische factoren, maar ook op politieke en sociale 
aspecten. 
Beleidsaanbevelingen 
De volgende beleidsaanbevelingen worden gegeven: 
(a) De maatschappijen die actief zijn in de West-Europese olieraffi-
nage en ethyleenproductie dienen hun investeringen uit te brei-
den in gebieden buiten West-Europa met hoge groeipotenties 
voor wat betreft deze sectoren. Door geografische diversificatie 
is de kans groter dat ongunstige resultaten die in een bepaalde 
regio zijn behaald kunnen worden gecompenseerd met betere 
resultaten elders in de wereld. 
(b) De overheid dient de West-Europese olieraffinage en petroche-
mische basisindustrie verder te privatiseren. Verwacht mag wor-
den dat door privatisering de overcapaciteit in de beide sectoren 
zal verminderen, omdat verliesgevende bedrijven dan eerder 
geneigd zijn hun productie in te krimpen ofte staken. 
(c) De betreffende maatschappijen dienen meer te gaan samen-
werken met andere marktparticipanten. Op deze wijze kunnen 
inefficiënte productie-eenheden gemakkelijker worden gesloten. 
Daarnaast kunnen door samenwerking de voorzieningen op het 
gebied van infrastructuur worden verbeterd. Verder kunnen 
technologische innovaties sneller tot stand worden gebracht. 
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The changes in the market position of producers engaged in the 
oil refining and basic petrochemical industry on the Western 
European market are the central theme of this book. Analysis of 
this reshuffling process among these actors is conducted on three 
levels. First, research is carried out at the level of world regions. In 
order to understand the reorganization of oil refining and basic 
petrochemical production in Western Europe, it is necessary to 
explore the recent aggregate dynamics of these activities on a 
global scale. Second, the differences in strategic behaviour are 
examined at the level of groups of market participants, namely the 
major oil companies, the chemical companies, the state-owned 
companies from both consumer and producer countries, and the 
independents. Finally, the investment/disinvestment decisions in 
the Western European oil refining and basic petrochemical 
industry are investigated at the level of the individual firm. 
Particular emphasis is placed upon explaining why companies 
active in the sectors under study have followed different strategies, 
although they have been confronted with similar adverse market 
conditions in Western Europe during the last decades. 
